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Income inequality is a major problem in Thailand. The Thailand Twelfth National Economic and Social 
Development Plan (12th NESDP), established in 2017 covering a five-year period, highlights the 
central role of microfinance institutions (MFIs) in enabling poor individuals and households to access 
financial resources at a reasonable cost. Though MFIs play an important role in alleviating poverty in 
developing countries, to date, there is no research simultaneously investigating the impact and 
sustainability of MFIs. Prior studies do not adequately address questions about MFIs’ impact and 
sustainability. This study simultaneously evaluates MFIs’ impact and sustainability in Thailand. The 
study uses a multinomial logit model, propensity score matching (PSM), a fixed effect model with 
PSM and financial performance indexes to evaluate MFIs’ impact and sustainability. The study 
employs secondary data from Thailand’s Socioeconomic Survey (cross-sectional data from 2017 and 
panel data from 2012 and 2017), to evaluate the accessibility and impact of selected MFIs. The study 
evaluates MFIs’ sustainability using secondary data from the 2014 – 2016 annual Village Fund (VF) 
and Saving Groups for Production (SGPs) reports. These data were collected by the Government 
Savings Bank (GSB) through the 2017 MFI Competition.   
The empirical results from the multinomial logit model reveal that the VF targets low-income rural 
households. The VF also encourages older individuals with lower education levels and female 
household heads to participate in their programme. Larger households are more likely to access the 
VF. Households with higher dependency ratios are less likely to borrow from the VF. This finding 
suggests that the VF cannot help less economically active households. Well-educated, young 
household heads in regional areas are more likely to borrow money from SGPs. SGPs’ borrowers 
have higher household incomes than VF borrowers.  
PSM and a fixed effect (FE) model with PSM were used to estimate the impact of the selected MFIs. 
The PSM results show that the impact of VFs is significant on income, education and transport 
expenditure but with negative signs. These results indicate that VFs do not improve borrowers’ socio-
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economic wellbeing. The empirical results reveal that SGPs’ effects are significant for income but 
insignificant for expenditure. This indicates that SGPs borrowers effectively invest their loans in 
income-generating activities such as agricultural production and self-employment. The FE model with 
PSM results show that the VF increases education expenditure, but SGPs participation impacts 
income and transport expenditure. This indicates that SGPs improve borrowers’ income and 
encourages them to increase investment in working capital and assets. 
The results for MFIs’ performance and sustainability show that both VFs and SGPs are profitable and 
financially sustainable. The determinants that affect Thai MFI sustainability are average loan balance 
per borrower, the number of borrowers per staff member, the total assets, the debt to equity ratio, 
the operating expense ratio, and the yield on gross loan portfolios. 
 
Keywords: poverty, microfinance institutions’ impact, microfinance institutions’ sustainability, Village 
Funds, Saving Groups.  
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Over the past six decades, Thailand has been developing its economy based on national and social-
development plans. These plans have encouraged economic growth by supporting the manufacturing 
industry, with the aim of increasing exports. As a result, the Thai economy has been one of the 
fastest growing economies in the world; GDP grew 10% per year in the 1990s (Warr, 2000). Between 
1988 and 2017, the poverty rate dramatically declined from 65.17% of the population, or 34.2 million 
people, to 7.9 %, or 5.47 million people (ADB, 2019; NESDB, 2015; Warr, 2011). 
However, income inequality remains a significant problem in Thailand. The Gini index shows that 
income inequality in Thailand is the highest in Southeast Asia (Bird et al., 2011). The index changes 
between 1988 and 2017 from 0.487 to 0.365, despite a declining poverty rate over the period (WB, 
2019b). The lowest 10% of the Thai population had 3% share income whereas the highest 10% had 
28.40% (WB, 2019a). Because of statistics like this, income inequality has become a national priority. 
In a study on poverty, TDRI (2004) concludes that the major cause is low education. Because of low 
education levels, it is difficult for the poor to find jobs and improve their income. Even though half of 
the poor in Thailand reside in rural areas and work in the agricultural sector, most do not own land. A 
study by Bird et al. (2011) concludes that a key determinant of income inequality in Thailand is the 
lack of financial access to financial institutions for low-income families. Poor households cannot 
access formal financial institutions because of high transaction costs. The private sector is also 
reluctant to provide financial services to this group of clients (Bird et al., 2011). TDRI (2004) and Bird 
et al. (2011) suggest that microfinance programmes can assist in reducing income inequality. By 
providing small loans to individuals who typically do not have access to loans from formal financial 
institutions, they can invest in productive or income-generating activities. Understanding the poor 
and their background will enable the government and policy makers to develop more effective 
strategies, plans and policies to help alleviate poverty. 
Thailand’s 12th NESDP, established in 2017 to cover a five year period, shows the overall 
development vision linked to the vision of the 20-year national strategy (2017-2036). The document 
outlines the 20 year vision: “Thailand as a developed country with security, prosperity, and 
sustainability in accordance with the principles of the Sufficiency Economy Philosophy” (NESDB 2017, 
p. 5). The document states that this will be achieved through 10 core strategies. 
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 Strategy 1: Strategy of strengthening and realizing the potential of human capital 
 Strategy 2: Strategy for creating a just society and reducing inequality 
 Strategy 3: Strategy for strengthening the economy, and underpinning sustainable 
competitiveness 
 Strategy 4: Strategy for environmentally-friendly growth for sustainable development 
 Strategy 5: Strategy for reinforcing national security for the country’s progress toward 
prosperity and sustainability 
 Strategy 6: Strategy for public administration, corruption prevention, and good governance 
in Thai society 
 Strategy 7: Strategy for advancing infrastructure and logistics 
 Strategy 8: Strategy for the development of science, technology, research, and innovation 
 Strategy 9: Strategy for regional, urban, and economic zone development 
 Strategy 10: Strategy for international cooperation for development 
Significantly for this study, two of the strategies relate to financial inclusion. The strategy for creating 
a just society and reducing inequality is designed to increase the productivity of the poorest sector of 
the population (set at 40%); the lowest income, the disadvantaged, women, and the elderly. This 
strategy also supports SMEs, community and social enterprises, the development of MFIs and greater 
financial access for job-creation. All of these activities are deemed important to achieve inequality 
alleviation. 
The 12th NESDP strategy for strengthening the economy and underpinning sustainable 
competitiveness has one objective: to improve financial services access by creating a network of 
financial institutions (NESDB 2017, p. 107). MFIs enable poor individuals to access financial resources 
at a reasonable cost. 
In Thailand, the main provider of microfinance programmes for poor households is the government, 
which has supported microfinance programmes for over 30 years (Bird et al., 2011; Fongthong & 
Suriya, 2014). Before the mid-1970s, informal lenders dominated the credit market in rural areas; 
informal lenders charge high interest rates that cause farmers to be in debt and in a vicious circle of 
poverty (Aditto, 2016). The Thai government has supported farmers since 1966 through the 
government agricultural bank that lends money to farming households (Siamwalla et. al., 1990). The 
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Thai government established and operates the BAAC that grants loans to agricultural households and 
cooperatives. The BAAC’s primary aims are to provide loans with reasonable interest rates and so 
improve the clients’ quality of life (Aditto, 2016; Menkhoff & Rungruxsirivorn, 2011). In 1975, the 
Bank of Thailand (BOT) sent a memorandum to all commercial banks requesting each bank to lend to 
agricultural households at least 5% of total of their loans (Siamwalla et. al., 1990). The Thai 
government successfully requested all commercial banks to increase agricultural loans and to offer 
these loans at low interest rates (Aditto, 2016; Yostrakul, 2018). This policy has enabled Thai rural 
households to participate in the formal credit system since the 1980s (Aditto, 2016; Yostrakul, 2018). 
Over 90% of rural households participated in some type of financial service (savings, loans from 
either formal or informal sources) (Bird et al., 2011). However, Thai rural households still rely heavily 
on informal credit sources (Yostrakul, 2018). 
Many poor Thai households still depend on informal lenders because they lack collateral or have 
established patronage with informal lenders (Jitsuchon, 1989; Yostrakul, 2018). As Siamwalla et al. 
(1990) note, the poorest households cannot access formal rural finance because they present a high 
credit risk. The groups that benefit most from formal finance are middle-income households and the 
rich. As Bird et al. (2011) note, low-income Thai households have access to a limited range of 
financial services. 
For the 12th NESDP strategy of creating a just society and reducing inequality and the strategy for 
strengthening the economy and underpinning sustainable competitiveness, MFIs play a vital role to 
help poor households access financial services. The following section provides an overview of Thai 
MFIs. 
1.2 Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) in Thailand 
MFIs in Thailand can be divided into three main groups (Bird et al., 2011). The first group covers 
formal MFIs, banks and nonbanking institutions that are controlled by prudential regulations. The 
MFIs in this group include commercial banks and SFIs. Two SFIs play an important role in providing 
financial access for low-income households: the BAAC and the Government Savings Bank (GSB) 
(Aditto, 2016). BAAC is a state-owned bank with a mission to grant loans to farmers and farmer 
associations in rural areas. BAAC also encourages farmers to save using a mobilization campaign for 
rural farmers. This product encourages rural households to increase their savings and develop 
greater financial responsibility. Similarly, GSB’s core mission is to encourage Thai people to save. GSB 
grants loans to grassroots clients through the GSB loan projects, e.g., the People Bank Loan and the 
Rural Community Development Loan. 
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The second group consists of semi-formal MFIs that are not controlled by prudential regulations. 
However, they still have legal status (Tambunlertchai, 2015). The second group includes 
cooperatives, Saving Groups for Production (SGPs) and Village Funds (VFs). Cooperatives consist of a 
group of individuals with the same occupation and/or live in the same area. Members pool their 
resources to help each other (Tambunlertchai, 2015). Cooperatives offer members deposit and credit 
services. The primary aim of cooperatives is to improve the members’ quality of life (Aditto, 2016). 
Members purchase shares in the cooperatives. Thai cooperatives have exhibited significant growth in 
terms of members, increasing from 10,329,036 persons in 2009 to 11,636,166 in 2018 (CPD 2019). 
These institutions operate under the Cooperative Act 1968 and are supervised by the CPD and CAD 
(Aditto, 2016). SGPs have two important aims: to develop sustainable human capital and solve 
members’ lack of credit access in rural areas (Aditto, 2016). SGPs are member-based rural 
community financial institutions established with the support of the CDD of the Ministry of Interior 
(MOI) (Tambunlertchai, 2015). VFs were introduced to the Thai rural financial system by the Thai 
government in 2001; VFs are community-based. The programme operates under the supervision of 
the NVFO. The NVFO is responsible for developing and implementing various policies, rules and 
regulations (Aditto, 2016; Tambunlertchai, 2015). 
The third group covers informal MFIs that are not established or covered by government legislation. 
This group is smaller than the formal and semi-formal groups. They are often savings groups run at a 
village level (Bird et al., 2011; Tambunlertchai, 2015). Such savings groups are typically founded by 
community members who establish the groups to save, provide welfare benefits and lend money to 
members. After saving money for a defined period (it varies between groups), members can borrow 
from the group funds for hospitalization, funeral or educational expenses. Funds can also be used for 
community development. These groups are informal, so it is difficult to track the total members and 
the total amount of members’ funds (Meagher, 2013). 
Studies have shown that, in Thailand, most low income and poor people can access financial services 
from community-based MFIs, such as VFs, cooperatives, and SGPs (Microfinance Services Ltd., 2013; 
Tambunlertchai, 2015). Microfinance Services Ltd. (2013) reveals that over 50% of VF borrowers and 
40% of SGPs borrowers have average incomes of less than THB 6,000 per month. Therefore, these 
Thai MFIs are important in encouraging the poor to participate in financial services, which can 
ultimately help them escape poverty. This study focuses on VFs and SGPs. 
Village Funds (VFs) 
The VF programme, the largest government microfinance programme in Thailand, was launched by 
the government in 2001. The Thai government provided THB 1 million (about USD 22,500 at a 2001 
average exchange rate of USD 1 = THB 44.5) per village to over 77,000 villages and urban 
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communities across the country (Fongthong & Suriya, 2014). After the general election in 2011, the 
government increased funding to this programme to THB 2 million (about USD 65,800 at a 2011 
average exchange rate of USD 1 = THB 30.4) per village. This programme is important in the credit 
market in Thailand, especially for the poor who live in rural areas and are often unable to access 
formal financial services (Fongthong & Suriya, 2014). 
The VF has four official objectives (The National Village and Urban Community Fund Act, 2003). First, 
the programme provides loans for investment, job creation, income generation, welfare 
improvement and expense reduction. Secondly, it provides emergency funds, a form of non-
productive credit. These loans are small and have maturity dates of less than one year. Thirdly, it may 
supply loans to other VFs for economic and social strengthening. This programme aims to develop 
the rural economy. 
The National Village and Urban Community Fund Act established the VFs’ guidelines. People cannot 
borrow up to THB 30,000. In some cases, loans were extended to THB 75,000 if borrowers met a 
higher standard of creditworthiness. Emergency loans are limited to THB 15,000. The interest rate 
must not exceed 15% per year. A borrower must have two guarantors and repay the loan within two 
years. 
The VF is administered at two levels: nationally and at the village level. The National Committee of 
the Central Government oversees VFs at the national level. There are 76 provincial and 928 district 
sub-committees. The village level committees have 9-15 members elected from villagers who have 
lived in the village for at least two years. At least half of the committee members must be women. 
The committees set the rules and manage the funds. The local committees also decide which loans to 
grant and how much money is lent to borrowers (Fongthong & Suriya, 2014). 
Saving Groups for Production (SGPs) 
SGPs were established in 1974 by community leaders to encourage members to save. The SGPs’ idea 
is to gather people of different status in a village to help each other solve their investment problems 
(Luxchaigul, 2014).The local people regularly save money in a cash pool. Saving is the best way for 
funds’ accumulation (Luxchaigul, 2014). SGPs’ economic activities begin with saving for welfare 
provision and loans. Borrowers obtain loans to invest in their businesses (Luxchaigul, 2014). SGPs 
also provide loans to improve members’ lives and to deal with emergencies. Borrowers must have 
four guarantors and pay a maximum interest rate of 15%. SGPs play an important role in providing 
microfinance services to the poor (Meagher, 2013). SGPs can create rural financial markets using a 
bottom-up approach (Akihiko, 2015). 
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SGPs as community-based financial institutions have been established in all Thailand’s regions. SGPs 
are supported by the CDD of the MOI. CDD sets the loan guidelines and evaluates SGPs’ reports. SGPs 
are not controlled by prudential regulations but are assessed by CDD via financial institution 
indicators. In 2012, there were 26,819 SGPs, with 3.6 million members and THB 36.9 billion in 
savings. The repayment rate is high, approximately 99% (Meagher, 2013). 
1.3 Research Problem 
MFIs are important in alleviating poverty in developing countries. Policymakers are interested in the 
role of microfinance programmes but there are no studies that have evaluated the impact and 
sustainability of MFIs in the same study. The studies answered two questions: 
(1) Does microfinance impact on the borrower’s social and economic welfare? 
(2) Is the microfinance institution sustainable? 
The first answer can be used to develop microfinance programmes as an instrument to alleviate 
poverty. The second answer should show strong evidence of the determinants the affect MFIs’ 
sustainability. There is no research that simultaneously investigates both the impact and 
sustainability of MFIs. Hermes, Lensink and Meesters (2008) conclude that many questions about 
MFIs’ impact and sustainability are not adequately answered. 
1.4 Research Questions 
The aim of this study is to simultaneously evaluate MFIs impact and sustainability in Thailand. The 
research questions are: 
(1) What are the determinants of households’ credit participation in microfinance programmes 
in Thailand? 
(2) How do microfinance programmes affect the economic and social welfare of households in 
Thailand? 
(3) How well do MFIs in Thailand perform? 
(4) What are the determinants that impact the sustainability of MFIs in Thailand? 
1.5 Research Objectives 
The first objective explores the determinants of households’ credit participation in Thailand. There 
many studies on this issue, but no specific study has addressed the factors that impact credit 
participation in Thailand at the village level. This can be done by comparing the determinants of 
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credit participation of VFs and SGPs. A VF is a microfinance programme established by the 
government whereas SGPs are semi-formal MFIs established by village leaders. Fongthong and Suriya 
(2014) investigate only the determinants of borrowers from the VF. Menkhoff and Rungruxsirivorn 
(2011) find that VF can improve access to finance for the poor compared with other financial 
institutions. Therefore, it is important to develop microfinance programmes that are targeted 
specifically at the poor. 
The second objective is to investigate the impact of microfinance programmes on the economic and 
social welfare of households in Thailand. It is important to understand the impact of microfinance 
programmes because the results are crucial towards developing effective microfinance products and 
services that can help reduce poverty problems (Cintina & Love, 2014; Hermes & Meesters, 2011). 
Some studies have focussed on the impact of microfinance programmes in Thailand, especially at the 
village level. Kaboski and Townsend (2012) and Boonperm, Haughton and Khandker (2013) 
investigated VFs’ impact on rural households’ economic welfare. There are no studies that examine 
the VFs impact on households at both at an economic and social welfare level. Only Coleman (1999) 
examines the impact of village banks in northeast Thailand on both economic and social welfare. 
Coleman (1999) uses a quasi-experimental design to measure the impact and finds that there is an 
insignificant impact on a set of outcomes such as savings, expenditure and physical assets. However, 
there is a significant negative impact on expenditure on men’s health care and a significant positive 
impact on women’s high-interest debt. 
The third objective evaluates VFs’ and SGPs’ financial performance to determine how well MFIs are 
doing financially and how to improve the institutions’ future performances. This objective’s result 
benefits MFIs internal management (Ledgerwood, 1998). Ledgerwood (1998) presents six indicators 
to evaluate MFIs’ financial performance and outreach. These indicators are usually in the form of 
financial ratios that compare MFIs’ performance over time and are analysed by trend analysis. For 
example, Agarwal and Sinha (2010), Arthur et al. (2013), and Bhuiyan et al. (2011) examine the 
financial performance of MFIs. Agarwal and Sinha (2010) analyse MFIs’ financial performance in India 
using six parameters of financial performance: financial structure, revenue, expense, efficiency, 
productivity and risk. The study finds that MFIs that performed well in India use a business model. 
Bhuiyan et al. (2011) compare the performance of MFIs in Malaysia and Bangladesh in terms of 
institutional characteristics, financial structure, outreach indicators, overall financial performance 
(sustainability), expenses, efficiency, and productivity. They show that MFIs’ performance in Malaysia 
is better than in Bangladesh in terms of operational self-sufficiency, earnings and expenses. 
However, performance is lower in terms of outreach and efficiency. Arthur et al. (2013) evaluate 
MFIs’ performance using financial performance indicators such as financial sustainability, profitability 
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and market share, and portfolio management, like Ledgerwood (1998). They find that MFIs’ financial 
performance in Uganda is strong and profitable. However, they also recommend that these MFIs 
should enhance their financial reporting framework to improve their liquidity, asset values, market 
share, financial sustainability and portfolio quality. Study of MFIs in Thailand is limited (Eur-U-Sa, 
2011). Eur-U-Sa (2011) investigates BAAC’s performance and outreach. The author determines the 
relationship between outreach and financial performance using secondary data from BAAC annual 
reports from 2004 to 2009 and finds that the breadth of outreach indicators have complementary 
relationships with financial performance and financial sustainability. 
The fourth objective investigates the determinants that affect MFIs’ sustainability. Scholars are 
concerned about the sustainability of MFIs. Schreiner (2000) suggests that MFIs might help poor 
people but, in the future, they will not be able to help the poor because the institutions must achieve 
a good financial performance to be sustainable. Kinde (2012) argues that financial sustainability is the 
major condition for MFIs’ sustainability in Ethiopia. The author finds that MFI sustainability is 
affected by the breadth and depth of outreach, the dependency ratio and the cost per borrower. 
Some MFIs in Thailand are government-funded. These institutions do not focus on profit-making 
(Hermes & Lensink, 2011). Individuals who obtain loans from these government-funded MFIs believe 
that these programmes will always be publicly, financially supported. Thus, they do not actively 
commit themselves to paying back the loans (Armendariz de Aghion & Morduch, 2004). This results 
in moral hazard behaviour and damages MFIs’ long term sustainability in Thailand. 
Unlike other countries, many Thai MFIs were established by groups of individuals (often living in the 
same community or village) on a voluntary basis. These include Savings Groups and Sajja Savings 
groups. These MFIs are funded and managed by community leaders and these MFIs’ survival appears 
to depend entirely on their leaders. If the leaders cannot maintain their position in the community or 
they are no longer involved in the MFI, these MFIs may not survive (TDRI, 2004). The MFI 
sustainability results are important for policymakers. Moreover, the results can be used to improve 
MFIs’ productivity, reduce donor funds, decrease operational costs and generate financial revenue 
(Rahman & Mazlan, 2014). 
1.6 Significance of the Study 
This study contribute to the development of the microfinance sector in Thailand. Studies have shown 
that in Thailand, most low income and poor households can access financial services from 
community-based MFIs, such as VFs and SGPs (Microfinance Services Ltd., 2013; Tambunlertchai, 
2015). However, no study has evaluated the impacts and sustainability of community-based Thai 
MFIs simultaneously. This study focuses on the Village Funds and Saving Groups for Production. 
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While VF microfinance programmes are established by the government, SGPs are semi-formal MFIs 
established by village leaders. It is important to understand the impacts and sustainability of VFs and 
SGPs simultaneously because these results will provide a better landscape of MFIs in Thailand. 
Furthermore, understanding the impact and sustainability of MFIs will help policymakers create 
appropriate policies on microfinance products and services and MFI performance. Developing 
effective microfinance products and services will help reduce the country’s poverty. In addition, 
policymakers can use the study’s results to improve MFIs productivity, reduce donor funds, decrease 
operational costs and generate financial revenue. 
This study found that VFs and SGPs are major credit sources in Thailand rural credit market. These 
programmes enable low-income households to access multiple sources of credit which ultimately 
leads to high levels of debts. The government should provide training courses on financial 
management and financial literacy to help households struggling with financial issues. In terms of 
MFI sustainability, this study found that both VFs and SGPs are sustainable. MFI sustainability is 
affected by staff member productivity and operating expenses. The government should encourage 
MFIs to use advanced technology to minimise their transaction costs and should create legislation 
that can help MFIs access long-term debt to improve their performance. 
1.7 Data and Data Analysis Methods 
1.7.1 Data Collection 
This study uses cross-sectional data (2017) and panel data from the Socioeconomic Survey (SES) 
(2012 and 2017) to evaluate the accessibility and impact of VFs and SGPs on Thai households. Cross-
sectional data are from the SES Survey (2017) collected by the National Statistical Office of the 
Ministry of Information and Communication Technology. The Office interviewed 43,210 households 
(both borrowers and non-borrowers) across the country. Data were collected monthly. The 
information includes a variety of household socioeconomic data, including household income, 
expenses, assets, and liabilities. 
Panel data from the SES surveys in 2012 and 2017, were collected by the National Statistical Office of 
the Ministry of Information and Communication Technology. In the 2017 survey, 4,461 households 
across the country were sampled. Data were collected monthly. The information includes a variety of 
household socioeconomic data, such as household income, expenses, assets, and liabilities. The 2012 
survey used the same questionnaire but covered 6,080 households. The sample used in this study 
includes 4,406 households (both borrowers and non-borrowers) from across the country. 
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To evaluate VFs’ and SGPs’ performance, secondary data were collected from the annual reports 
from 2014 to 2016. The annual reports include general VFs and SGPs information and financial 
statements. The annual reports provide information about the number of members, the number of 
active borrowers, the total value of loans, the revenue, expenses, profits and losses, assets, liabilities 
and equities. This study uses the annual VFs and SGPs reports from 2014 to 2016 to achieve 
objectives 3 and 4. 
1.7.2 Scope of the Study 
This present study focuses on semi-formal MFIs at the village level in Thailand because most low 
income, poor people in Thailand can access financial services from community-based MFIs, such as 
VFs, cooperatives and saving groups (Microfinance Services Ltd., 2013; Tambunlertchai, 2015). In 
Thailand, semi-formal MFIs play an important role in providing financial services to the poor. Such 
financial services can help them escape poverty. This study focuses on the VFs and SGPs. VFs are 
supported by the GSB. The GSB is a government bank that finances VFs. SGPs are supported by the 
CDD. The CDD is a government department that supports SGPs in all Thailand’s districts. 
1.7.3 Methods and Estimation Procedures 
Four main methods are used to answer this study’s research questions. First, the multinomial logit 
model is used to determine household characteristics that affect participation in microfinance 
programmes. Secondly, Propensity Score Matching (PSM) and the fixed effect model are used to 
examine the impact of microfinance programmes. These methods can be used to resolve selection 
bias problems (Carreras, 2012). Thirdly, the study examines MFIs’ performance using financial ratios 
analysis techniques. These ratios explain financial structure and financial performance. Finally, the 
panel regression technique, which involves pooling observations on a cross-section of units over 
several time periods, is used to investigate the determinants that affect MFIs’ sustainability. This 
study uses panel regression because this model can address a broader range of issues and tackle 
more complex problems (Kinde, 2012). Panel data combine cross-sectional data and time series data. 
This technique can increase the degrees of freedom and, therefore, the power of the test (Kinde, 
2012). The model is used to solve multicollinearity problems among the independent variables that 
can arise if one uses a time series model alone (Kinde, 2012). 
1.8 Structure of the Thesis 
The rest of the thesis is organized into six chapters. Chapter 2 presents an overview of literature on 
the determinants of microfinance participation, the impact of microfinance on economic and social 
welfare, and MFIs’ performance and sustainability. Chapter 3 describes the research methodology 
and data collection methods. The results are discussed over two chapters. Chapter 4 focuses on the 
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determinants that affect household participation in microfinance programmes. This chapter also 
evaluates VFs’ and SGPs’ impact on economic and social welfare. Chapter 5 assesses VFs’ and SGPs’ 
performance and investigates the factors that affect MFIs’ sustainability. Finally, Chapter 6 
summarizes the research findings, discusses the study’s limitations, provides policy 




This chapter addresses four areas of microfinance literature and is divided into six sections. Section 
2.1 reviews the literature on credit markets and the problem of asymmetric information, the theory 
of credit rationing and the household demand for credit in credit markets. Section 2.2 summarizes 
the literature on microfinance participation, including the determinants of and models for 
participation in microfinance programmes. Section 2.3 discusses the impact of microfinance 
evaluation, including the impact evaluation methodologies. Section 2.4 analyses MFIs’ performance, 
including performance proxies. Section 2.5 reviews the MFIs’ sustainability, including the 
determinants and models for sustainability. Finally, section 2.6 summarizes the chapter. 
2.1 Credit Markets and the Problem of Asymmetric Information; Credit 
Rationing and Household Demand for Credit in Credit Markets 
2.1.1 Credit Markets and the Problem of Asymmetric Information 
The market for lemons, or a market with asymmetric information characteristics, leads to market 
failure (Akerlof, 1970). Akerlof’s (1970) study on the market for lemons shows that one side of the 
transaction has more information than the other. The market for lemons symbolizes the theory of 
asymmetric information. Applied to the credit market, this theory suggests that borrowers know 
more than lenders about the probability of success of their projects or investments. In short, lenders 
cannot differentiate between safe and risky borrowers because they do not have enough 
information. Asymmetric information flow leads to problems of adverse selection and moral hazard 
(Mishkin, 2004). These issues are key concerns for any lenders. 
The adverse selection problem arises because borrowers withhold vital information (Quach, 2005; 
Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981). This problem occurs during screening, which involves differentiating between 
safe and risky borrowers. In screening, lenders need to differentiate between good and bad 
borrowers; lenders do not know the probability of success of the borrowers’ projects or investments. 
Lenders may reject safe applicants but grant loans to risky applicants (the adverse selection effect) 
(Quach, 2005; Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981). In this process, the transaction cost involves differentiating 
borrowers using the borrowing costs or the interest rate. If lenders increase interest rates to 
compensate for high transaction costs, this increase may eliminate good borrowers from the pool of 
potential borrowers. Hence, only risky borrowers remain (Quach, 2005; Phan, 2012). 
 13 
The moral hazard occurs when lenders grant loans to borrowers. In turn, borrowers may alter their 
projects or investments, which alters the probability of repayment. Thus borrowers alter the lenders’ 
expected returns (the moral hazard effect) (Quach, 2005; Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981). The moral hazard 
relates to monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, where borrowers decide not to repay their 
loans because they know that the lenders share part of the risk (Pham & Lensink, 2007). If the loan 
contract cannot enforce borrowers to repay loans, borrowers may refuse to pay back their loans. 
Moral hazard theory assumes that borrowers intend to repay loans when they have the means to do 
so (Ghosh, Mookherjee & Ray, 2000). 
Lenders not only decide to whom to grant credit but also how much, based on the information that 
they obtain from borrowers. However, asymmetric information discourages lenders from granting 
loans to all applicants or asymmetric information induces lenders to grant loans to risky borrowers. 
In short, lenders invest in risky projects (Quach, 2005; Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981). This is known as credit 
rationing and leads to credit constraints for borrowers, regardless of their individual repayment 
capability (Armendariz de Aghion & Morduch, 2005). 
2.1.2 Credit Rationing 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) state that there are two underlying assumptions underpinning credit 
rationing. First, banks (or lenders) cannot differentiate between safe and risky borrowers. Second, 
lenders cannot enforce loan repayments. For example, if an investment’s or project’s returns are less 
than the debt obligations, borrowers may choose not to repay (regardless of their returns, i.e., they 
have enough money to do so) by realizing that the bank cannot enforce the contract. This is the 
problem of contract enforcement (Ghosh et al., 2000). 
A Model of Credit Rationing 
A simple ex-ante asymmetric information model is used to illustrate how credit rationing happens in 
credit markets. This model assumes that there are two agents in the credit market; households and 
lenders. Each household is assumed to be a borrower. The borrower has an opportunity to invest in a 
project to generate income but lacks capital. This model also assumes that the borrower’s initial 
wealth is only in the form of labour which they trade in the labour market. The borrower, therefore, 
looks for credit facilities. The lender grants loans with the expectation of making a profit. This model 
assumes that the credit market is characterised by asymmetric information (Quach, 2005; Stiglitz & 
Weiss, 1981). 
This study follows Stiglitz and Weiss’ (1981) assumption that projects or investments have an 
expected return (𝜇𝑖), but different probabilities of success (𝜌𝑖). A borrower’s decision is based on a 





), respectively. The lender offers the same contract with an interest rate (r) and a 
loan (B) to all borrowers, with the same expected project or investment return. 
The return of successful projects is assumed to be greater than (1+r)B, which is the repayment to the 
lender. The return of a failed project is assumed to be lower than (1+r)B. A project or investment is 
launched if the expected return, in the case of success, is greater than the opportunity cost, W, which 
is the initial wealth of the individual borrower. Therefore, the expected project return for an 
individual borrower can be illustrated as (Phan, 2012; Quach, 2005; Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981): 
𝜇𝑖 = 𝜌𝑖𝜇𝑖
𝑠 + (1 − 𝜌𝑖)𝜇𝑖
𝑓
         (2.1) 
𝜋(𝜌𝑖 , 𝑟) =  𝜌𝑖[𝜇𝑖
𝑠 − (1 + 𝑟)𝐵] ≥  𝑊𝑖        (2.2) 
Adding equation (2.1) to equation (2.2), we obtain (Phan, 2012; Quach, 2005; Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981): 




− (1 + 𝑟)𝐵] ≥  𝑊𝑖       (2.3) 






− (1 + 𝑟)𝐵 < 0         (2.4) 
In the case of failure (𝜇𝑖
𝑓
), the expected return is less than the expected return in the case of success 
(𝜇𝑖
𝑠), and the repayment to the lender (1 + 𝑟)𝐵. Equation (2.4) implies that the expected return to 
the borrower is a decreasing function of the probability of success 𝜌𝑖. Therefore, at a certain interest 
rate, the least risky projects or investments have a lower break-even point and the riskiest projects 
or investments have a higher break-even point (Phan, 2012; Quach, 2005; Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981). 
Considering the relationship between the interest rate and the probability of success, differentiating 
r with respect to 𝜌𝑖 in equation (2.4), using the implicit function theorem, we obtain (Phan, 2012; 






< 0          (2.5) 
Equation (2.5) shows that 𝜕𝜋(𝜌𝑖 , 𝑟)/𝜕𝜌𝑖  < 0 and 𝜕𝜋(𝜌𝑖 , 𝑟)/𝜕𝑟 < 0. The equation implies that an 
increase in the interest rate (charged by the lender) leads to a decrease in the probability of success 
of a project or investment. This means that if a lender increases the interest rate, marginal borrowers 
may withdraw and, thus, only risky borrowers remain in the credit market. In short, borrowers seek 
projects or investments that provide higher returns but have lower success rates. This effect is 
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Figure 2.1 The Expected Returns for Borrowers and the Probability of Success. 
Source: Adapted from Quach (2005) 
Figure 2.1 illustrates the effect of a change in interest rate on a borrower’s expected return and the 
effect of an increase in opportunity costs. The line A-B in equation (2.3) depicts a borrower’s 
expected return when the probability of success varies; 𝜌𝑖
𝑚 shows the probability of success for 
marginal borrowers. Failed projects exhibit negative returns, as shown in equation (2.4), 𝜇𝑖
𝑓
−
(1 + 𝑟)𝐵 < 0, thus, if the interest rate (r) is increased, borrowers’ expected returns will move from 
A-B to A-B’. Marginal borrowers’ expected returns are lower than their opportunity costs. Therefore, 
marginal borrowers drop out of the credit market. New marginal borrowers now confront the 
probability of success, 𝜌𝑖
𝑚′, which is lower than 𝜌𝑖
𝑚. This implies that there are more risky borrowers 
in the pool. In the same way, if the opportunity cost increases from C-D to C’-D’, the result is the 
same effect (Phan, 2012; Quach, 2005; Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981). 
The lender always expects to receive full repayment (1+r)B with a successful project and receive 𝜇𝑖 
𝑓
 
for a failed project. The expected return to the lender can be written as follows (Phan, 2012; Quach, 
2005; Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981): 
𝜅(𝜌𝑖, 𝑟) = 𝜌𝑖(1 + 𝑟)𝐵 + (1 − 𝜌𝑖)𝜇𝑖
𝑓




     (2.6) 
Differentiating equation (2.6) with respect to 𝜌𝑖, (Phan, 2012; Quach, 2005; Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981): 
𝜕𝜅(𝜌𝑖,𝑟)
𝜕𝜌𝑖
= (1 + 𝑟)𝐵 − 𝜇𝑖
𝑓
         (2.7) 
Borrowers with 𝛒𝐢 ɛ (𝛒𝐢
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The term (1 + 𝑟)𝐵 − 𝜇𝑖
𝑓
> 0, in equation (2.7) implies that the expected bank returns are a function 
of the probability of the success of a programme or investment. Interest rates affect the lender in 
two ways. First, an increased interest rate leads to an increase in (1 + 𝑟)𝐵 − 𝜇𝑖
𝑓
. In short, an 
increased interest rate refers to an increase in interest income. Secondly, increasing interest rates 
leads to a decrease in 𝜌𝑖. As equation (2.5) shows, when the interest rate increases, lenders receive a 
lower expected return because lower-risk borrowers drop out of the credit market (Phan, 2012; 
Quach, 2005; Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981). 
Hence, there is a critical equilibrium interest rate (𝑟𝑟𝑎) where, if the interest rate r is lower than the 
equilibrium interest rate (𝑟𝑟𝑎), the lender can increase interest rates. This practice does not affect 
lower-risk borrowers or cause them to drop out of the credit market (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981). As a 
result, lenders’ expected return increases. If the interest rate increases beyond the equilibrium 
interest rate (𝑟𝑟𝑎), low risk borrowers drop out, leading to increased numbers of risky borrowers in 
the credit market. As a result, lenders’ expected return decreases. Lenders then prefer to allocate 
credit at 𝑟𝑟𝑎. However, this leads to the problem of underinvestment (Phan, 2012; Quach, 2005; 
Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981). 
Figure 2.2 shows the relationship between the lenders’ expected returns and credit rationing, based 
on demand and supply curves, and the credit market interest rate. The upper right part of Figure 2.2 
illustrates the critical interest rate, 𝑟𝑟𝑎, which is a lender’s highest expected return. Therefore, if at 
𝑟𝑖, the loan supply equals the loan demand, no credit rationing occurs. In fact, at this point, the 
demand for credit is higher than the loan supply. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) state that it is better for 
lenders to ration credit (rather than increase the interest rate) to solve excess demand for credit 
because, if the interest rate increases, low risk borrowers drop out leading to an increased number of 










Figure 2.2 Lender Returns and Credit Rationing 
Source: Adapted from Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) 
There are two types of credit rationing; internal credit rationing and external credit rationing (Phan, 
2012). The first is associated with the demand for credit. It refers to a borrower’s acts of self-
rationing (asking for the smallest possible loan). In other words, borrowers assess the risks 
themselves. Internal credit rationing is a function of a borrower’s risk aversion, business and finance 
risk levels, and a project’s specific forms of risk management (Barry et al., 1995). The perceived risks 
may change over time because of changes in assets, experience and household characteristics (Barry 
et al., 1995). 
The second, external credit rationing, is related to the supply side of credit and refers to lenders’ 
decisions about whether to grant the total amount requested by borrowers (Barry et al., 1995). 
Lenders use creditworthiness criteria to determine whether to grant the full amount. Collateral can 
reveal a borrower’s creditworthiness and lenders ask for collateral to overcome problems associated 
with adverse selection with ex-ante loan contracts (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981). In short, collateral 
reduces external rationing levels. There are loan contracts with different levels of credit rationing: 
complete, part, or no credit rationing. In other words, because of their lack of collateral, loan 
applicants are offered credit based on their collateral. 
External credit rationing is also influenced by the lender’s characteristics, the lender’s legal structure 
and the regulatory environment operating (Barry et al., 1995). Credit constraints can be decreased by 
reducing the lender’s transaction costs. In other words, credit participation can be improved by 
enhancing investment in physical infrastructure (roads, bridges, public transports and 
communication, in rural areas) and institutional infrastructure before launching financial services in 
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Supply of credit 
Demand for credit 
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the credit market (Phan, 2012). Generally, external credit rationing is described as credit constraint in 
various economic models. The next section discusses the use of external credit rationing as one form 
of credit constraint on household credit demand. The theory explains credit participation in this 
study. 
2.1.3 Household Demand for Credit 
This study derives the household demand for credit. We assume that households desire to maximize 
their satisfaction levels via consumption under the underinvestment of credit rationing as discussed 
above. Household consumption can be explained using the standard Ramsey model (Phan, 2012). 
This model shows that the 𝑖𝑡ℎ  household chooses a stochastic consumption plan to maximize the 
expected value of the lifetime utility function. This study also demonstrates that borrowing increases 
a household’s consumption over time via increasing output under credit constraints. 
A household’s production function consists of labour (L) and own capital (K). This function assumes a 
constant return to scale. Following credit constraint, it leads to diminishing returns on private capital. 
Private capital cannot be mobilized perfectly between households. The general production function 
is (Phan, 2012; Turnovsky & García-Pen᷉alosa, 2008): 
𝑌 = 𝐹(𝐾, 𝐿)           (2.8) 
Where: Y is Output; K is Capital and L is Labour. 
Following the assumption of a constant return to scale, this study uses the intensive form of the 
production function (Romer, 2001). Setting constant 
1
𝐿
 in equation (2.8), the production function can 
be expressed as (Romer, 2001): 
𝑌 = 𝐹(𝐾/𝐿, 𝐿/𝐿)  










 is the amount of capital per unit of labour and 
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, we can rewrite equation (2.9) in per capita terms as the average product of 
capital (Phan, 2012; Romer, 2001): 
𝐴𝑃𝑘 = 𝑦 =  𝜙(𝑘)         (2.10) 




′ =  𝜙′(𝑘)          (2.11) 
Equation (2.11) possesses the following properties (Phan, 2012; Romer, 2001): 
𝜙′(𝑘) > 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜙′′(𝑘) < 0 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑘 > 0      (2.12) 
And 𝑙𝑖𝑚
𝑘→∞
𝜙′(𝑘) = 0 and 𝑙𝑖𝑚
𝑘→0
𝜙′(𝑘) = ∞ 
Assuming the total output is divided between consumption (C) and gross investment, (𝐼𝑔) can be 
shown as Equation (2.13a) (Phan, 2012; Romer, 2001): 
𝑌 = 𝐶 + 𝐼𝑔           (2.13a) 
If depreciation (δ) is considered, net investment (I) can be expressed as (Phan, 2012; Romer, 2001): 
𝐼 = ?̇? = 𝐼𝑔 − 𝛿𝐾         (2.13b) 
Adding equation (2.13a) into equation (2.13b), we obtain: 
𝐼 = ?̇? = 𝐼𝑔 − 𝛿𝐾 = 𝑌 − 𝐶 − 𝛿𝐾       (2.13c) 
Substituting per the capita term into equation (2.13c), it can be seen that (Phan, 2012; Romer, 2001): 
?̇? =  𝜙(𝑘) − 𝑐 − (𝑛 + 𝛿)𝑘 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑐 ≡
𝐶
𝐿
 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑛 ≡  
𝑑𝐿/𝑑𝑡
𝐿
     (2.14) 
Equation (2.14) shows how the capital-labour ratio (?̇?) varies over time. This equation also describes 
the relationship between the capital-labour ratio (?̇?) and the population growth rate (n), the 
depreciation rate (𝛿), and per capita consumption (c) at the household level. 
The level of per-capita consumption determines household utility and welfare at any one time. 





           (0 < 𝜎 < 1)        (2.15) 
Equation (2.15) shows that the household utility function (𝑈(𝑐)) is increasing and concave in relation 
to per capita consumption (c). The properties in this function can be shown as (Phan, 2012; Romer, 
2001): 
𝑈′(𝑐) = 𝐶(𝑡)
−𝜎 > 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑈′′(𝑐) = −𝜎𝐶(𝑡)
−(1+𝜎) < 0 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑐 > 𝑜     (2.16) 
and 𝑙𝑖𝑚
𝑐→∞
𝑈′(𝑐) = ∞ and 𝑙𝑖𝑚
𝑐→0
𝑈′(𝑐) = 0 
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Our study assumes that individual households maximize inter-temporal additive utilities integral to 
the standard Ramsey model. Using the integrating process to attain utility maximization at any one 
time, utility maximization should consider population growth (n), and the discount rate (ρ) (Phan, 
2012; Romer, 2001). Total utility measures the instantaneous average per capita utility, which 
depends only on per capita consumption at a discount rate (ρ) at any one period (t). If the discount 
rate (ρ), and the subjective rate of time preference (𝜎) are higher, the contribution of a future 
generation’s utility is lower (Phan, 2012; Romer, 2001). A higher rate of time preference means that 
a household prefers to maintain current consumption levels under capital constraints. 
If the rate of return to savings (r) is different from the discount rate (ρ) and the population growth 







𝑒−(𝜌−𝑛)𝑡𝑑𝑡 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 (𝑟 ≡ 𝜌 − 𝑛 > 0)        (2.17) 
Equations (2.17) and (2.14), and the set of assumptions outlined above, form the standard optimal 
consumption growth. Using the dynamic optimization method, the derivation of the optimal rate of 




[𝜙′(𝑘) − (𝑛 + 𝛿 + 𝑟)]       (2.18) 




           (2.19) 
The rate of depreciation plus the labour augmenting technical progress can be written as (Phan, 
2012; Romer, 2001): 
d=δ +n           (2.20) 
The relationship between the rate of consumption growth, 𝑔(𝑡) and the marginal product of capital, 
𝑀𝑃𝑘 = 𝑦
′ =  𝜙′(𝑘), is (Phan, 2012; Romer, 2001): 
𝑔(𝑡) ≡ 𝑑𝑙𝑛𝐶(𝑡) =
1
𝜎
[𝑀𝑃𝑘 − (𝑛 + 𝛿 + 𝑟)] =
1
𝜎
[𝑀𝑃𝑘 − (𝑑 + 𝑟)]    (2.21) 
In equation (2.21), the rate of consumption growth, 𝑔(𝑡), depends on the marginal product of 
capital, 𝑦′(𝑘), the subjective rate of preference, 𝜌, the depreciation rate, d, and the inter-temporal 
elasticity of substitution, 𝜎. However, only 𝑀𝑃𝑘 and d are induced by external capital. In the other 
words, under credit rationing and credit constraint conditions, a household’s demand for credit can 
improve an individual’s utility by increasing the marginal product of capital, 𝑀𝑃𝒌. The marginal 
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product of capital can improve via the production cycle or directly finance some basic needs, via 
reducing constraints of current obligations in terms of the depreciation rate (Phan, 2012). 
There are two examples that show utility improvement by increasing the marginal products of capital 
and decreasing credit constraints. One can use the agricultural sector to explain utility improvements 
by increasing the marginal products of capital. Farmers spend a lot of money on seeds and fertilizers. 
However, the production may take weeks or months to generate income and many rural poor 
households do not have enough money to invest. Therefore, these households need to have external 
capital because their own capital is insufficient to ensure consumption growth (Petrick, 2005; Phan, 
2012). Households use cash for expenditure and consumption. Because of sporadic income, poorer 
households need credit to maintain basic levels of consumption, particularly while maintaining 
machinery and facing increasing levels of depreciation. Depreciation takes the form of input credit 
and maintenance is shown as a fixed cost to keep equipment functional. These obligations can be 
seen in advanced credit that households must repay. If the households repay all the credit, smooth 
consumption and consumption growth can still be attained (Petrick, 2005; Phan, 2012). 
This study uses the demand for credit to explain credit participation, which occurs when an individual 
or a household maximizes his or her expected utility by taking a loan from credit providers. The 
decision to take a loan is a rational choice based on the demand for credit. Credit plays an important 
role in supporting rural households. Access to credit is a key requirement for the growth of the 
economy and the raising of the living standards of rural communities (Petrick, 2005). 
2.2 Participating in Microfinance  
Microfinance programmes play a crucial role in supporting rural households’ access to microcredit 
(Petrick, 2005; Phan, 2012). The availability of microfinance enables rural households to invest in new 
technology, improve their production and productivity and ultimately increase their income and 
consumption. Therefore, it is important to understand the factors that affect households’ 
participation in microfinance programmes. Understanding these factors can help improve credit 
access and the implementation of credit policies for rural households. This study reviews both credit 
rationing theory and the demand for credit to use these theories as guidelines for credit 
participation. 
Credit participation begins with the demand for credit; it assumes that an individual (or household) 
wants to maximize his or her loan utility. Loans have an opportunity cost or the cost associated with 
the interest rate. Therefore, an individual or household’s decision to borrow money can be seen as a 
rational choice based on the theory of demand for credit. However, demand for credit alone cannot 
explain credit participation behaviour because credit is rationed under information asymmetry 
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conditions (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981). Lenders cannot charge borrowers at the market price or interest 
rate because they do not have enough information about borrowers’ default risks. Moreover, lenders 
cannot increase interest rates until interest rate equilibrium is reached in the credit market because 
they need to ration every loan. This means that, if lenders increase the interest rate until it reaches 
interest rate equilibrium, marginal borrowers may withdraw, leaving only risky borrowers in the 
market. 
Discrete choice theory discusses credit rationing alongside credit demand theory. The discrete choice 
theory explains the relationship between utility and an individual’s discrete choices, or how an 
individual maximizes his or her utilities through choices (McFadden, 1973). This theory has been used 
in many fields, including consumer choice, housing and transport choice, and nonmarket goods 
(Phan, 2012). The choice theory models household behaviour in the credit market. This model 
assumes that borrowers take out loans to maximize their utilities. A borrower’s demand for credit is 
affected by decision processes and socioeconomic choices. A binary and polychotomous choice 
model can be used to describe a borrowers’ behaviour and the social economic factors that affect 
households’ participation in the credit market. 
In the literature, there are three common estimation methods used to investigate the determinants 
that affect household participation in microfinance: the probit model, the logit model and the 
multinomial logit model (Fongthong & Suriya, 2014; Menkhoff & Rungruxsirivorn, 2011; Mpuga, 
2008). The probit and logit models are used when households choose between two alternative credit 
options. The multinomial logit model is used when households have over two options of available 
credit. 
Several studies have used the probit and logit models to investigate factors affecting household 
participation in microfinance programmes, when a household makes a decision between two forms 
of available credit (e.g., Coleman, 2006; Fongthong & Suriya, 2014; Li, Gan & Hu, 2011a; Nguyen, 
2007). Nguyen (2007) examines the determinants of credit participation of Vietnamese households 
using the probit model and data from the Vietnamese Living Standard Survey (VLSS) conducted in 
1992/93 and 1997/98. Nguyen (2007) shows that age, farm work, household size, and landholding 
are significant determinants affecting household participation in microfinance schemes. 
Li et al. (2011a) use the logit model to investigate borrower characteristics that affect access to rural 
credit. The authors find that household demographics and socioeconomic characteristics (income, 
the dependency ratio, household location, access to other credit sources and attitude towards debt), 
affect rural households’ access to microcredit. Other factors include interest rates and loan 
processing times. 
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Phan (2012) examines factors that influence rural households’ access to microcredit in Vietnam. The 
author uses the credit accessibility model and data from the 2010 Mekong River Delta (MRD) survey, 
the 2006 Vietnamese Household Living Standard Surveys (VHLSS) and 2008 panel data. He shows 
that careers, problems with group lending, poor education level, work skills, and village road access 
all affect access to microfinance schemes. 
Kasali, Ahmad and Ean (2016) examined determinants that affect poor households’ access to 
microfinance programmes in Nigeria and analyse data using the logit model. The data are based on 
1,134 microfinance loan borrowers and non-borrowers in South-West Nigeria. The authors find that 
age, household size, business worth, skill or experience, education level, assets, health status, living 
standards and income all affect access to microfinance programmes in Nigeria. Significantly, they find 
that the poor in Nigeria cannot access microfinance programmes because of strict terms and 
conditions. 
Santoso (2016) identifies the determinants that influence rural Indonesian households’ access to 
microcredit programmes. The author uses primary data collected from 605 rural households in the 
Bantul District, Yogyakarta Province, Indonesia. Binary logistic regression is used to investigate the 
factors that affect household access to microcredit programmes. The study finds that age, household 
income, loan duration and interest rate affect rural Indonesian households’ access to microcredit 
programmes. 
Ashraf and Ibrahim (2014) pinpoint participation barriers for rural poor in Bangladesh using eight 
explanatory factors and six demographics in three models. The first model compares non-
participants who join microfinance programmes, and another group, which includes participants and 
non-participants (those who do not join microfinance schemes). The second model compares 
participants and non-participants. The final model compares non-participants (those who would like 
to join microfinance programmes), with another group (which includes participants and non-
participants, those who do not want to join microfinance schemes). Model 1 shows that barriers to 
microfinance participation include a lack of education, assets, and a female-headed household. 
Gender, age, income, land, religion, and a lack of knowledge affect microfinance participation in 
model 2. Model 3 indicates that barriers to participation in microfinance schemes in Bangladesh are 
gender, education, land, insufficient resources, and a lack of knowledge. The authors suggest that if 
microfinance programmes in Bangladesh want to reduce barriers, they should improve high-cost 
loans by changing institutional features to decrease the cost, membership criteria and repayment 
systems. 
Sebatta, Wamulume, and Mwansakilwa (2014) investigated the determinants that affect smallholder 
farmers’ access to rural finance. Primary data are from five provinces in Zambia. The authors use the 
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probit model and find that the household head’s education level, household size and the number of 
daily meals served significantly influence household participation in rural finance. Personal savings, 
having a phone and the loan maturity date affect participation levels in agricultural finance. 
Saqib et al. (2016) explored the factors that influence Pakistani farmers’ access to agricultural credit 
using a probit regression model and primary data from 168 farmers. The results show that age, 
education, farming experience, family size, and income affect farmers’ ability to access agricultural 
credit. The authors recommend that the government should develop agricultural credit policies to 
help small farmers in the event of natural disasters. 
Tang, Guan and Jin (2010) identify socioeconomic factors that influence farmers’ decisions to change 
from formal credit systems to an informal credit one in China. They use primary data from 471 
households in 28 Chinese villages. The authors use the probit model to investigate factors that affect 
farmers’ access to loans and the multinomial probit model to identify the determinants affecting 
farmers’ choice of loan source. The results of the probit model show that household size, agricultural 
land and household head’s education levels significantly influence households’ ability to borrow and 
likelihood of borrowing. The multinomial probit model shows that household size, education and 
land area increase households’ probability of accessing loans from formal credit markets. 
Using the logit model, Coleman (2006) investigated the characteristics of village bank members. The 
author uses data from 444 households in 14 villages in northeast Thailand. Coleman finds that the 
value of land owned by women, creditworthiness score and female household head significantly 
affect participation in the programme; wealthier villagers are more likely than poorer villagers to 
participate in the programme. 
Fongthong and Suriya (2014) evaluated the VF used to reach the poor in Thailand. The authors use 
the logit model to investigate borrower determinants. They used data from Thailand’s 2009 
Socioeconomic Survey. They find that the VF borrowers are near-poor and moderate-income 
households. The determinants that influence the borrowers are female committees and households 
with more members.  
Dufhues, Buchenrieder and Munkung (2013) investigated the determinants that affect households’ 
access to formal credit in north Thailand. The authors focus on social capital variables that impact 
formal credit access. They used primary data collected from the Chiang Mai Province and logit 
regression for empirical analysis. The authors find that household head’s age, social capital, the 
dependency ratio, past credit, location of the house, being a member of the ethnic majority (Thai) 
and the possession of an identification card affect formal credit access. 
 25 
Several studies have used the multinomial logit model to investigate the factors affecting 
microfinance participation (e.g., Balogun & Yusuf, 2011; Durojaiye, Yusuf & Balogun, 2014; Eularie & 
Vishwanatha, 2016; Menkhoff & Rungruxsirivorn, 2011; Mpuga, 2008). Mpuga (2008) investigated 
credit access and demand in rural Uganda. The author uses secondary data from Ugandan household 
surveys conducted in 1992/93 and 1999/2000 and uses the probit, tobit and multinomial logit 
models to analyse the data. The probit model is used to predict factors associated with an 
individual’s or household’s decision to apply for credit and the tobit model is used to investigate the 
factors that affect loan size (the amount that borrowers are able to take). The multinomial logit 
model is used to investigate the individual or household characteristics that affect access to different 
sources of credit. The author finds that age, education level, gender, occupation, the value of 
household assets and dwelling characteristics strongly influence access to credit, whereas age, 
education level, location, dwelling characteristics, occupation, and household wealth affect an 
individual’s or household’s access to different sources of credit. The author also finds that age, 
education level, gender, occupation, marital status, the value of household assets, location and 
dwelling characteristics are related to loan size. 
Durojaiye et al. (2014) examined the factors that influence the demand for microcredit in southwest 
Nigeria. They use a multinomial logit model to analyse their data. They find that social capital 
variables (trust index, decision-making index, labour contribution, meeting attendance index and 
heterogeneity index) and credit variables (interest rate, credit distance, and payback period) explain 
the demand for credit. Their study suggests that social networks need to be developed so that 
borrowers are more aware of lending schemes. This knowledge can improve borrowers’ access to 
credit. As a result, borrowers can improve their income. 
Using descriptive statistics and a multinomial model, Balogun and Yusuf (2011) determined the 
factors that affect demand for microcredit among rural households in Ekiti and Osun, Nigeria. They 
use primary data for household demographic characteristics, social capital and microcredit variables. 
The authors’ multinomial logit results show that household social capital variables (membership 
density index, meeting attendance index, cash contribution index and heterogeneity index), the 
dependency ratio and credit variables (credit distance and interest rate) significantly explain a 
household’s demand for credit. 
Eularie and Vishwanatha (2016) used a multinomial logit model to investigate the factors that 
influence small farmers access to microfinance programmes. They use primary data from 300 small 
farm households in the Huye District, southern Rwanda. The authors find that the area of land, 
distance, annual interest rate, age, off-farm income, and household size significantly influence 
household access to microcredit programmes. 
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Using data from the National Finance Access (FinAccess) survey (2009), Wachira and Kihiu (2012) 
evaluated the impact of financial literacy on access to financial services in Kenya. They used the 
multinomial logit model to investigate the factors that affect individuals’ access to financial services. 
Income, distance from a bank, education level, gender, age, household size, and marital status 
significantly influence access to financial services. Notably, access to financial services is not related 
to financial literacy. The authors also show that financial literacy is low in Kenya and recommend that 
the government increase the funding for community financial literacy programmes.  
Chen and Jin (2017) explored the determinants affecting Chinese households’ decisions to borrow 
from both the formal and informal sectors. The authors used data from the 2011 China Household 
Financial Studies and analyse it using the multinomial logit model. The authors find that marital 
status, age, employment, education, Communist party membership, household location, annual 
income, and net worth significantly influence a household’s access to formal credit. Similarly, marital 
status, age, employment, education, household location, annual income, and net worth significantly 
affect a household’s access to informal credit. The factors affecting households using both sources of 
credit are marital status, age, employment, education, household location, and net worth. The 
authors recommend that the Chinese government introduce financial literacy training.  
Using a multinomial logit model and secondary data from the 1998 Vietnam Living Standard Survey 
(VLSS), Pham and Lensink (2007) investigated the factors affecting Vietnamese households’ access to 
various sources of credit. Their results show that income, gender, collateral, guarantors, and 
borrowing for their business affect households’ access to loans from both formal and semi-formal 
institutions. They find that poor households and female household heads are more likely to borrow 
from informal credit sources. 
Menkhoff and Rungruxsirivorn (2011) used the multinomial logit model to compare borrowers’ 
characteristics between VFs and six other financial institutions in three provinces in northeast 
Thailand. They find that loan source determinants are age, a female household head, the number of 
children, occupation, income, land holding, assets, the default loan ratio, and loan characteristics.  
Using primary data from 2007 and 2008 from three provinces in northeast Thailand, Ubon 
Ratchathani, Burirum and Nakhon Phanom, Kislat and Menkhoff (2012) evaluated the role of VFs. 
The authors divide borrowers into four groups: those who took a loan in the first year but not in the 
second year; those who took a loan in the second year; those who took a loan in both years; and 
those who have never taken a loan. They used the multinomial logit model to investigate VF 
borrower characteristics. They find household size, income and occupation influence households’ 
access to VFs.  
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As the previous studies reveal, three main methods have been used to investigate factors that affect 
rural households’ access to MFIs. These methods are: the probit, logit, and multinomial logit models. 
As seen in the preceding paragraphs, the factors that affect household participation in microfinance 
programmes include household head characteristics and demographics (household size, the 
dependency ratio, occupation, income, and assets). Significantly, most studies that investigated 
factors that affect households’ participation in the VF in Thailand focus on northeast Thailand. 
Coleman (2006) investigated the characteristics of village bank members in northeast Thailand using 
the logit model; Kislat and Menkhoff (2012) evaluated the role of VFs from three provinces in 
northeast Thailand. Coleman states that northeast Thailand is the country‘s poorest region. However, 
no studies have investigated the determinants affecting household participation in both VFs and 
SGPs in Thailand. Studies have shown that, in Thailand, most low income and poor people can access 
financial services from community-based MFIs, such as VFs, cooperatives, and SGPs (Microfinance 
Services Ltd., 2013; Tambunlertchai, 2015). This study will identify the determinants that affect 
borrowers’ decisions to participate in VFs and SGPs in Thailand. 
2.3 Microfinance Impact Evaluation 
Microfinance programmes have had an impact on the poor, both in increasing their income and in 
increasing consumption. Microfinance programmes can create a virtuous circle for the poor (Islam, 
2007). The circle starts with the poor taking out a loan for investment. As a result, they earn more 
income. They are then able to take out a larger loan to increase investment and earn more income. 
The continuous growth in income then increases household consumption. In other words, 
microfinance programmes can improve borrowers’ welfare. Moreover, improving income by 
microfinance loans encourages the poor to increase investment in working capital (such as seeds, 
raw materials and fertilizers) and assets (e.g., machinery and cash savings). Capital and asset 
accumulation improve borrowers’ income-generating capabilities (Armendariz de Aghion & Morduch, 
2005; Islam, 2007; Phan, 2012). 
Microfinance programmes also contribute to borrowers’ productivity, which can improve their 
overall economic condition (Islam, 2007). Microfinance programmes provide small loans that allow 
the poor to invest in high-yielding varieties and advanced technology, which ultimately improves 
productivity and promotes higher production levels (Li, 2010). These improvements are crucial 
factors in reducing poverty. Microfinance programmes also create employment opportunities for the 
poor; they can use loans to establish their own businesses. As self-employment expands, more 
labour is needed and employment rates improve. Microfinance programmes have been universally 
applauded for reducing poverty and improving poor households’ well-being through providing a 
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more stable income base, increased consumption and employment opportunities (Armendariz de 
Aghion & Morduch, 2005; Islam, 2007; Phan, 2012).  
However, accurately measuring the impact of microfinance programmes is difficult because of a lack 
of information (Caliendo, 2006). This problem persists in non-experimental or observational studies, 
which tend to have gaps in their data through a lack of information (Caliendo, 2006). Researchers can 
observe differences in outcomes between those who participate and those who do not participate in 
microfinance schemes (Caliendo, 2006; Phan, 2012). However, impact evaluation requires 
comparisons between two potential outcomes for the same individual; one with the treatment and 
the other without. In short, researchers cannot observe both situations for a particular individual 
simultaneously (Kono & Takahashi, 2010). The following section reviews the literature on MFI impact 
evaluations. 
2.3.1 Impact Evaluation Frameworks 
Hulme (2000) constructed a model of impact assessment (IA) and a framework of impact assessment 
(IA) (see Figure 2.3). The aim of impact assessment is to compare the differences in outcomes 
between agents who experience microfinance programmes against outcomes with the same agents 
without microfinance programmes. There are three steps to IA: define the agents (assessment unit); 
define the outcomes (assessment indicators); and assessment. 
To illustrate how impact evaluation works, we must assume that there is a microfinance scheme 
assigned to a target group of households and that there are two variables, d, and Y. Here d is defined 
as the binary choice variable of microfinance participation. We suppose that d = 1 if a household or 
individual participates in a microfinance scheme, and d = 0 otherwise. Y is the outcome value of 
microfinance participation. The outcome depends on microfinance participation; that is, Y = Y1 if d = 
1, and Y = Y0 if d = 0. The impact of microfinance participation on the outcome of the ith household or 
individual, which is represented by Δi, can be measured as follows (Hulme, 2000; Phan, 2012): 
Δi = Yi1 - Yi0                                             (2.22) 
The impact of microfinance participation in equation (2.22) is equal to the difference in the outcome 
between the microfinance programme state and non- microfinance programme state. The outcome 
cannot be observed because the same household or individual cannot participate or not participate 
at the same time. This problem is a counterfactual situation (Heckman, Ichimura, & Todd, 1997). The 
microfinance impact cannot be estimated because of it. Kono and Takahashi (2010) and Stuart (2010) 
note that the Average Treatment Effect (ATE) and the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT) 
are commonly used to evaluate the microfinance impact because these methods can directly 














Figure 2.3 A Model of Impact Evaluation 
Source: Adapted from Hulme (2000) 
ATE measures the impact of programme participation on individuals or households randomly 
selected and assigned to the programme, whereas ATT measures the impact of programme 
participation on individuals or households who actually participated in the programme (Kono & 
Takahashi, 2010). ATE can be shown as: 
ATE = E(Y1 – Y0)                                               (2.23) 
ATE = E(Y1|d=1) –  E(Y0|d=0) 
In equation (2.23), E(·) is an expectation operator. ATE shows the expected effect of the treatment 
on the individuals or households randomly drawn from the population. 
In equation (2.24), d is the binary choice variable of microfinance participation. We suppose that d=1 
if a household or individual participates in the microfinance scheme and d=0 otherwise. ATT can be 
expressed as: 
ATT=E(Y1|d=1)–E(Y0|d=1)                           (2.24) 
Assuming that the study can observe both Y1 and Y0 for any individual or household, the average 
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programme. If E(Y1–Y0) and E(Y1|d=1)–E(Y0|d=1) are positive, microfinance has a positive impact on 
the outcome of interest and vice versa. 
ATE and ATT differ from each other because the outcome depends on programme participation; 
therefore, E(Y1)≠E(Y1|d=1) and E(Y0)≠E(Y0|d=1). This study evaluates the impact of microfinance 
participation on borrowers’ economic and social welfare using the ATT method. However, the ATT 
method cannot be estimated directly because some components in equation (2.24) cannot be 
directly observed. In the next sub-section, I discuss the methods used to solve the counterfactual 
problem. 
2.3.2 Impact Evaluation Methods 
There are statistical methods that can be used to construct the counterfactual. These methods 
include: (1) the Matching method; (2) the Instrument Variables method; (3) the Regression 
Discontinuity design; and (4) the Difference-in-Difference approach. Each method has its strengths 
and weaknesses.  
The primary goal of the matching method is to find a control group that is the same or like the 
treatment group, except for the treatment status (Kono & Takahashi, 2010). The similarity of the two 
groups is identified from their observable characteristics. A key assumption of this method is that the 
observable characteristics and participation in a microfinance programme are independent of the 
outcome of interest (Kono & Takahashi, 2010). The matching techniques include propensity score 
matching (PSM), caliber and radius matching, nearest neighbour matching and kernel matching 
(Stuart, 2010). The benefit of these techniques is that they can be used to obtain the impact 
coefficient to solve the selection bias from the observable characteristics. However, matching does 
not solve the selection bias resulting from unobservable characteristics such as entrepreneurial drive, 
and the internal risk status of rural farmers (Marr, 2012). Several studies have used the matching 
model to evaluate microfinance impact on households (e.g., Cintina & Love, 2014; Setboonsarng & 
Parpiev, 2008; Swain & Floro, 2012). Setboonsarng and Parpiev (2008) studied the impact of the 
Khushhali Bank (KB) in Pakistan. The authors use 2005 data from Montgomery (2005) to evaluate the 
impact of KB on economic and social issues. The authors use the PSM method to address selection 
bias. They show that KB contributes positively and significantly to income generation activities but it 
only marginally affects education, health, and female empowerment. 
Swain and Floro (2012) investigated the Self-Help Group (SHG) in India that was established to 
reduce poverty and household vulnerability. The authors use cross-sectional SHG rural household 
survey data from 2003. They use the PSM method to investigate whether SHG leads to a reduction in 
poverty and household vulnerability. They show that SHG members’ vulnerability is not significantly 
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higher than non-SHG members even though SHG members have a high poverty incidence. However, 
SHG members’ vulnerability reduces significantly after they have been members for a year. 
Cintina and Love (2014) compared the microfinance impact on MFI borrowers’ expenditure. The 
authors use data from Banerjee et al. (2014) and the PSM method to evaluate the impact of 
microfinance loans on expenditure and find that microfinance borrowers exhibit higher expenditure 
in several categories, notably durables, household repairs, health, festivals, and temptation goods. 
The second approach is the instrumental variables method (IV). The main point of this method is to 
control the selection bias from unobservable characteristics by finding a variable that determines 
microfinance participation but does not influence the outcome (Kono & Dias, 2000). Three conditions 
make the IV method valid (Kono & Takahashi, 2010). First, an instrumental variable influences the 
decision to participate in microfinance schemes. Secondly, the instrumental variable does not affect 
the outcome. Finally, the instrumental variable is uncorrelated with the error term and entirely 
determined by the independent variables in the model. Unlike the matching models, this method can 
solve the bias from unobserved factors that affect participants’ decisions. Previous studies that use 
the IV method to evaluate microfinance impact include Cuong (2008), Khandker and Faruqee (2003) 
and Pitt and Khandker (1998). Cuong (2008) evaluated the impact of microcredit programmes in 
Vietnam using two methods to measure the impact: instrumental variables regression and fixed‐
effect with instrumental variables regression using panel data. Cuong used Vietnam Household Living 
Standards Survey (VHLSS) data from 2002 and 2004. The author finds that microcredit programmes 
are not very pro‐poor, particularly in terms of targeting. However, the programme did reduce 
participants’ poverty rate. 
Khandker and Faruqee (2003) studied the impact of farm credit on household welfare in Pakistan 
using IV and household survey data from rural Pakistan collected by the Rural Financial Market 
Studies (RFMS). The authors find that loans contribute to better household welfare and consumption 
and production were higher for small landholders than for large holders. 
Burgess and Pande (2002) evaluated the impact of rural banks on poverty reduction in India using IV. 
They use Central Bank data collected between 1961 and 2000. They find that rural bank branch 
expansion significantly affects economic growth and total per capita output. Non-agricultural 
outputs, in particular small-scale manufacturing and services, are most impacted by rural bank 
branch expansion. 
Regression discontinuity design (RDD) works best for individuals who are at the cut-off point of 
programme eligibility (Kono & Takahashi, 2010). For example, suppose the microfinance scheme 
identifies the target group using the number of landholders. If individuals have less than 1 hectare of 
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land, they are eligible to participate in the programme. MFIs use this criterion to select borrowers. 
The assumption in this method is that both the observable and unobservable characteristics of 
households are uncorrelated with eligibility (Kono & Takahashi, 2010). Based on this assumption, this 
method compares the outcomes of individuals who are just below and above the cut-off point for 
eligibility. This means that RDD can solve the bias from participating decisions that affect the decision 
rules. The main drawback of RDD is that the selection criteria are not always clear (White & 
Sabarwal, 2014). The microfinance programme cannot distinguish precisely between eligibility 
criteria, therefore, behavioural responses to microfinance programme intervention may be confused 
(Khandker, Koolwal, & Samad, 2010). Several studies have used RDD to evaluate microfinance impact 
(e.g., Aktaruzzaman & Farooq, 2016; Pitt & Khandker, 1998). Pitt and Khandker (1998) use the 
regression discontinuity design to estimate the impact of group-based credit programmes on poor 
households in Bangladesh by identifying the target households that own less than half an acre of 
land. The results show that microcredit increases household consumption and improves children’s 
schooling. The authors also find that the poor can access microcredit schemes and that these 
significantly reduce poverty levels. 
Aktaruzzaman and Farooq (2016) examined the impact of participation in microcredit programmes 
on consumption. They use RDD to identify the credit impact based on data collected from 69 villages 
in Bangladesh. The authors find that access to the programmes decreases per capita expenditure on 
durable goods while increasing the expenditure per school-going child and on non-durable goods, 
health care, recreation and gifts. 
A popular evaluation method is the Difference-in-Difference method (DID). The basic idea of this 
method is a combination of before after comparisons and with-without comparisons (Kono & 
Takahashi, 2010). This method can compare changes over time in observed outcomes of participants 
with those of non-participants. This method requires data from before and after microfinance 
programme implementation. The main assumption of this method is time-invariant assumptions of 
unobservable variables. The assumption means that unobservable variables that affect programme 
selection do not change over time (White & Sabarwal, 2014). The main advantage of this method is 
that it can solve selection bias related to the programme based on unobserved factors. However, a 
major disadvantage of this method is that it requires panel data that must be collected before and 
after the programme. This is a violation of the time-invariant assumption (White & Sabarwal, 2014). 
Some studies have used DID to evaluate microfinance impact (e.g., Chandoevwit & Ashakul, 2008; 
Coleman, 1999).  
Using data from 445 households in 14 villages in northeast Thailand, Coleman (1999) examined the 
impact of village banks on assets and income,. DID was used to compare participating and non-
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participating households and between villages where the programme has been introduced and those 
where it has not. The author finds no evidence of programme impact. In short, the village bank has 
no visible impact on assets and income. 
Chandoevwit and Ashakul (2008) investigated the impact of the VF in Thailand on household income, 
expenditure and poverty rate. With data from the 2002 and 2004 Socioeconomic Surveys, the 
authors use both the PSM and DID to measure the impact on income, expenditure and poverty. The 
results show that the VF does not alleviate household poverty. The VF increases farm income only in 
the central region and non-consumption expenditure (expenditure on taxes, gifts, insurance 
premiums, donations, gambling and interest payments) in the northern and southern regions. 
To estimate the different impact of microfinance, these methods rely on specific assumptions. This 
can lead to questions about the validity of the results. The next section examines recent literature on 
the impact evaluation of microfinance programmes. 
2.3.3 Impact Evaluation Studies 
Understanding the literature on impact evaluation is crucial for ensuring scholars design better 
methods to evaluate the impact of microfinance schemes. Pitt and Khandker’s (1998) study of rural 
areas in Bangladesh tried to address the sample selection bias by constructing a quasi–experimental 
design survey, which mitigates bias arising from unobserved individual and village-level 
heterogeneity. Pitt and Khandker (1998) used a regression discontinuity design to estimate the 
impact, by identifying target households that owned less than half an acre of land. The results show 
that microcredit increases household consumption and improves children’s schooling. The authors 
also find that the poor have access to microcredit schemes and that these programmes significantly 
reduce poverty levels.  
Morduch (1998) argues that Pitt and Khandker’s (1998) study violates the eligibility criterion of less 
than half an acre of landholding. The land market in Bangladesh is rather active. This means that 
clients in the programme can sell and purchase land easily. In short, Morduch suggests that the 
impact estimation is erroneous. Morduch overcomes this problem by adjusting the sample to 
maintain comparability. He uses an instrument approach estimation. 
In a similar quasi-experimental design, Coleman (1999) addressed the selection bias problem using 
445 households’ data (from 14 villages in northeast Thailand). The villages are divided into two 
groups. The first group has eight villages. These villages have had banks since 1995. The second 
group is six villages that have village banks (the banks have been established but are not currently 
operating). In the second group, households have waited over a year for the bank to grant them a 
first loan. Coleman uses households in this group as a control group and applies the DID method to 
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compare production, physical assets, income, savings, and expenditure. Coleman finds that 
membership of a village bank has no impact on household assets and income. Coleman’s findings 
thus differ from those of Pitt and Khandker (1998) in that the impact is not significantly different 
from the control group. 
However, Coleman (1999) assumes that old and new borrowers’ characteristics do not change over 
time. This assumption may be unrealistic (Armendariz de Aghion & Morduch, 2005). If the borrowers’ 
timing of entry is because of motivation, ability and entrepreneurship, Coleman’s (1999) comparison 
may do little to solve the selection bias and could exacerbate it (Armendariz de Aghion & Morduch, 
2005). 
The biases in Coleman’s (1999) study are because microfinance programme participants drop out; 
this can be a problem in cross-sectional data when comparing the impact between old borrowers and 
new borrowers (Alexander-Tedeschi & Karlan, 2002; Karlan, 2001). In short, borrowers might 
graduate from microfinance programmes because they do well in their business and no longer need 
assistance. In this case, the impact of microfinance is underestimated. Conversely, some borrowers 
may have had trouble in their business and left the programme. In this case, the impact is 
overestimated. 
To solve the selection bias and drop-out problem, Marr (2012) reviewed theories and econometric 
techniques. Marr recommends propensity score matching. This method compares borrowers and 
non-borrowers based on the probability of participation in microfinance programme, conditional on 
a set of observed characteristics (Cintina & Love, 2014). Although this method can account for the 
bias from observed characteristics, the technique cannot solve bias from unobserved characteristics 
(Marr, 2012).  
Several studies use the PSM method to study microfinance’s impact. Setboonsarng and Parpiev 
(2008) studied the microfinance impact of the Khushhali Bank in Pakistan. The authors use data from 
Montgomery (2005) to evaluate the impact of the KB on economic and social issues. The authors use 
the PSM method to address selection bias. Their results show that the KB contributes significantly, 
positively to income generation, but only marginally affects education, health and female 
empowerment. They use cross-sectional data that are prone to incorrect inference because the 
microfinance impact is spread over time. Therefore, the time element should be included to reflect 
the true microfinance impact. 
Swain and Floro (2012) investigated the Self Help Group in India. It aims to reduce poverty and 
household vulnerability. The authors use cross-sectional SHG rural household survey data from 2003. 
They employ the PSM method to investigate whether the SHG leads to a reduction in poverty and 
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household vulnerability. Their results show that SHG members’ vulnerability is not significantly 
higher than non-SHG members. However, SHG members’ vulnerability reduces significantly after 
they have been SHG members for over one year. Swain and Floro (2012) claim that their results are 
robust because they use sensitivity analysis to test the results’ robustness. 
Cintina and Love (2014) compared the microfinance impact on MFI borrowers’ expenditure between 
treated and untreated groups. In the first group, the authors compare expenditure for MFI borrowers 
and non-borrowers. In the second group, they compare expenditure for MFI borrowers and informal 
borrowers. The authors use data from Banerjee et al. (2014) and the PSM method to evaluate the 
impact of microfinance participation on expenditure. Cintina and Love (2014) find that MFI 
borrowers exhibit higher expenditure in several categories: durables, household repairs, health, 
festivals and temptation goods. The authors tested the robustness of their results by presenting four 
different matching methods. The standard errors for all four different matching methods are 
calculated using bootstrap simulations with 100 repetitions. This means the propensity scores are 
estimated. The robustness tests reveal that the four matching methods produce similar results. 
Some researchers use more than one approach to solve observed and unobserved biases. Phan 
(2012) investigated the impact of the Vietnam Bank for Social Policy (VBSP) on household 
consumption and income using PSM and the fixed effect model with instrumental variables. Phan 
uses 2010 Mekong River Delta (MRD) data and the Vietnam Household Living Standard Surveys 
(VHLSS). PSM and instrument variables-fixed effect model confirm that the formal credit programme 
has a positive impact. The PSM method shows a positive, significant impact on household 
consumption. Phan’s study, however, suffers from inconsistent impact estimators from the IV-FE 
models because instruments encountering endogeneity likely face weak instrument identification. 
Chandoevwit and Ashakul (2008) evaluated the impact of VF on household income, expenditure and 
poverty rates in Thailand using PSM and DID with data from the 2002 and 2004 Socioeconomic 
Surveys. Their results show that the VF has not alleviated the country’s poverty. The VF increases 
farm income in only the central region and non-consumption expenditure (including expenditure on 
taxes, gifts, insurance premiums, donations, gambling and interest payments) in the northern and 
southern regions. 
Boonperm et al. (2013) evaluated the impact of the VF on income and spending in Thailand using 
both PSM and the fixed effect model. They use data from the 2002 and 2004 Socioeconomic Surveys. 
Boonperm et al. (2013) find that the VF increases the poor’s income by 1.4% and spending by 3.5%. 
Their results also show that the VF’s effect on expenditure is strongest in the lower quantiles and 
flows disproportionately to low-income households. These results demonstrate that the VF is pro-
poor. 
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No studies have simultaneously evaluated the impact of both VF and SGPs on economic and social 
welfare in Thailand. This study evaluates the impact of both the VF and SGPs on participants’ 
economic and social welfare in Thailand. As a result of the literature review, I use both PSM and the 
fixed effect method because these methods can solve observed and unobserved biases. 
The following section reviews the literature on the economic and social welfare impact of 
microfinance. Though economic welfare impact covers income, savings, expenditure, assets, 
consumption and investment, the social welfare impact is education and healthcare. The literature 
review shows that there are problems with selection bias. Many studies use more than one method 
to overcome selection bias. For example, Phan (2012) studied the impact of the Vietnam Bank for 
Social Policy (VBSP) on household consumption and household income using both PSM and the fixed 
effect model with instrumental variables. Similarly, Chandoevwit and Ashakul (2008) investigated the 
impact of the VF in Thailand on household income, expenditure and poverty rate. They used PSM and 
the DID method. 
2.4 Assessment of MFIs’ Performance 
Although microfinance programmes play an important role in improving both the economic and 
social welfare of the borrowers, MFIs cannot help borrowers if their own performance is poor. This 
section reviews the literature on MFI performance assessment and, in particular, poor MFI 
performance.  
MFI performance assessment involves evaluating progress and determining whether an MFI has 
achieved its goals. The most important goal of all MFIs is to improve the living standard of the poor 
and to eradicate poverty. There are three stakeholders to consider when discussing MFI 
performance: borrowers, donors and microfinance staff (Schreiner, 1996). 
Borrowers measure MFI performance by their access to the scheme. For example, when borrowers 
obtain microfinance loans, they can improve their business, provide healthy food for their family and 
pay for their children’s education. In short, microfinance loans can improve borrowers’ general 
wellbeing (Schreiner, 1996). Islam (2007) reveals that the poor borrow money to invest. As a result, 
they can earn more income. As their investments pay off, they can increase the size of their loans 
and earn more money; continued income growth can increase household consumption.  
Donors measure MFI performance using market leverage. Market leverage shows how MFIs can 
achieve particular goals with the donations given (Schreiner, 2003). For example, outreach to the 
poor should increase as donations increase. Equally, as donations increase, MFIs should become 
more stable and efficient in providing the services. Navajas et al. (2000) point out that though MFIs 
provide credit to poor households, most of these poor are the richest amongst the poor. Quayes 
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(2015) argues that funding agencies prefer outreach effort. Outreach effort demonstrates that an 
MFI is reaching the poor and is ensuring the efficient use of funds.  
Borrowers and donors measure MFI performance using social performance indicators (Copestake, 
2007; Islam, 2007; Schreiner, 1996). According to Copestake (2007), there are three sets of indicators 
used to evaluate an MFI’s social performance (the breadth of outreach, depth of outreach and 
quality or impact of outreach). Copestake defines the breadth of outreach as the number of people 
using microfinance products in a given period of time. Depth of outreach shows the initial social 
status of MFI clients. Quality or impact of outreach shows the net benefit to each client. This includes 
indirect benefits to other households and non-household members during the given time period 
(Copestake, 2007). 
Mosley and Rock (2004) state that the poor benefit via three indirect routes. Firstly, if microfinance 
programmes do provide loans to the poor, these loans can decrease poverty by drawing very poor 
people into labour market to work as employees. Borrowers from microfinance programmes hire the 
very poor people in their business. This can improve income of the very poor. Secondly, microfinance 
often improves human capital through educational expenditure. Borrowers often use the money on 
health-related expenses and thus, have better health. Spending the loan money on education and 
health may have intrahousehold and inter-generational effects. Finally, microfinance also often 
improves a household’s risk management because it enhances their social capital. Borrowers can 
participate in training arranged by MFIs. In addition, borrowers can build up their social networks. 
Borrowers can share information about the market, prices and technology. They can also cut costs by 
pooling their resources to transport goods to and from the markets and by sharing storage facilities 
(Mosley & Rock, 2004). These actions may reduce the very poor’s vulnerability to risk and stabilise a 
village’s income (Mosley & Rock, 2004). Woller and Parsons (2002) contend that indirect impacts of 
microfinance programmes can be evaluated using employment levels. According to the authors, their 
results reveal that the economic benefits of microfinance programmes extend beyond programme 
beneficiaries.  
The final group, microfinance staff, evaluate MFI performance using financial self-sufficiency (FSS) 
(Schreiner, 2003). FSS is important for staff because they will have a job when donors leave 
(Mokhtar, 2011). Quayes (2015) states that most MFIs operate as non-profit organizations because 
they provide loans to the poor to facilitate poverty alleviation. Some microfinance programmes 
operate using profit maximization principles (with no outreach goals). This reflects a paradigm shift in 
microfinance programmes, from subsidized credit to financial sustainability. However, MFIs can have 
both outreach and sustainability goals, without these being at odds with one another (Quayes, 2015). 
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Quayes (2105) suggests that MFIs should diversify their asset-liability portfolios and access funds 
from deposits. 
Evaluating MFI performance can be done using three criteria, what are referred to as the triangle of 
microfinance (Zeller & Meyer, 2002). These criteria are outreach, financial sustainability and welfare 
impact. Outreach refers to the total number of poor, including the total number of women, who are 
served by microfinance programmes (Mokhtar, 2011). This criterion means that microfinance 
programmes can reach the poorest with a variety of financial services. Financial sustainability is 
measured using 11 financial performance indicators: portfolio at risk, the provision expense ratio, the 
risk coverage ratio, the write-off ratio, the operational expense ratio, cost per client, personnel 
productivity, credit officer productivity, the funding expense ratio, the cost of funds ratio, and loan 
loss reserves (Mokhtar, 2011). The welfare impact is measured by the benefits borrowers gain from 
the programme. This measurement is essential in determining the success of a microfinance 
programme. Welfare information is used by donors and governments to justify their investment in 
the programme.  
Mokhtar (2011) points out that microfinance welfare impact measurement is essential in 
determining the success of microfinance programmes. The author explains that donors and 
governments can use the welfare impact measurement to justify their investment in terms of 
improving borrowers’ socioeconomic position. Islam (2007) states that microfinance loans increase 
borrowers’ production levels and reduce their poverty levels. This means that the success of a 
particular microfinance programme is shown by positive changes in borrowers’ production levels, 
household welfare and personal lives. 
Many researchers measure MFI performance using a welfare only perspective impact (e.g., Coleman, 
1999; Pitt & Khandker, 1998; Setboonsarng & Parpiev, 2008; Swain & Floro, 2012). Some researchers 
focus solely on outreach (e.g., Navajas et al., 2000). Others examine both outreach and financial 
performance (e.g., Bhuiyan et al., 2011; Cull, Demirguc-Kunt, & Morduch, 2007; Kereta, 2007; 
Quayes, 2015). Very few studies simultaneously measure performance from an impact, outreach, 
and financial perspective. This study evaluates the microfinance impact on economic and social 
welfare as outlined in objective two. To fulfil the third objective, the study focuses on MFI 
performance; it examines Thai VFs’ and SGPs’ outreach and financial performance.  
Agarwal and Sinha (2010) analyses MFI financial performance in India using six parameters of 
financial performance: financial structure, revenue, expenses, efficiency, productivity, and risk. These 
parameters are comprehensive and are globally accepted indicators of MFI financial performance 
(Agarwal & Sinha, 2010). Agarwal and Sinha also use financial performance to capture the holistic 
picture of MFI performance. Financial performance is defined as whether an MFI is profitable enough 
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to maintain and expand its services without subsidies (Rosenberg, 2009). This means financial 
performance contributes to an MFI’s financial sustainability (Eur-U-Sa, 2011). Financial performance 
covers three ratios: return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE) and operational self-sufficiency 
(OSS). MFIs are profitable and sustainable if they exhibit positive ROA and ROE and have an OSS 
value over 100% (Bassem, 2012). OSS is a ratio that shows whether operating income is enough to 
cover operating costs including salaries, loan losses and other administrative costs (Arthur et al., 
2013). OSS over 100% means that MFIs can run their business without funding or subsidies from 
external sources (Schäfer & Fukasawa, 2011).  
Agarwal and Sinha (2010) uses data from 22 MFIs obtained from the 5-star rated performers of the 
Mix-market database. Data are analysed using different means tests to compare the performance of 
the 22 MFIs. The authors find that, in India, most of the best performing firms follow different 
business models. However, their study is limited because the data are of 5-star rated performers 
from the Mix-market database. The Mix-market database has information about MFIs’ performance 
for only 22 MFIs in India. If the authors used a broader sample, the results may be different. 
Using the same indicators as Agarwal and Sinha (2010), Bhuiyan et al. (2011) compared the financial 
sustainability and outreach of MFIs in Malaysia and Bangladesh. The data are from the 2008 Annual 
Report and the Mix-market database. Their results show that MFI performance in Malaysia is better 
than MFI performance in Bangladesh, in terms of OSS, earnings and expenses, but the performance is 
lower in terms of outreach and efficiency.  
Rahman and Mazlan (2014) compared the financial performance of five MFIs in Bangladesh. The 
authors use financial structure and financial performance as performance indicators. They use 
secondary data from the Mix-market database for the period 2005 to 2011. They conclude that the 
five Bangladeshi MFIs are financially sustainable because they exhibit positive ROE and ROA values. 
Financial structure is defined as the specific mix of long-term debt and equity that an MFI uses to 
finance its operations (Kar, 2012). The funding composition directly affects a business’s value (Kar, 
2012). The financial committee should decide how much money to lend and the best mixture of debt 
and equity (Kar, 2012) and must find the least expensive source of funds.  
Bayai and Ikide (2016) conclude that MFIs whose objective is to maximize profit can employ debt, 
equity and savings. In contrast, donations, subsidies, and grants are used by NGOs. Debt is supplied 
by commercial banks, investors (non-commercial) and multilateral organizations. Developing banks 
and non-profit organizations play a role as investors by holding equity in an MFI (Bayai & Ikide, 2016). 
Bayai and Ikide (2016) investigate how MFIs are financed globally. The authors show that 25% to 35% 
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of MFIs use savings/deposit financing, 35% to 40% of MFIs use debt financing and 30% to 40% of 
MFIs use equity financing (Bayai & Ikide, 2016).  
This section reviewed the literature and concludes that there are three ways to evaluate 
microfinance institutions’ performance. They are: outreach, welfare Impact, and financial self-
sufficiency. This study focuses on outreach and financial self-sufficiency and investigates the 
performance of VFs and SGPs. We compare both VFs’ and SGPs’ performance in terms of institutional 
characteristics, outreach, productivity, financial structure and financial performance in a similar 
manner to Agarwal and Sinha (2010), Bhuiyan et al. (2011) and Rahman and Mazlan (2014). The data 
are from annual reports like in Bhuiyan et al.’s (2011) study. 
2.5 Microfinance Financial Sustainability 
Microfinance financial sustainability can be affected by several factors. Kinde (2012) argues that 
financial sustainability is key to microfinance institutions’ sustainability. Financial sustainability 
means that an MFI can cover all its costs from its income without subsidies (Kinde, 2012). Dunford 
(2003) defines financial sustainability as an MFI’s ability to achieve its objectives without donor 
support. These definitions emphasize self-operation sustainability (Kinde, 2012).  
There are two levels of financial sustainability (Meyer, 2002). The first level relates to MFI 
achievement and is a lower level. The OSS level means that operating income is sufficient to cover 
operating costs, such as salaries and wages, supplies, loan losses and other administrative costs. The 
second standard level is FSS, which means that an MFI can cover both its operating and financing 
costs and other forms of subsidies, valued at market prices.  
Very few studies explore the determinants of MFIs’ sustainability. Woldeyes (2012) reviewed the 
factors that affect MFI operational and financial sustainability. They are yield on gross loan portfolio; 
portfolio at risk (PAR); the liquidity ratio (current ratio); the number of borrowers per staff member; 
cost per borrower; the operating expense ratio; the average disbursed loan size (depth of outreach); 
size of the MFI; the debt to equity ratio; and the age of the MFI. The author uses a panel regression 
model and six years of data (2005 to 2010) from the Mix-market database for 12 selected MFIs in 
Ethiopia. The author identifies four factors that significantly affect MFI operational sustainability: 
average loan balance per borrower, MFI size, cost per borrower and yield on the gross loan portfolio. 
Three determinants affect an MFI’s financial sustainability: cost per borrower, the number of active 
borrowers, and yield on the gross loan portfolio. Woldeyes (2012) finds that although MFIs in 
Ethiopia are operationally self-sufficient, they are not financially self-sufficient. However, Woldeyes’ 
study is limited because it did not include all MFIs in Ethiopia. 
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Kinde (2012) identifies the determinants that affect Ethiopian MFIs’ financial sustainability. The 
author uses only FSS to represent financial sustainability, following the Mix-market definition. The 
author uses panel regression and nine years of data (2002 to 2010) from the Mix-market database 
and The National Bank of Ethiopia for 16 selected Ethiopian MFIs. The author finds that these MFIs 
are financially self-sufficient and that there are four factors that affect MFI sustainability: 
microfinance breadth of outreach, depth of outreach, the dependency ratio, and cost per borrower. 
Kinde’s (2012) results differ from Woldeyes’ (2012) because Kinde studied a longer period and used 
data from two different sources (from both the Mix-market database and the National Bank of 
Ethiopia), whereas Woldeyes uses only data from the Mix-market database. Secondly, Kinde (2012) 
evaluated 16 MFIs compared with Woldeyes’ 12 MFIs. 
Rahman and Mazlan (2014) investigated the determinants that affect FSS of MFIs in Bangladesh. 
They use multiple regression and independent variables from Woldeyes’ (2012) study. Secondary 
data are from five MFIs in Bangladesh in the Mix-market database between 2005 and 2011. The 
results show only three factors affect FSS: MFI size, MFI age, and the operating expense ratio. 
Some studies use OSS to evaluate financial sustainability (e.g., Bogan, 2012; Quayes, 2012; Sekabira, 
2013). Bogan (2012) evaluated how capital structure affects financial sustainability. The author uses 
OSS to measure financial sustainability and panel data on MFIs in Africa, East Asia, Eastern Europe, 
Latin America, the Middle East, and South Asia for the years 2003 and 2006. The data are from the 
Mix-market database. The results show that assets and capital structure affect MFI performance. 
Quayes (2012) studied the relationship between the depth of outreach and financial sustainability 
including OSS and FSS. The author collected data for 2006 from 702 MFIs in 83 countries from the 
Mix-market database. Quayes finds a positive relationship between the depth of outreach and 
financial sustainability. Quayes recommends using panel data because they provide scholars with 
more robust results.  
Sekabira (2013) investigated MFI sustainability based on capital structure. OSS and FSS are used to 
measure MFI sustainability. The author used panel data from 14 Ugandan MFIs (including financial 
and income statements for five years). Sekabira finds that debt and grants are negatively correlated 
with OSS and FSS and that capital structure is essential in MFI sustainability. 
Previous studies use two indicators to evaluate microfinance institutions’ sustainability: OSS and FSS. 
This study focuses on FSS because it covers the cost of funds and other subsidies. I investigate the 
determinants that affect the FSS of MFIs in Thailand using panel regression and secondary data, like 
Kinde (2012) and Woldeyes (2012). 
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2.6 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has reviewed previous studies on household participation in microfinance credit, the 
impact of participation on economic and social welfare, MFIs’ performance and MFIs’ sustainability. 
To understand the credit market, this study reviewed credit rationing and the demand for credit in 
the credit market. The asymmetric information problem explains how the credit market works. 
Asymmetric information flows leads to adverse selection and moral hazard problems. Both problems 
lead to credit rationing. Credit rationing gives rise to credit constraints regardless of an individual’s 
repayment ability. The demand for credit can explain household behaviours by assuming that 
households maximize their utility levels. The demand for credit plays an important role in 
understanding rural households’ access to credit. 
The first research objective is to investigate factors that affect rural households’ access to 
microfinance programmes. Three main methods have been identified to address this objective: the 
probit model, the logit model, and the multinomial logit model. This study uses the multinomial logit 
model because households typically have more than one option for borrowing money. There are also 
several factors that determine a households’ ability to participate in microfinance schemes. These 
include household head characteristics and demographics (including occupation, income, and assets). 
The second objective is to evaluate the impact of microfinance programmes on borrowers’ economic 
and social welfare. Economic welfare consists of income, savings, expenditure, assets, consumption, 
and investment, whereas social welfare consists of education and healthcare. To address selection 
bias, this study uses PSM and the fixed effect models to evaluate the impact of microfinance 
programmes. No studies have evaluated the economic and social welfare impact of microfinance on 
rural households in Thailand. 
The last two objectives investigate MFI performance and sustainability. Previous studies conclude 
that there are three ways to evaluate MFI performance: outreach, welfare impact, and FSS. This 
study focuses on FSS. The last objective investigates the factors that affect MFI sustainability. There 
are two indicators that are typically used to evaluate MFI sustainability: OSS and FSS. This study 
focuses on FSS. Achieving financial sustainability is important for MFIs. This does not only assure 
MFIs’ existence but also guarantees continued provision of microfinance programmes to the poor. 
Moreover, no studies evaluate MFI performance and sustainability in Thailand. The next chapter 
presents and discusses relevant issues in the microfinance literature (the theory of credit rationing, 





The theory of credit rationing, household credit demand, MFI performance and MFI sustainability 
were introduced in Chapter 2. This chapter expands on them to explain the study’s methodology. The 
chapter is organized into five sections. Section 3.1 discusses the standard assumptions of credit 
rationing as outlined in Stiglitz and Weiss’ (1981) model to explain how imperfect information 
creates the problem of credit rationing in the credit market. This situation leads to credit constraints. 
In credit constraint conditions, the demand for credit can be derived using the standard Ramsey 
Growth Model explained in Section 2.1.3, Chapter 2. The explanation shows how loans can improve 
individual or household utility through production and consumption and, hence, increase an 
individual’s/household’s welfare. Section 3.1 also outlines the empirical model used to investigate 
the determinants affecting household participation in credit. Section 3.2 describes the Propensity-
Score Matching (PSM) and fixed effect (FE) models used to evaluate the impact of microfinance 
programmes on borrowers’ economic and social welfare. Then sections 3.3 and 3.4 discuss the 
conceptual framework and methodology of MFI financial performance and sustainability. The 
chapter is summarized in section 3.5. 
3.1 Determinants of Credit Participation 
3.1.1 The Conceptual Framework 
This section links credit rationing and credit demand to explain the poor’s participation in credit 
programmes. This study constructs a model that can be used to explain the credit market under 
credit rationing conditions. First, borrowers’ demands for credit are driven by the borrowers’ 
decisions and household characteristics. Next, the credit supply can be explained by screening 
procedures, where lenders collect information about the borrower to decide whether to grant the 
loan application, partially grant it or totally reject it (Zeller, 1994). In a credit constrained condition, 
household participation in the credit market is defined as the demand for credit (see Stiglitz and 
Weiss, 1981). Household participation can be defined as when a household has chosen to be a 
borrower and borrows money (Doan, Gibson & Homes, 2010). Diagne (1999) explains that credit 
participation relates to borrowers’ potential choices and demand for credit. Participation in the 
credit market is determined by household information, e.g., physical and capital endowments. Some 
studies have used a reduced form regression equation to investigate the factors that affect credit 
participation (Diagne, 1999; Doan et al., 2010; Zeller, 1994). Zeller (1994) investigated the factors 
related to credit rationing in Madagascar and notes that lenders evaluate borrowers using 
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information from group lenders and the borrowers’ creditworthiness. Diagne (1999) evaluated the 
determinants affecting households’ access to credit in Malawi. Diagne finds that a household’s total 
value of assets (land and livestock) determine the poor’s access to credit. Investigating the factors 
affecting Vietnamese access to credit, Doan et al. (2010) conclude that household size, income, 
phone ownership and the home’s location are important factors in determining credit participation.   
Borrowers’ demands for credit and their creditworthiness are used by lenders to determine whether 
they will grant loans or not. Therefore, factors determining credit participation can represent either 
borrowers’ demands for credit or borrowers’ creditworthiness (Doan et al., 2010). This means if 
borrowers have more endowments (physical and human resources), they are more likely to be 
granted (Doan et al., 2010). The factors affecting credit participation are household head 
characteristics, demographics, occupation, income and assets (Fongthong & Suriya, 2014; Li et al., 
2011a; Menkhoff & Rungruxsirivorn, 2011). 
Scholars investigating poor households have noted that the above determinants may play other roles 
in explaining credit participation. These factors may drive credit demand factors rather than the 
components of creditworthiness. This means that physical endowments (e.g., assets and land 
ownership) and human endowments (e.g., education) have a negative impact on credit participation 
(Doan et al., 2010). Evaluating group-lending microfinance programmes and poverty in Bangladesh, 
Khanker (2005) finds that landless households are more likely to obtain loans from group-lending 
microfinance programmes than households that own land. The author also finds that education and 
being female have a negative effect on the number of loans granted from group-lending 
microfinance programmes. These results suggest that group-lending systems, in which the demand 
for microfinance is largely derived from landholding eligibility conditions and education, matter in 
deciding the number of loans from group-lending microfinance programmes (Khanker, 2005). The 
different factors affecting credit participation for different groups of borrowers are the result of 
segmented credit markets in developing countries (Doan et al., 2010). Conning and Udry (2007) note 
that lenders may use diverse ways to screen applicants and evaluate their creditworthiness for 
different credit segments.  
There are also supply-side factors that affect households’ participation in credit, e.g., financial 
lending policies and membership requirements. In short, lenders use diverse methods to screen and 
evaluate borrowers in different credit segments (Doan et al., 2010). Umoh (2006) points out that 
many households do not have access to credit because of financial lending policies. These include 
complicated application procedures, specified minimum loan amounts and prescribed loan purposes. 
MFIs also have membership requirements, policies on self-selected credit groups and group lending 
(Li, 2010). Maes and Foose (2006) state that MFIs tend to reject very poor members because they are 
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unable to repay loans, which destroys the entire group’s creditworthiness. These screening methods 
affect household participation in credit (Li, 2010).  
Supply-related and demand-related factors jointly affect households’ participation in microfinance 
programmes. Focusing on the demand side, this study investigates the factors that affect households’ 
participation in MFIs in Thailand. As the literature review has shown, many socio-economic factors 
affect a household’s participation in the credit market. The factors can be divided into four levels: the 
individual, household, credit market, and geographic levels. The literature tends to focus on the 
individual level (but not all four levels). Pham and Izumida (2002), Gan, Nartea, and Garay (2007) and 
Li et al. (2011a) focus on factors at the individual level, including household head age, gender 
(female), head’s ethnicity, and head’s education level. The second group (e.g., Chen & Jin, 2017; Gan 
et al., 2007; Menkhoff & Rungruxsirivorn, 2011; Nguhen, 2007 ) focuses on household level factors, 
e.g., land ownership, family size, membership of a credit group, membership requirements, family 
income and expenditure levels. Pham and Izumida (2002) focus on factors at the credit market level, 
such as an agricultural loan, trade loan and loan duration. The last group (e.g., Coleman, 1999; Li et 
al., 2011a;Pill & Khanker, 1988) focus on determinants at the geographic level such as urbanized 
communes (located in rural areas but adjacent to cities or town where industrial zone(s) are 
present), road access, and distance to the nearest bank. In this study, factors include borrowers’ 
characteristics, demographic information, occupations, income, and assets like Chen and Jin (2017), 
Gan et al. (2007), Menkhoff and Rungruxsirivorn (2011) and Nguhen (2007). 
3.1.2 Empirical Framework 
This study uses discrete choice models (DCMs) to analyse MFI participation in Thailand. DCMs are 
used to predict and analyse a decision-maker’s choice from a set of alternatives, the choice set (Ben-
Akiva & Bierlaire, 1999). The choice set has three features that fit within the framework of discrete 
choices (Ben-Akiva & Bierlaire, 1999; Koppelman & Bhat, 2006; Li, 2010): 
1. The alternatives, in the choice set are mutually exclusive. This feature means that if an 
individual or household chooses one alternative, s/he gives up all other alternatives. 
2. The alternatives are collectively exhaustive. This feature means that all the possible 
alternatives are included in the choice set. 
3. The number of alternatives is finite. This means the alternatives can be counted. 
DCMs are probability models that are used to specify the probability of a decision-maker making a 
certain choice, via the utility function (Ben-Akiva & Bierlaire, 1999; Koppelman & Bhat, 2006; Li, 2010). 
The decision-maker chooses the alternative that maximizes his or her utility. This means that the 
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borrower chooses the loan/lender based on what provides the greatest utility among the available 
alternatives in the choice set (Cm) (Ben-Akiva & Bierlaire, 1999; Li, 2010).  
To illustrate the decision-maker maximizing his or her utility, let us assume that Uin and Ujn are the 
utility that the decision-maker n obtains from alternatives i and j, respectively. The probability that 
the decision-maker n chooses alternative i from Cm can be shown as (Ben-Akiva & Bierlaire, 1999; Li, 
2010): 
Pn(i|Cm)=Pr[Uin> Ujn, i, j ɛ Cm and i≠j)       (3.1) 
To reflect the uncertainty, the utilities of the alternatives are modeled as random variables in DCMs. 
As a random variable, utility Uin is divided into two parts, the systematic part Vin and the random 
components ɛin. More specifically, Vin is a function related to the observed information. Observed 
information refers to the decision-maker’s characteristics and the alternatives. The random term ɛin  
captures the uncertainty that affects the utility (Ben-Akiva & Bierlaire, 1999; Li, 2010). The utility 
function is: 
Uin = Vin + ɛin, i ɛ Cm         (3.2) 
Ujn = Vjn + ɛjn, j ɛ Cm         (3.3) 
Where: 
Vin, Vjn is the deterministic or systematic part of the utility; and 
ɛin, ɛjn is the random term that captures the uncertainty. 
The decision-maker chooses an alternative that achieves the highest utility. This means substituting 
equations (3.2) and (3.3) into equation (3.1). The probability of the decision-maker n choosing 
alternative i from the choice set Cm can be shown as (Ben-Akiva & Bierlaire, 1999; Li, 2010): 
Pn( i|Cm) = Pr(Uin>Ujn) = Pr(Vin + ɛin > Vjn + ɛjn)      (3.4) 
So, Pn( i|Cm) = Pr(Uin>Ujn) = Pr(Vin - Vjn > ɛin - ɛjn)  i, j ɛ Cm and i≠j  (3.5) 
In this study, the choice set contains over two alternatives (multinomial choice). This situation leads 
to what is termed a multinomial logit model. To formalize this, suppose there is a choice between M 
alternatives. The alternative i is chosen by individual n if the alternative i gives the highest utility. The 
probability of choosing alternative i can be shown as (Ben-Akiva & Bierlaire, 1999; Li, 2010; Verbeek, 
2008): 
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Pn (i) = Pr (Uin = max {U1n, U2n, ……., Umn})      (3.6) 
So: Pn (i) = Pr (Uin> 𝑘=1,…𝑘,𝑘≠𝑖
𝑚𝑎𝑥 Ukn) = Pr (Vin + ɛin > 𝑘=1,…𝑘,𝑘≠𝑖
𝑚𝑎𝑥 Vkn + ɛkn)   (3.7) 
The multinomial logit model is based on the assumption that the utility error term is mutually 
independent, which is also known as the type I extreme-value distribution (Verbeek, 2008). Following 
these assumptions, the distribution function of each ɛin, for all i, n can be shown as (Ben-Akiva & 
Bierlaire, 1999; Maddala, 1994; Verbeek, 2008): 
F(ɛ) = exp[-𝑒−𝜇ɛ], 𝜇 > 0         (3.8) 
Where: 
𝜇: is a positive scale parameter that can be assumed to take the value of 1 for convenience (Ben-Akiva 
& Bierlaire, 1999). 





         (3.9) 
Equation (3.9) shows that Pn(i) is a value between o and 1 and ∑ 𝑒𝜇𝑉𝑗𝑛𝑗∈𝐶𝑚  =1. 
The distribution of the error term in equation (3.9) sets the utility value, which is undefined. To solve 





         (3.10) 
The systematic part of utility Vin is linear in the parameter (Li, 2010): 
𝑉𝑖𝑛 =  𝛽𝑖𝑋𝑛          (3.11) 
Where: 
𝛽: is a vector of unknown parameters associated with the variables; 
𝑋𝑖𝑛: is a vector of observed variables relating to alternative i and decision maker n; and 
𝜇 takes the value of 1 for convenience (Ben-Akiva & Bierlaire, 1999).  







 i=1, 2, …, m       (3.12) 
In this study, households choose to participate in microfinance programmes (or not to participate) 
based on their options; they have more than two mutually exclusive alternatives. The multinomial 
logit model is used to determine the factors that affect credit participation in Thailand (VFs and 
SGPs). The model is coded as four outcomes that affect microfinance credit participation (1 = non-VF 
and SGP borrowing; 2 = borrowing from VFs (only); 3 = borrowing from SGPs (only); 4 = borrowing 
from both VFs and SGPs).  
The choice of microfinance participation in this model depends on household characteristics and the 
financing strategies that the households chooses to maximize their utility.  
If 𝑇𝑖𝑛 is the dependent variable then it can take on one of the different alternative choices.  
𝑃𝑛 (𝑇𝑛 = 𝑖) is the probability of observing outcome i. The probability model for 𝑇𝑛 is (Li, 2010; Verbeek, 
2008): 





            (3.13) 
In other words, the coefficients of the first choice category, which can be arbitrary, are used as a base 
to compare the alternative choices. In this study, the first choice category, used to compare with the 
other choices, is the non-borrowing group.  
The multinomial logit model can be shown and interpreted in terms of odds. This means the odds of 
the outcome i versus outcome u (Balogun & Yusuf, 2011; Durojaiye et al., 2014; Mpuga, 2008; Verbeek, 















         (3.14) 
Where: 
𝑃𝑛(𝑇𝑛 = 𝑖): is the probability of observing outcome i;  
𝑃𝑛(𝑇𝑛 = 𝑢): is the probability of observing outcome u;  
X: is a vector of characteristics including household head characteristics and demographics (including 
household size, occupation, income and assets); and 
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 : is the parameter to be estimated. 
Arranging the exponent in equation (3.14) leads to the following odds equation: 
𝑃𝑛(𝑇𝑛=𝑖)
𝑃𝑛(𝑇𝑛=𝑢)
= 𝑒𝑥𝑝[𝑋𝑛(𝛽𝑖 − 𝛽𝑢)]         (3.15) 
Equation (3.15) shows the odds equation in a non-linear form, which leads to difficulties in interpreting 
the coefficients. For the purpose of interpretation, equation (3.15) is transformed into a log form. 
Equation (3.16) expresses the multinomial logit model, which is linear in the logit form (Balogun & 




= [𝑋𝑛(𝛽𝑖 − 𝛽𝑢)]        (3.16) 
The difference between 𝛽𝑖and 𝛽𝑢 in equation (3.16) is the influence of X on the logit of outcome i 
versus outcome u. This equation can easily compute the partial derivative because the model is 








= (𝛽𝑖 − 𝛽𝑢)        (3.17) 
We can interpret 𝛽𝑖 − 𝛽𝑢in equation (3.17). Thus, holding all other variables constant, changing a unit 
in 𝑋𝑛, the logit of outcome i versus u will change by 𝛽𝑖 − 𝛽𝑢units. 
The multinomial logit models (equations 3.13 – 317) are used to estimate the effect of explanatory 
variables on the dependent variable, which is an unordered response category. There are two 
advantages to this model: its computational ease and its relative robustness (Mpuga, 2008). 
The multinomial logit model is a nonlinear function of coefficients (𝛽𝑛). Therefore, the ordinary least 
squares technique (OLS) cannot be used to estimate this model because it is not statistically 
appropriate (Li, 2010; Verbeek, 2008). This study therefore uses maximum likelihood estimation 
(MLE), because MLE can estimate coefficients consistently and asymptotically efficiently (Li, 2010; 
Verbeek, 2008). MLE consists of model parameters that maximize the probability (or likelihood) of 
the observed choices, conditional on the model, i.e., it maximizes the likelihood that the sample was 
generated from the model with the selected parameter values (Koppelman & Bhat, 2006). The 
likelihood function for a sample of n individuals, each with j alternatives, is defined as (Koppelman & 
Bhat, 2006): 
𝐿(𝛽) =  ∏∀𝑛∈𝑁 ∏ (𝑃𝑗𝑛(𝛽))
𝛿𝑗𝑛
∀𝑗∈𝐽        (3.18) 
Where: 𝛿𝑗𝑛 = 1 is the chosen indicator (=1 if j is chosen by individual n and 0, otherwise); and 
 50 
             𝑃𝑗𝑛 is the probability that individual n chooses alternative j. 
The parameter’s value that maximizes the likelihood function, is obtained by finding the first derivative 
of the likelihood function and equating it to zero. This study maximizes the log-likelihood function 
because the likelihood function and log-likelihood function yield the same maximum and the log-
likelihood function is more convenient to differentiate. The function is expressed as (Koppelman & 
Bhat, 2006): 
𝐿𝐿(𝛽) = 𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐿(𝛽)) =  ∑∀𝑛∈𝑁 ∑ 𝛿𝑗𝑛𝑋 𝑙𝑛 (𝑃𝑗𝑛(𝛽))∀𝑗∈𝐽     (3.19) 
Therefore, the maximum likelihood estimators ?̂? can be obtained by differentiating equation (3.19) 
with respect to 𝛽𝑘 (Koppelman & Bhat, 2006): 
𝜕(𝐿𝐿)
𝜕𝛽𝑘






 ∀𝑘∀𝑗∈𝐽       (3.20) 
3.1.3 Explanation of the Variables 
The Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable for the multinomial logit model is the choice that an individual or household 
i makes. The dependent variable has four outcomes that affect microfinance credit participation (1 = 
non-VF and SGP borrowing; 2 = borrowing from VFs (only); 3 = borrowing from SGPs (only); 4 = 
borrowing from both VFs and SGPs). Microfinance credit participation means that the borrower 
decides to accept a loan from a microfinance programme (Diagne, 1999). 
Independent Variables 
Table 3.1 shows the independent variables used in the multinomial logit model. 
Table 3.1 Description of Variables used in the Multinomial Logit Model 




Age The borrower’s age years 
Gender The borrower’s gender  1=female; 0=male 
Education The borrower’s education level  years 
Marital Status The borrower’s marital status 1=married, 0=otherwise 
(b) Demographics:   
Household Size  Number of persons persons 
Dependency Ratio 
This is defined as the ratio of non-
workers to workers in each household 
persons 
(C) Occupation:   
Landless Farmers  Farmers do not have their own land 1=landless farmer, 0=otherwise 
Farmers Borrowers are farmers 1=farmer, 0=otherwise 
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Variable Name Description Measures 
Entrepreneurs Borrowers are entrepreneurs 1=entrepreneur, 0=otherwise 
Formal Workers  Borrowers are formal workers 1=formal workers, 0=otherwise 
Informal Workers  Borrowers are informal workers 1=informal worker, 0=otherwise 
Unemployed Borrowers are unemployed 1=unemployed, 0=otherwise 
(d) Income and Assets   
Monthly Income Monthly household income  THB 1,000 
Assets Total value of household assets  THB 1,000 
The hypothesized relationship between the independent variables and household participation in 
microfinance programmes in Thailand is based on previous studies. Education (+) means that the 
education of the borrower is positively related to participation in microfinance programmes. The 
borrower’s education reflects human capital, which facilitates participation in microfinance 
programmes. Mpuga (2008) notes that educated borrowers are more likely to have higher income 
and savings and therefore are more likely to have assets that can be used as collateral. Li (2010) 
states that educated farmers can better understand the conditions of microfinance loans and they 
are more likely to comply with microfinance loan requirements. 
Borrower characteristics affecting participation in microfinance programmes are age, gender and 
marital status. Age and gender are hypothesized to negatively influence participation, whereas 
marital status is hypothesized to positively influence access to the programmes. Generally, younger 
individuals are more energetic and dynamic, meaning they adopt new technologies better than older 
individuals. Therefore, young individuals tend to save and/or borrow more for investment, whereas 
older individuals may be less inclined to save or borrow (Li, 2010; Mpuga, 2008). Li (2010) states that 
older individuals struggle to understand the operations and loan conditions and therefore do not 
tend to participate in microfinance schemes. Mohamed (2003) and Okurut (2006) confirm that the 
probability of borrowing from formal and semi-formal sources of credit reduces for older individuals. 
In terms of gender, it is hypothesized that female borrowers are more disadvantaged in securing 
microfinance loans than men because, in the rural areas, women have limited access to information 
and information technologies, in particular. Women’s limited freedom and mobility leads to 
decreasing demands for credit, thus decreasing the likelihood of microfinance participation (Evans, 
Adams, & Mohammed, 1999; Li, 2010; Zeller, 1994). Marital status is hypothesized to positively 
influence household access to microfinance programmes because married people are more likely to 
be stable and lenders view them as more reliable. Therefore they are more likely to access credit 
than their unmarried counterparts (Mpuga, 2008). 
In terms of occupation, the farmer and entrepreneur variables are hypothesized to positively affect 
participation in credit facilities, whereas the landless farmers, formal and informal workers, and 
 52 
unemployed variables are hypothesized to negatively affect participation in microfinance 
programmes. Borrowers who operate a business in addition to agricultural production have a higher 
probability of participating in microfinance programmes because they need financial support to 
invest in or expand their businesses (Li, 2010; Mohamed, 2003). 
The dependency ratio is defined as the ratio of non-workers to workers in each household 
(Fongthong & Suriya, 2014). A higher ratio reduces a household’s ability to repay credit and thus the 
probability of these households’ participation in microfinance programmes is lower. 
Some variables (such as household size, income and assets), have ambiguous relationships with 
household participation in microfinance programmes. The ambiguous effects of these variables on 
households’ participation in microfinance programmes arise from their uncertain effects on 
households’ demand for credit (Li, 2010). An example of the uncertainty effects relates to family size. 
Larger households tend to have greater levels of consumption thus they often have greater credit 
demands. However, a larger household size also means that they are less likely to meet repayment 
requirements because they have a smaller future expected income, which reduces the demand for 
credit (Li, 2010; Nguyen, 2007; Ruiz-Tagle, 2005). Similarly, income and assets have an uncertain 
effect. When households have more income and/or assets, they feel rich and consume more. 
Therefore, they may also demand more credit (Cheng, 2006; Li, 2010; Ruiz-Tagle, 2005). However, 
income and assets show a household’s initial capital. This means a higher level of income and/or 
assets reflect a less constrained household budget, which may weaken the demand for credit (Li, 
2010; Ruiz-Tagle, 2005; Umoh, 2006). 
To investigate the factors that impact microfinance programmes, this study uses cross-sectional data 
from the Socioeconomic Survey (2017), collected by the National Statistical Office of The Ministry of 
Information and Communication Technology in 2017. The survey interviewed 43,210 households 
across the country. Data were collected on a monthly basis, including a variety of household 
socioeconomic data such as household basics, covering income, expenses, assets, and liabilities. 
This study links credit rationing and the demand for credit, to explain households’ participation in the 
credit market. The credit rationing model explains how imperfect information leads to the problem 
of credit rationing in the credit market. This situation leads to credit constraints. The model assumes 
that the credit market is characterised by asymmetric information. The model shows a household’s 
decision in the credit market. Households desire to maximise their satisfaction levels via 
consumption, even under credit constraints. An individual launches a project or investment if the 
expected return, in the case of success, is greater than the opportunity cost, which refers to the 
individual borrower’s initial wealth. Households can choose to borrow from a variety of sources, but 
often choose the alternatives that will maximize his/her utility. The multinomial logit model is used 
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to determine the determinants that affect credit participation in two Thai MFIs (VFs and SGPs). We 
use this model because households have more than two alternative credit sources. This model is 
known for its computational ease and is considered relatively robust, as measured by the goodness 
of fit and prediction accuracy tests (Mpuga, 2008). 
3.2 Impact Evaluation of Microfinance Programmes on the Economic and 
Social Welfare of Thai Households 
In this study, microfinance impact evaluation consists of two parts: the welfare outcome of impact 
evaluation and an empirical model. The first part evaluates the impact of particular microfinance 
programmes using welfare outcome indicators. In the second part, the empirical model explains how 
PSM and fixed effect models are used to evaluate the impact of VFs and SGPs on borrowers’ 
economic and social welfare. 
3.2.1 Welfare Outcomes of Impact Evaluation 
The main objective of impact evaluation of microfinance is to evaluate the differences between 
agents’ outcomes (e.g., individuals, households, firms, and cities) that participate in intervention 
programmes, against outcomes that would have occurred without any programmes/participation. 
Coleman (2006) concludes that microfinance impacts can be divided into two parts: the impact on 
economic welfare and on social welfare. In terms of the economic welfare impact of microfinance, 
two common indicators are used: income and consumption (Hume, 2000). Income indicators are 
calculated using all sources of income. These indicators are included to evaluate the impact of 
microfinance programmes. However, the welfare impact measurement from household income may 
be misleading because of errors in income data (Li, 2010; Phan, 2012). Household income tends to 
fluctuate during the year because of the dependence on agricultural production and natural 
conditions. This means that household income is difficult to measure or predict. Furthermore, some 
households wrongly estimate their income, e.g., if a large proportion of income is not monetarized. If 
households consume their own products or exchange their production for other goods, this situation 
leads to households underestimating their total income (Islam, 2007; Li, 2010; Phan, 2012). 
Consumption is more stable than income during a household’s lifetime. It can better reflect a 
household’s actual living standard and shows its ability to meet its basic needs (Islam, 2007; Li, 2010; 
Phan, 2012).  
Several studies focus on economic welfare (e.g., Burgess & Pande, 2002; Chandoevwit & Ashakul, 
2008; Khandker & Faruqee, 2003). Khandker and Faruqee (2003) studied the impact of farm credit on 
household welfare in Pakistan. The authors find that loans contribute positively to household welfare 
and that the impact on consumption and production is higher for smallholders than for large holders. 
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Burgess and Pande (2002) evaluated the impact of rural banks on poverty reduction in India. They 
find that rural banks significantly affect economic growth and total per capita output. Rural banks 
also impact small-scale manufacturing. The services most impacted by the existence of rural banks 
are non-agricultural outputs. The authors also find that rural poverty reduction is linked to expanded 
savings mobilization and credit provisions in rural areas. They conclude that the poor take loans to 
improve capital accumulation and long-term productive investments. 
Chandoevwit and Ashakul (2008) investigated the impact of the VF on Thai household income, 
expenditure and the incidence of poverty. Their results show that the VF has not alleviated the 
country’s poverty. The VF increases farm income only in the central region and non-consumption 
expenditure in the northern and southern regions. The increase in non-consumption expenditure 
suggests that borrowers in the northern and southern regions do not spend their loans on 
investments. The authors conclude that the VF alone cannot alleviate poverty. They also suggest that 
VF loans should provide borrowers with information about investment channels, risk management, 
and technical knowledge.  
Some studies evaluated the impact of microfinance on both economic and social welfare (e.g., 
Aktaruzzaman & Farooq, 2016; Cintina & Love, 2014; Coleman, 2006). Coleman (2006) evaluated the 
impact of microfinance programmes on both the economic and social welfare of households in 
Thailand. Coleman states that village banks positively affect committee members’ households at the 
expense of poorer borrowers. Focusing on medical and school expenditure, Coleman shows that 
village banks do not impact borrowers’ medical and school expenditure. This study also shows that 
educational expenditure for boys by committee members’ households is significantly higher than for 
boys in poorer member households.  
Cintina and Love (2014) compared microfinance programmes’ impact on borrowers’ expenditure in 
India. They find that microfinance borrowers exhibit higher expenditure in several categories: 
durables, house repairs, health, festivals and temptation goods. Aktaruzzaman and Farooq (2016) 
examined the impact of participation in microcredit programmes on consumption in Bangladesh. The 
authors find that access to the programmes decreased per capita expenditure on durable goods 
while increasing expenditure on each school-going child as well as non-durable goods and 
healthcare, recreation and gifts. 
Some studies focus on poverty (e.g., Cuong, 2008; Swain & Floro, 2012). Cuong (2008) evaluated 
programmes that actually reach the poor and the impact of microcredit programmes in Vietnam. The 
author finds that microcredit programmes are not very pro‐poor. Cuong states that most borrowers 
are not poor and that this group of borrowers receives more loans than the poor. However, the 
programme reduces participants’ poverty rate. Cuong finds that borrowers in the programme have 
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greater incomes and higher consumption levels. Swain and Floro (2012) investigated whether the 
Self Help Group (SHG) in India reduces borrowers’ poverty and household vulnerability. Their results 
show that SHG members’ vulnerability is not significantly higher than non-SHG members. However, 
SHG members’ vulnerability reduces significantly after more than one year. This result suggests that 
the impact of SHG on vulnerability takes longer. 
This study evaluates the impact of microfinance programmes on both economic and social welfare. 
First, it examines the impact of microfinance programmes on economic welfare, including 
consumption. Consumption covers both food and non-food items, whereas income refers to the sum 
of all possible sources of finance in a household. This study also includes the impact of microfinance 
programmes on borrowers’ social welfare such as medical and school expenditure. As Kasali et al. 
(2016) note, microfinance loans are used primarily for health, education and production and are 
given as aid for recovery efforts from events like natural disaster and health-related calamities. 
3.2.2 Empirical Model 
The aim of impact assessment is to compare differences in outcomes, in terms of individual or 
household income and consumption. Instead of using different agents, impact assessment estimates 
differences in outcomes for the same agents, i.e., with aid and without it. In this study, Ti is a binary 
variable that shows microfinance participation. If Ti equals one, it means an individual or household i 
participates in a microfinance programme. If Ti equals zero, it means an individual or household i 
does not participate in any microfinance programme. We also assume Yi1 shows the outcome value 
of interest when an individual or household i participates in a microfinance programme. Yi0 shows 
the outcome value of interest when an individual or household i does not participate in a 
microfinance programme. 
The impact of the microfinance on the outcome of the ith individual or household can be measured by: 
Δi = yi1 - yi0                                             (3.21) 
The impact identified in equation (3.21) is equal to the difference in outcomes when an individual or 
household participates in a microfinance programme to the same outcomes when s/he does not 
participate in a microfinance programme. The outcomes cannot be observed because the same 
household or individual cannot participate or not participate at the same time. This problem is called 
a counterfactual problem (Heckman et al., 1997). Therefore, a microfinance programme’s impact 
cannot be estimated because of the counterfactual problem. As Kono and Takahashi (2010) and 
Stuart (2010) note, ATT is commonly used to evaluate microfinance programme impacts because 
these methods can directly measure the microfinance programme impact on the target group. 
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ATT measures the impact of programme participation on individuals or households that participate in 
the programme (Kono & Takahashi, 2010). ATT can be shown as (Li, 2010; Phan, 2012): 
δi = E(yi1|Ti=1) – E(yi0|Ti=1)                           (3.22) 
Assuming δi is the true impact of microfinance programmes and the study can observe both yi1 and 
yi0 for any individual or household, the average difference in outcome should be attributable to 
access to microfinance programmes. If E(y1|Ti=1) – E(y0|Ti=1) are positive, it can be shown that 
microfinance programmes have a positive impact on the outcome of interest and vice versa. 
However, the ATT method cannot be estimated directly because some components in equation 
(3.22) cannot be directly observed. This means we can estimate E(y1|Ti=1), but we cannot estimate 
E(y0|Ti=1). This problem can be addressed by constructing counterfactuals based on the treatment 
and control framework (Li, 2010). The idea of this framework is to select non-participation in the 
programme as a control group and observe the outcomes of this group. Based on this idea, we can 
evaluate the impact of microfinance as (Li, 2010; Phan, 2012):  
δ*= E(yi1|Ti=1) – E(yj0|Tj=0)                           (3.23) 
In equation (3.23), δ* is the estimation of the true impact of microfinance programmes. We can 
estimate the outcome of microfinance programmes using two different individuals or households; 
individual or household i participates in the microfinance programmes and individual or household j 
does not. Yi1 is the outcome evaluated for individual or household i and yi1 is the same outcome 
evaluated for individual or household j. This study evaluates the impact of microfinance programmes 
on the economic and social welfare of individuals or households using the ATT method. In the next 
section, we discuss two types of programme impact estimators used to investigate the effect of 
microfinance programmes. 
3.2.2.1 Propensity Score Matching Method 
Propensity score matching (PSM) is a method that attempts to find a comparison group; this group is 
very similar to the treatment group except for the treatment status (Kono & Takahashi, 2010). The 
similarity between the two groups is evaluated by observable characteristics. This method compares 
the outcome of the treatment group with the outcome of the comparison group (Phan, 2012). This 
means differences in outcomes between the two groups can be attributed to the programme of 
interest (Heckman et al., 1997). This approach is typically used to evaluate the impact of job training 
and education programmes (Dehejia & Wahba, 2002). 
Several scholars have used the matching model to evaluate microfinance impact (e.g., Cintina & Love, 
2014; Setboonsarng & Parpiev, 2008; Swain & Floro, 2012). Setboonsarng and Parpiev (2008) studied 
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the impact of the Khushhali Bank (KB) in Pakistan, using the PSM method to address selection bias. 
They find that KB contributes significanly, positively to income generation activities, but has a 
minimal effect on education, health and female empowerment. The authors conclude that the 
microfinance programme contributes to income generation, providing children with school education 
and training, and access to health services. 
Swain and Floro (2012) investigated the Self Help Group (SHG) in India. This programme is designed 
to reduce poverty and household vulnerability. The authors use PSM and linear regression to 
evaluate the impact of the microfinance programme. Their results show that microfinance members’ 
vulnerability is not significantly higher than non-microfinance members. However, members’ 
vulnerability reduces significantly after more than a year. 
Cintina and Love (2014) compared microfinance borrowers’ expenditure using the PSM method to 
determine its impact. They find that microfinance borrowers exhibit higher expenditure. The results 
suggest that microfinance programmes make a notable difference to borrower expenditure. 
However, this increased expenditure does not lead to long-term benefits because the loans are likely 
to be unproductive expenditure; in short, they improve utility in the short term but are unlikely to 
lead to any significant long term changes. 
In this study, PSM is used to measure microfinance programmes’ impact on borrowers’ economic 
and social welfare in Thailand (only of those who participate in the scheme). This method can be 
used to estimate the propensity scores for each borrower and non-borrower in a microfinance 
programme based on observed characteristics such as age, gender, education, and land holding 
status. It compares the mean outcome of the borrowers with that of the matched (similar in terms of 
scores) non-borrowers (Kono & Takahashi, 2010).  
PSM is the conditional probability of receiving a treatment given X (Arun, Imai & Sinha, 2006). 
𝑝(𝑋) = 𝑃𝑟{𝑇 = 1|𝑋} = 𝐸{𝑇|𝑋}                 (3.24) 
Where: 
𝑇 = {0,1}: a binary variable if an individual or household has participated in a microfinance 
programme (T=1) or if not (T=0); and 
X: is a vector of pre-treatment characteristics. 
Three assumptions underpin PSM for the identification of the programme effect: the assumption of 
conditional independence, common support and mean dependence. 
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a. Assumption of Conditional Independence 
PSM depends on the assumption of conditional independence, which is conditional on the observed 
characteristics. This assumption means that participation in the microfinance programme is 
independent of the outcome of interest. This assumption can be shown as (Kono & Takahashi, 2010; 
Phan, 2012): 
(𝑦0, 𝑦1) ⫫ 𝑇|𝑥 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝐴𝑇𝐸                                         (3.25a) 
𝑦0 ⫫ 𝑇|𝑥 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝐴𝑇𝑇                                             (3.25b) 
Where: 
x: is a set of observed characteristics; 
𝑦0: is the outcomes for non-participants; 
𝑦1: is the outcomes for participants; 
ATE: is the Average Treatment Effect; and 
ATT: is the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated. 
Equations (3.25a) and (3.25b) imply that the outcome distributions of participants and non-
participants can be defined as (Kono & Takahashi, 2010; Phan, 2012): 
𝐸(𝑦0|𝑥, 𝑇 = 1) = 𝐸(𝑦0|𝑥, 𝑇 = 0) =  𝐸(𝑦0|𝑥)              (3.26a) 
𝐸(𝑦1|𝑥, 𝑇 = 1) = 𝐸(𝑦1|𝑥, 𝑇 = 0) =  𝐸(𝑦1|𝑥)               (3.26b) 
Equations (3.26a) and (3.26b) imply that the outcomes for participants are similar to those of non-
participants, if both groups are in the same situation.  
If both sides of equations (3.26a) and (3.26b) are simultaneously defined for all x, PSM can add the 
assumption of common support. 
b. Assumption of Common Support 
The second assumption can be shown as (Khandker et al., 2010): 
0 < 𝑃𝑟(𝑇 = 1|𝑥) < 1, 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑥                      (3.27) 
Equation (3.27) shows a significant overlap in covariate x between the treatment and comparison 
groups. This means that individuals with the same observed characteristics (x) have a positive 
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probability of being both participants and non-participants in the microfinance programme (Kono & 
Takahashi, 2010). Thus, the second assumption implies that the support for x is equal in both groups 
(participants and non-participants). For example, S= Support (x |T=1) = Support (x |T=0) which means 
the matched pairs of the treatment and comparison groups, over the region of common support, 
have the same propensity scores. Next, we calculate the average of the difference between the 
matched treatment and comparison groups. This calculation can be treated as the impact of 
microfinance programmes (Kono & Takahashi, 2010). If the region in which the support of x does not 
overlap for the treatment and comparison groups, matching is performed only over the common 
support region (Lechner, 2000). This means that interpretation of microfinance impact has to be 
redefined as the mean treatment effect of those individual or household that fall within the common 
support (Blundell, Dearden & Sianesi, 2005). 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) note that the first and second assumptions can be called “strong 
ignorability” in practice. Strong ignorability implies that the balancing scores indicate the 
distributions of covariates between the treatment and comparison groups are the same (Rosenbaum 
& Rubin, 1983). That means if treatment assignment is strongly ignorable, then the difference 
between the treatment and comparison groups at each value of a balancing score is an unbiased 
estimation of the treatment effect. Moreover, pair matching, sub-classification and covariance 
adjustment on a balancing score can produce an unbiased estimate of ATE (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 
1983). 
Heckman et al. (1997) provide an alternative assumption to estimate ATT under the matching 
method. 
c. Mean Independence 
𝐸(𝑦0|𝑇 = 1, 𝑥) = 𝐸(𝑦0|𝑇 = 0, 𝑥) = 𝐸(𝑦0|𝑥) and 𝐸(𝑦1|𝑇 = 1, 𝑥) = 𝐸(𝑦1|𝑇 = 0, 𝑥) = 𝐸(𝑦1|𝑥) 
Based on the above assumptions, the mean impact of the treatment on the treated can be shown as 
(Kono & Takahashi, 2010; Phan, 2012): 
𝛿𝑃𝑆𝑀
𝐴𝑇𝑇 = 𝐸(𝑦1|𝑇 = 1, 𝑥) − 𝐸(𝑦0|𝑇 = 1, 𝑥)                 (3.28a) 
𝛿𝑃𝑆𝑀
𝐴𝑇𝑇 = [𝐸(𝑦1|𝑇 = 1, 𝑥) − 𝐸(𝑦0|𝑇 = 0, 𝑥)] − [𝐸(𝑦0|𝑇 = 1, 𝑥) − 𝐸(𝑦0|𝑇 = 0, 𝑥)]          (3.28b) 
𝛿𝑃𝑆𝑀
𝐴𝑇𝑇 = 𝐸(𝑦1|𝑇 = 1, 𝑥) − 𝐸(𝑦0|𝑇 = 0, 𝑥)                 (3.28c) 
Where: 
y1, y0: are the potential outcomes in the two counterfactual situations (i.e., participation in the 
microfinance programme and no participation in the microfinance programme). 
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The first line in equation (3.28a) shows the policy effect. The effect is defined by the difference 
between the economic and social indicators of households participating in the microfinance 
programme and for the same household in the counterfactual that does not participate in the 
microfinance programme. Based on 𝐸(𝑦0|𝑇 = 1, 𝑥) = 𝐸(𝑦0|𝑇 = 0, 𝑥), ATT can be estimated 
consistently if unobserved characteristics of households are not important factors of selection for 
participation in microfinance programme (Kono & Takahashi, 2010). 
However, Marr (2012) argues that PSM cannot control for unobserved characteristics that affect 
microfinance participation. Moreover, the method is suitable only for cross-sectional survey data 
(Dehejia & Wahba, 2002). Nguyen (2007) notes concerns about the bias in microfinance impact 
assessment using PSM and cross-sectional data. The author proposes using panel data with PSM and 
the fixed effect models to solve this problem. Phan et al. (2013) deal with this problem using panel 
data and estimate PSM in the first period to match borrowers and non-borrowers using a set of 
observed characteristics. In the first stage, PSM creates a new data set consisting of borrower and 
non-borrower groups that are more comparable in terms of observed characteristics than the 
original panel data. The purpose of this step is to remove observed heterogeneity in the first period 
before using the fixed effect model to investigate the impact of microfinance programmes (Heckman 
et al., 1997). Phan et al. (2013) conclude that PSM and the fixed effect model can solve observed and 
unobserved biases. The next section explains how the fixed effect model works. 
3.2.2.2 The Fixed Effect Model 
Panel data are used to solve the unobserved variable bias when measuring the impact of VFs and 
SGPs (Boonperm et al., 2013). This study uses panel data and the fixed effect (FE) model to evaluate 
the impact of VFs and SGPs in Thailand. There are some advantages to using a FE model. First, the 
model can control for relevant unobserved characteristics that do not change over time (Lensink & 
Pham 2008). Secondly, the FE model also allows observed characteristics to be arbitrarily correlated 
with unobserved fixed effects. This means that the estimates in this model are robust (Wooldridge, 
2009). However, there are some factors that are time-constant (e.g., gender). These factors cannot 
be included in this model because we cannot distinguish the effects of time-constant factors from 
unobserved fixed effects or if unobserved fixed effects can be arbitrarily correlated with regressors 
(Wooldridge, 2009). Although this model can control unobserved time-invariant attributes, it does 
not entirely control the endogeneity problem1 that comes from unobserved attributes that may 
change over time (Khandekar, 2005). It is necessary to test for endogeneity to detect whether the FE 
method is sufficient to determine the exogeneous programme impact or if instrument variables (IVs) 
                                                          
1 Endogeneity is likely to occur if the assumption of unobserved factors at household, village and community 
levels does not remain fixed. Probable sources of endogeneity in this study include, a change in lending 
regulations that might affect microfinance participation and a household’s income and expenditure. 
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are need for the identification of the endogenious programme impact (Khandekar, 2005; Phan et al., 
2013). To overcome the problem of endogeneity, this study could use village poverty rates and the 
distance from the village to the nearest MFIs as IVs; however, this information is not available. This 
study uses Boonperm et al.’s (2013) model: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝑇𝑖𝑡𝛾 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑡∅ +  𝑖𝑡                   (3.29) 
Where 𝑦𝑖𝑡  indicates the outcome variables of interest, e.g., household income and consumption for 
household i at time t (t= 2012, 2017), 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a set of regressors that are the observed household 
characteristics, such as household head’s gender, household head’s age, number of household 
members, education level, careers, value of house and land holding, 𝑇𝑖𝑡is a programme participation 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if individual or household i takes a loan from microfinance 
programme in time t and 0 otherwise. 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑡 is a vector of year dummy that considers time-specific 
effects, 𝛼𝑖 indicates unobserved characteristic of the household and 𝑖𝑡 is an error term. 
A fixed effect model sets a separate intercept (𝛼𝑖) for each household to eliminate (unobserved) 
heterogeneity across households. The model is given in equation (3.30): 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 − 𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 =  (𝑋𝑖𝑡 − 𝑋𝑖𝑡−1)𝛽 + (𝑇𝑖𝑡 − 𝑇𝑖𝑡−1)𝛾 + (𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑡 − 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑡−1)∅ + ( 𝑖𝑡 − 𝑖𝑡−1)     
           (3.30) 
This study estimates the impact of VFs and SGPs on VFs’ and SGPs borrowers’ economic and social 
welfare using equation (3.30). The model generates within estimates that are identified by variation 
over time whether a household borrows from the VFs or SGPs. This study uses secondary data from 
Thailand’s Socioeconomic Survey (2012 and 2017) collected by the National Statistical Officeof the 
Ministry of Information and Communication Technology. The survey interviewed 6,000 households 
across the country. Data were collected monthly. The information includes a variety of household 
socioeconomic data, such as household basics, covering income, expenses, assets, and liabilities. It is 
important to use data from both 2012 and 2017 to evaluate the impact of microfinance borrowing, 
because the impact of microfinance borrowing in equation (3.30) comes from a change in borrowing 
habits in variable 𝑇𝑖𝑡. Therefore, we cannot estimate the impact of microfinance programmes, 𝑦, if 
borrowing habits do not change (Boonperm et al., 2013). This means that if a borrower takes a loan 
one year and another year does not borrow or vice versa, we can still estimate the impact of 
microfinance programmes. 
In summary, this study uses both the PSM and the fixed effect methods because they can solve 
observed and unobserved biases. PSM is estimated for the first time to match borrowers with non-
borrowers, using a set of observable characteristics. This method is used to create a new panel data 
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set that consists of borrower and non-borrower groups with similar observed characteristics. The 
objective of this step is to eradicate the observed heterogeneity in the initial period before using the 
fixed effect model (Heckman et al., 1997). 
3.3 MFIs’ Performance 
This section explains the conceptual framework and methodology used to investigate MFIs’ 
performance. 
3.3.1 Conceptual Framework 
This study focuses on institutional characteristics: outreach, productivity, and financial performance 
of MFIs in Thailand. The institutional characteristics provide us with a picture of an individual MFI. 
This study includes MFI age, the number of personnel, profit, total assets, total liabilities and total 
equity. An MFI’s age is associated with experience. Shahzad (2015) evaluated South Asian MFIs’ 
performance and finds that older MFIs are more efficient than younger MFIs. Hermes et al. (2008) 
argue that MFI age indicates the number of years since its establishment and older MFIs can learn 
how to manage their MFIs with microfinance practices by trial and error. Kar (2012) states that older 
MFIs may benefit from organizational learning. Therefore, in this study, MFI age is hypothesized to 
affect MIF performance. 
The number of personnel refers to the total number of staff members; the more staff members an 
MFI has, the larger an MFI is. MFIs that have more staff are more capable of serving and keeping 
track of a larger number of borrowers (El-Maksoud, 2016). El-Maksoud (2016) notes that larger MFIs 
can hire more staff and open new branches, which means that they are more capable of reaching 
more borrowers. Anduanbessa (2009) evaluated Ethiopian MFIs’ performance and finds that the 
number of staff members affects MFI outreach. 
MFI profit shows the profit, which reflects an MFI’s ability to cover its costs with its revenue, without 
accounting for implicit grants and subsidies (Cull, Demirguc-Kunt, & Morduch, 2016, 2018). 
Sustainability means that an MFI is financially viable into the future (Shaoyan & Duwal, 2012). This 
indicates that an MFI should generate sufficient profit to cover its expenses while eliminating all 
subsidies. Dissanayake (2012) points out that MFIs must be well designed to be profitable and 
alleviate poverty. 
MFI assets show the MFI’s size. Larger MFIs can benefit from economies of scale by reducing 
operating expenses and therefore achieving greater financial performance (Meyer, 2019). MFI assets 
are associated with MFI‘s FSS (Mersland & Storm, 2009). Greater assets can imply that an MFI has 
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more capital; thus larger MFIs can reach greater numbers of people than smaller MFIs (Mersland & 
Storm, 2009). 
The term total liabilities refers to all liability accounts, which represent everything that an MFI owes 
to others (CGAP, 2003). Total liabilities include all deposits, borrowings, accounts payable, and other 
liability accounts (CGAP, 2003). When MFIs take on more debt instruments, efficient liability 
management and planning is key to growing the institutions (Bayai & Ikhide, 2016). Muriu (2011) 
states that if MFIs employ more debt in their capital structure, these institutions can increase their 
profits. However, Dissanayake (2012) finds that total liabilities do not affect an MFI’s performance. 
Kar (2012) explains that long-term debts are more expensive and, therefore, employing a high 
proportion of these debts could lead to lower profitability. 
Total equity covers total assets once total liabilities have been deducted (CGAP, 2003). Total equity is 
the sum of all equity accounts net equity distributions, e.g., dividends, stock repurchases, or other 
cash payments made to shareholders (CGAP, 2003). Kar (2012) states that capital structure has an 
impact on MFI performance. Bayai and Ikhide (2016) point out that equity is cheap and can increase 
an MIF’s FSS.  
Outreach efforts demonstrate an MFI’s ability to reach the poor and ensure the efficient use of 
funds. MFI outreach can be evaluated using two aspects: depth of outreach and breadth of outreach 
(Ngo, 2012). The depth of outreach refers to borrowers’ poverty and the breath of outreach refers to 
the scale of an MFI’s operations (Ngo, 2012). Almost all MFIs’ core aim is to expand outreach. The 
most common indicators used to measure outreach are average loan balance per borrower and 
number of active borrowers, representing the depth and breadth of outreach (Bhuiyan et al., 2011; 
Ngo, 2012). 
Productivity refers to the volume of business that is generated (output) for any given resource or 
asset (input) (Ledgerwood, 1998). Several ratios are commonly used to evaluate MFI productivity. 
These ratios focus on MFI staff productivity because they are the primary revenue generators. This 
study uses average loan balance per borrower, borrowers per staff member, and loans per staff 
member, which are like Bhuiyan et al.’s (2011) and Rahman and Mazlan’s (2014) studies. 
The financial performance of MFIs can be evaluated using two indicators: financial structure and 
financial performance (Rahman & Mazlan, 2014). Financial structure includes five factors: capital per 
asset, debt per equity, deposit per loans, deposit per total assets, and gross loan portfolio per assets. 
Financial performance is whether an MFI is profitable enough to maintain and expand its services 
without subsidies (Rosenberg, 2009). Financial performance covers three indicators: ROE shows 
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institutional profitability; ROA is institutional profitability that reflects both the institutional profit 
margin and institutional efficiency; OSS measures how well an MFI can cover its costs.  
Some studies use two indicators (financial structure and financial performance) to evaluate MFIs 
(e.g., Agarwal & Sinha, 2010; Bhuiyan et al., 2011; Rahman & Mazlan, 2014). Agarwal and Sinha 
(2010) evaluated MFI performance using six parameters of financial performance: financial structure; 
revenue; expenses; efficiency; productivity; and risk. The author finds that in India the best 
performing firms follow different business models. This result is reflected in particular parameters 
such as the capital per asset ratio, deposits to loans, deposits to total assets, gross loan portfolio per 
total assets and ROA. Bhuiyan et al. (2011) compared financial sustainability and outreach between 
MFIs in Malaysia and Bangladesh using the same indicators as Agarwal and Sinha (2010) and 
indicators that show MFI outreach. Their results show that Malaysian MFIs perform better than 
those in Bangladesh in terms of operational self-sufficiency, earning revenue and financial expenses. 
The authors show that Malaysian MFIs have lower expenses than Bangladeshi MFIs. However, 
Malaysian MFIs’ performance is lower in terms of outreach. Malaysian MFIs have lower performance 
levels in terms of active borrowers, the number of the loans outstanding, and gross loan portfolios. 
Bhuiyan et al. (2011) suggest that MFIs in Malaysia should adopt Islamic microfinance principles 
because they deal with poor people. Rahman and Mazlan (2014) compared the financial 
performance of five MFIs in Bangladesh. The authors used the performance indicators financial 
structure and financial performance. These indicators consist of the capital assets ratio; debt to 
equity; deposit to loans; deposits to total assets; gross loan portfolio to assets; ROA; ROE; OSS. They 
find that all MFIs are financially sustainable because all of them exhibit positive values for both ROE 
and ROA.  
This study compares the institutional characteristics, outreach, productivity, financial structure and 
financial performance of VFs and SGPs in Thailand using the performance indicators and ratios shown 
in Table 3.2. There are five ratios in financial structure: the capital per asset ratio; debt per equity 
(%); deposit per loans (%); deposits per total assets (%); gross loan portfolio per assets (%). The 
capital per asset ratio is used to evaluate MFI solvency. This variable also shows an MFI’s ability to 
meet its obligations and absorb unexpected losses (Yenesew, 2014). Yenesew (2014) states that the 
determination of an acceptable ratio level is generally based on an MFI assessment: expected losses; 
financial strength; and ability to absorb losses. This means that the ratio measures the amount of 
capital required to cover unexpected losses. This study uses capital per asset ratio as a proxy for 
MFIs’ capital. That means if an MFI has higher capital per asset ratio, this MFI is safer than lower ratio 
institutions. Agarwal and Sinha (2010) evaluated MFIs performance in India. The authors find that the 
capital per asset ratio shows that MFIs in India are different in terms of their risk management 
practices because Indian MFIs maintain divergent capital per asset ratios. However, Agarwal and 
 65 
Sinha (2010) do not explain why MFIs do this. Bhuiyan et al. (2011) compared MFI financial 
sustainability and outreach in Malaysia and Bangladesh. They find that the capital per asset ratio of 
MFIs in Malaysia is lower than that in Bangladesh; the capital per asset ratio of MFIs in Malaysia is 
15.4, whereas in Bangladesh it is 23.9. However, Bhuiyan et al. (2011) do not explain why the capital 
per asset ratio of MFIs in Malaysia is lower than in Bangladesh. 
Table 3.2 Institutional Characteristics, Outreach, Productivity, Financial Performance 
Measurement Indicators and Ratios 
Indicator Ratio or Calculation 




Total Assets  




The Number of Members 
(persons) 
The Number of Borrowers 
(Persons) 
Average Loan Balance per 
Borrower (Baht per Borrower) 
 
3. Productivity 
Borrowers per Staff Member 
 
 
Loans per Staff Member 
 
4. Financial Structure 
 
Age of MFI 
Number of Personnel 
MFI’s Profit 
Total Assets of MFI 
Total Liability of MFI 
Total Equity of MFI 
 
 
Number of Members 
 
Number of Borrowers 
 
Gross Loan Portfolio












Capital per Asset Ratio Equity
Assets
 
Debt per Equity (%) Liabilities
Equity
 
Deposit per Loan (%) Deposits
Gross Loan Portfolio
 
Deposits per Total Assets (%) Deposits
Assets
 






5. Financial Performance  
ROA (Net Operating Income − Taxes)
AverageTotal Assets
 




(Financial Expense + Net Impairment + Operating Expense)
 
Source: Bhuiyan et al. (2011); Rahman, and Mazlan (2014) 
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The debt per equity ratio is measured by dividing total liability by total equity. Total liability includes 
all the debt that an MFI owes, such as deposits, borrowings, and other liability accounts. This ratio is 
the simplest indication of capital adequacy because the ratio reflects an MFI’s overall leverage 
(Yenesew, 2014). Muriu (2011) evaluated MFIs’ profitability in 32 countries. The author asserts that if 
MFIs employ more debt in their capital structure, these institutions can increase their profits. Muriu 
also shows that a higher debt per equity ratio can improve ROE. Dissanayake (2012) investigated the 
factors affecting MFIs’ profitability in Sri Lanka. The author finds that the debt to equity ratio is 
negative but is statistically insignificant in relation to MFIs’ performance. 
The deposit per loan ratio indicates self-sufficiency and an institution’s ability to mobilize savings 
(Eur-U-Sa, 2011). Eur-U-Sa (2011) evaluated the performance of The BAAC in Thailand. The author 
finds that the deposit per loan ratio of the BAAC gradually increased between 1967 and 2009. This 
means that the bank is moving towards becoming a self-financing institution. Bhuiyan et al. (2011) 
evaluated the financial sustainability and outreach of MFIs in Malaysia and Bangladesh. They find 
that the deposit per loan ratio of MFIs in Malaysia is higher than the ratio in Bangladesh. This means 
that Malaysian MFIs have greater levels of self-financing than Bangladeshi MFIs. However, Bhuiyan et 
al. (2011) do not explain why the deposit per loan ratios of Malaysian MFIs are higher than 
Bangladeshi ratios. 
The deposit per total asset ratio is measured by dividing total deposits by total assets. This ratio is 
only relevant for mobilizing MFIs’ deposits. If an MFI has an efficient deposit programme, this ratio 
will be high. This means that an institution has low funding costs (Muriu, 2011). Muriu explains that 
external funding is more costly than deposits, thus MFIs may effectively use local depositors. 
However, Rahman and Mazlan (2014), who evaluated MFI sustainability in Bangladesh, find that 
Bangladeshi MFIs do not use deposits as their main source of funds. The main source of their funds 
comes from debt-financing, which explains why the debt to equity ratio of these MFIs is high. 
Evaluating Indian MFIs performance, Agarwal and Sinha (2010) find that most Indian MFIs do not use 
deposits as their primary funding source. The results, which are the same as Rahman and Mazlan’s 
(2014) ones, show that the debt to equity ratio of these Indian MFIs is high. This means that their 
main funding is debt. 
The gross loan portfolio per asset ratio is measured by dividing the gross loan portfolio by total 
assets. This ratio is one indicator that shows the financial structure. The ratio indicates the 
proportion of MFIs’ core earning assets. Rahman and Mazlan (2014) use this ratio to compare the 
financial structure of five Bangladeshi MFIs. Their results show that the gross loan portfolio to assets 
ratio of Bangladeshi MFIs is high. Though Bhuiyan et al. (2011) use this variable to compare the 
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financial structure of Malaysian and Bangladeshi MFIs, their results reveal that Malaysian MFIs’ ratio 
is higher than Bangladeshi MFIs’ one. 
MFI financial performance consists of ROA, ROE, and operational self-sufficiency. ROA is measured by 
dividing net operating income by total assets. This variable reflects an MFI’s ability to deploy its asset 
profitably. Nyamsogoro (2010) shows that Tanzanian MFIs had a negative return on assets between 
2001 and 2002 because these institutions were starting businesses in a new environment. Therefore, 
ROA experiences both positive and negative values. Rahman and Mazlan (2014) used this ratio to 
compare the financial performance of five Bangladeshi MFIs. They conclude that Bangladeshi MFIs 
are financially sustainable because this ratio is positive. Agarwal and Sinha (2010) used this variable 
to evaluate the financial performance of Indian MFIs. The authors find that MFIs in India are 
financially sustainable. 
ROE is measured by dividing net operating income by total equity. ROE reflects the efficiency of 
operations and proper portfolio management in relation to equity (Nyamsogoro, 2010). This ratio is a 
crucial indicator for private investors when deciding whether to invest in MFIs (Ledgerwood, 1998). 
Shaoyan and Duwal (2012) used ROE to measure the operating performance of Nepalese MFIs. The 
authors state that ROE can be used to measure returns on owners’ investments. Shaoyan and 
Duwal’s (2012) result shows that Nepalese MFIs perform better than the global benchmark. Rahman 
and Mazlan (2014) used ROE to evaluate Bangladeshi MFIs sustainability. They find that ROE is 
positive, which means that Bangladeshi MFIs are financially sustainable. 
Operational self-sufficiency is measured by dividing operating income by operating expenditure. 
Meyer (2002) states that operational self-sustainability means that the operating income is sufficient 
to cover operating costs (such as salaries and wages, supplies, loan losses, and other administrative 
costs). Some studies use this variable to evaluate MFI sustainability. Bogan (2012) evaluated how 
changes in capital structure can improve financial sustainability using operational self-sustainability. 
The author uses panel data from MFIs in Latin America, Asia, and Eastern Europe between 2003 and 
2006. Bogan’s results show that assets and capital structure affect MFIs’ performance. Asset size is 
positive and significantly influenced by sustainability. The grant per asset ratio is significantly, 
negatively influenced by sustainability. The relationship between grant per asset and sustainability 
means that MFIs should rely less on grants, soft loans, and other types of donor funds. Sekabira 
(2013) investigated the sustainability of 14 MFIs in Uganda, based on capital structure. The study 
uses operational self-sustainability and financial self-sustainability to measure sustainability. Sekabira 
finds that debt and grants are negatively correlated with operational and financial self-sustainability 
and that capital structure is essential for MFIs’ sustainability. The author states that when MFIs 
increase their debts, they struggle to make repayments. Moreover, when MFIs receive more grants, 
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operations become less competitive because these funds are given to borrowers at lower than 
market interest rates. This practice reduces interest revenue and funds for future operations. 
3.3.2 Methodology 
This study compares both VFs’ and SGPs’ performance, including MFI characteristics, outreach, 
productivity, financial structure and financial performance. The data were collected from the annual 
reports of MFIs between 2014 and 2016. VFs’ and SGPs’ annual reports were collected by the GSB 
between 2014 and 2016. GSB collected these data through the MFIs competition in Thailand. The 
MFIs competition is an annual contest run by the GSB. There are over 100 MFIs in Thailand that 
participate in this contest. This study uses data from 90 VFs and 70 SGPs in Thailand. The annual 
reports include the total number of members and borrowers, the total number of staff members, the 
total cash, loans outstanding, assets, liabilities, equity, revenue, expenses, and net profit. This study 
uses descriptive statistics to assess VFs’ and SGPs’ performance. 
3.4 Determinants that Affect MFIs’ Sustainability 
In this section, we investigate the determinants that affect MFI sustainability. There are two sub-
sections; the conceptual framework and the economic model and variables. The conceptual 
framework for MFIs’ sustainability covers the definition, the concept, ideas and related research; the 
empirical model and the variables explain the econometric model. 
3.4.1 Conceptual Framework 
This section focuses on MFIs’ sustainability in terms of financial sustainability. Kinde (2012) states 
that MFI financial sustainability is a key dimension of MFI sustainability. Financial sustainability is 
defined as an MFI’s ability to cover all its costs from its own generated income without depending on 
subsidies or donations (Kinde, 2012). Dunford (2003) defines financial sustainability as the ability of 
an MFI to achieve its objectives without donor support. These definitions emphasize self-sufficiency 
(Kinde, 2012). Therefore, MFIs’ sustainability means that an MFI can cover all its costs from its 
operational income.   
Several studies have investigated the factors affecting MFIs’ sustainability (Khan, Butt, & Khan, 2017; 
Kinde 2012; Rahman & Mazlan, 2014; Woldeyes, 2012). Woldeyes (2012) reviewed the factors that 
affect operational and financial sustainability of an MFI in Ethipoia, such as yield (yield on gross loan 
portfolio), portfolio at risk (PAR), the liquidity ratio (current ratio), the number of borrowers per staff 
member, cost per borrower, the operating expense ratio, the average disbursed loan size (depth of 
outreach), the size of the MFI, the debt to equity ratio, and the age. The author uses panel data 
regression, with six years of data (2005 to 2010) for 12 MFIs in Ethiopia. The author finds four factors 
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affect operational sustainability: the average loan balance per borrower; the size of the MFI; the cost 
per borrower; and the yield on gross loan portfolio. Woldeyes identifies three determinants that 
affect financial sustainability: cost per borrower, the number of active borrowers, and the yield on 
gross loan portfolio. The author finds that though MFIs in Ethiopia are operationally self-sufficient, 
they are not financially self-sufficient. The author recommends that these MFIs should reconsider the 
number of borrowers they have, serve borrowers at the lowest cost, and use their short-term assets 
to generate more cash and financial revenue. They should also increase loan size and the value of 
total assets. 
Kinde (2012) examined the determinants that affect the financial sustainability of MFIs in Ethiopia. 
The author uses FSS to represent financial sustainability, with panel data regression for the period 
2002 to 2010. The author identifies four factors that affect MFIs’ sustainability: the breadth of 
outreach, the depth of outreach, the dependency ratio, and the cost per borrower. The author 
suggests that these MFIs should minimize their dependency on donated capital to be operationally 
competent. They should also increase the number of borrowers so that they can increase the volume 
of loans. However, an increase in loan volume does not guarantee financial sustainability. They 
should have an effective follow-up plan to ensure a higher repayment rate.  
Rahman and Mazlan (2014) investigated the determinants that impact on the FSS of MFIs in 
Bangladesh. They use multiple regression and the independent variables from Woldeyes’ (2012) 
study. The authors find only three factors affect FSS: MFI size, MFI age and the operating expense 
ratio. The authors recommend that MFIs in Bangladesh should reduce their dependence on donor 
funds, reduce operational costs, generate financial revenue and increase their total assets.  
Khan et al. (2017) investigated the determinants that affect the FSS of MFIs in Pakistan, India, and 
Bangladesh. The authors use panel data from 2011 to 2015. They find that MFI size, the loan 
portfolio to total assets, portfolio at risk, the breadth of outreach, management inefficiency, and the 
operating cost ratio impact FSS. The authors suggest that these MFIs should increase their 
borrowers’ repayment rates. They also suggest that MFI management should be more efficient in 
disbursing loans and collecting repayments and should reduce their transaction and administrative 
expenses. 
For Thailand, Eur-U-Sa (2011) states that studies on MFI performance are still limited. Eur-U-Sa 
(2011) investigated BAAC performance and outreach. The author examined the relationship between 
outreach and financial performance, using data from BAAC’s 2004 t0 2009 annual reports. The 
author finds that the breadth of outreach indicators have complementary relationships with financial 
performance and financial sustainability. The results also show that the BAAC successfully manages 
its credit risk, which leads to good financial performance and financial sustainability. The BAAC has a 
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large outreach programme. However, the BAAC does not reach truly poor farmers because 
government policies, designed to reach them, are not effective. The author suggests that BAAC 
should design products that suit poor farmers, such as insurance products, more practice on joint 
liability group lending and cash-flow based lending. 
This study focuses on FSS, which is defined as the ability of an MFI to achieve its objectives without 
donor support. The study follows the works of Dunford (2003) and Kinde (2012). I use determinants 
that affect the FSS of MFIs in Thailand based on panel data regression. I use secondary data as did 
Kinde (2012), Woldeyes (2012) and Khan et al. (2017). 
3.4.2 Empirical Model and Variables 
I use a panel regression model to identify the determinants of FSS of MFIs in Thailand. I use the panel 
regression model because of its advantages over cross-section and time-series data methods (Kinde, 
2012). Kinde (2012) states that panel data involve the pooling of observations on a cross-section of 
units over several time periods. This can increase the degrees of freedom and, therefore, the power 
of the test (Kinde, 2012). It means that panel data are more useful than either cross-section or time-
series data alone. Brook (2008) states that the advantages of using a panel data set include 
increasing the degrees of freedom and mitigating multicollinearity problems among the independent 
variables. The variables used in this model are derived from the Rahman and Mazlan’s (2014) study. 
The panel regression model for FSS of MFIs (Kinde, 2012) is: 
𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑌𝐼𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑛𝑆𝐼𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐷𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝐵𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐿𝑛𝐴𝐿𝐵𝑃𝐵𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐿𝑛𝐴𝐺𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽8𝐿𝑛𝑀𝐴𝐵𝑖𝑡𝛽9𝑂𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡 +∈𝑖𝑡        (3.31) 
Where:  
FSS: is the financial self-sufficiency ratio of MFI i at time t;  
𝛼𝑖: is a constant term; 
YIE: is the yield on gross loan portfolio (+); 
SIZ: is the total assets (+); 
PP: is the personnel productivity ratio (+); 
DE: is the debt to equity ratio (-); 
CB: is the cost per borrower (-); 
ALBPB: is the average loan balance per borrower (+); 
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AG: is the age of the MFI (+); 
MAB: is the number of active borrowers (+); 
OER: is the ratio of operating expense (-); and 
∈: is the error term. 
Table 3.3 defines the indicators used in the panel regression model. 
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Our hypotheses relating to the independent variables and FSS are based on findings in the literature. 
The yield on gross loan portfolio (+) is positively related to FSS. Woldeyes (2012) states that yield on 
gross loan portfolio shows an MFI’s efficiency in generating cash revenue from its outstanding 
portfolio. Cull et al. (2007) assessed patterns of profitability, loan repayments and cost reductions in 
124 micro-banks in 49 countries. The authors find that yield on gross loan portfolio is positive and 
significantly associated with FSS for individual lenders. However, the result is not true for village 
banks and solidarity group lenders. Cull et al. (2007) state that the yield on gross loan portfolio of 
both types of lender is negative and insignificant. Woldeyes (2012) concludes that yield on the gross 
loan portfolio indicates an MFI’s ability to generate revenue that covers its financial and operating 
expenses. Similarly, Nyamsogoro (2010) evaluated the financial sustainability of MFIs in Tanzania and 
finds that there is a positive relationship between gross loan portfolio yield and FSS. Nyamsogoro‘s 
result provides evidence that an MFI’s ability to generate revenue positively affects its financial 
sustainability. 
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MFI size is hypothesized to positively influence MFIs’ FSS. Size can be measured using the value of an 
MFI’s assets (Cull et al., 2007; Woldeyes, 2012). Cull et al. (2007) and Woldeyes (2012) find that the 
MFI size significantly positively affects the FSS of MFIs. Cull et al. (2007) conclude that MFIs size is 
significantly, positively related to three financial performance indicators: FSS, OSS, and ROA. 
Woldeyes (2012) agrees with Cull et al.’s (2007) argument that an increase in size causes a positive 
change in OSS. Mersland and Storm (2009) state that size is associated with the FSS of MFIs and 
conclude that larger MFIs have more capital thus they can reach more people than smaller MFIs. 
The personnel productivity ratio is hypothesized to positively influence the FSS of MFIs. This is 
measured by dividing the number of active borrowers by the number of loan officers (CGAP, 2003). 
However, loan officers have some duties that overlap with other microfinance staff. Thus, 
productivity can be measured by dividing active borrowers by the number of officers (Kinde, 2012). 
This ratio is the personnel productivity ratio. A higher ratio reflects an MFI’s ability to use its staff 
efficiently. Nyamsogoro (2010) studied the relationship between the number of borrowers per staff 
member and the financial sustainability of rural Tanzanian MFIs. The author’s results show a 
negative, strong statistically significant relationship between borrowers per staff member and 
financial sustainability. However, Nyamsogoro also concludes that Tanzanian MFIs’ staff in rural areas 
are not efficient because they fail to manage borrowers when the number of borrowers grows. 
The debt to equity ratio is hypothesized to negatively influence the FSS of MFIs. This ratio indicates 
the capital structure. A high ratio implies that MFIs are leveraged rather than financed through 
equity capital (Kinde, 2012). Kinde (2012) investigated the factors affecting the FSS of Ethiopian MFIs. 
The author finds that debt to equity has a negative, statistically insignificant impact on FSS. This 
result implies that the combination of various sources of capital does not improve an MFI’s FSS. The 
negative coefficient shows that the more MFIs are debt-financed than by other sources of finance, 
the less sustainable they are. According to Nyamsogoro (2010), equity is a relatively cheap source of 
funding; equity can improve MFIs’ sustainability. The author shows that capital structure is positively 
correlated with MFIs’ sustainability. The capital structure represents the percentage of equity to total 
long-term capital. Therefore, a positive coefficient shows that the more MFIs are equity financed 
(than with other sources of finance), the greater the improvement in their sustainability. This result 
could be caused by the fact that owners benefit not from debt, but rather from the loans given to 
them. This makes equity a cheaper source of finance. In short, it improves financial sustainability. 
Cost per borrower covers MFI efficiency. This variable evaluates the cost of MFI management. Some 
studies have investigated the relationship between cost per borrower and MFI sustainability. Kinde 
(2012) evaluated the financial sustainability of Ethiopian MFIs and finds that there is a negative 
relationship between the cost per borrower and financial sustainability. The result indicates that an 
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increase in cost per borrower reduces MFIs’ financial sustainability. This result implies that cost 
reductions can improve financial sustainability. Woldeyes (2012) reviewed the factors that affect 
Ethiopian MFI sustainability and finds that there is a negative, statistically significant correlation 
between the cost per borrower and MFIs’ sustainability. The result indicates that an increase in cost 
per borrower reduces MFIs’ operational sustainability.  
The average loan balance per borrower is measured using the depth of outreach (Ledgerwood, 
1998). This means that smaller loans reflect poorer clients (Cull et al., 2007; Mersland & Storm, 
2009). Cull et al. (2007) studied the financial performance and outreach of 124 MFIs in 49 developing 
countries. The authors state that average loan size is a proxy for a customer’s poverty level. This 
variable indicates that smaller loans show poorer customers. Some studies examined the relationship 
between average loan balance per borrower and MFI sustainability. Adongo and Stork (2005) 
investigated the factors that influence the financial sustainability of Namibian MFIs. They find that 
profitability is related to bigger loans. Similarly, Nyamsogoro (2010) evaluated the financial 
sustainability of Tanzanian MFIs and finds that there is a positive, statistically significant correlation 
between the average loan balance per borrower and MFIs’ sustainability. The result indicates that 
MFI profitability is associated with larger loan size. That means larger loans are related to greater 
cost efficiency and, therefore, profitability.  
MFI age may impact MFIs’ sustainability. This variable refers to the period that an MFI has been in 
operation (Woldeyes, 2012). Kar (2012) states that older MFIs may benefit from organizational 
learning. The learning pattern involves a first period of speeding up and then slowing down, because 
the practically feasible level of development is reached. Therefore, MFIs’ age is hypothesized to 
initially affect MFI sustainability positively and then negatively. Cull et al (2007) evaluated the 
financial performance and outreach of 124 MFIs in 49 developing countries. The authors find a 
positive relationship between MFI age and sustainability. In contrast, Nyamsogoro (2010) finds that 
in Tanzania MFI age is not related to financial sustainability.  
The number of active borrowers is hypothesized to positively affect MFI sustainability. In their study 
of Indian MFIs, Crombrugghe, Tenikue and Sureda (2008) state that increasing the number of 
borrowers per officer raises the OSS and FSS. This result indicates a positive relationship between the 
number of borrowers and profitability. This means that the cost of serving one more borrower in 
microfinance programmes increases minimally. Therefore, increasing the number of borrowers raises 
an MFI’s sustainability. Likewise, Kinde (2012) finds that there is a positive relationship between 
active borrowers and MFI sustainability. This is because increasing the number of borrowers 
increases the number of sales, which is one way to maximize profitability and ultimately financial 
sustainability. The author also states that when the number of borrowers increases, MFIs enjoy an 
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economy of scale and so reduce their costs, leading to financial sustainability. In contrast, 
Nyamsogoro (2010) finds that active borrowers are negatively related to financial sustainability in 
Tanzania. Nyamsogoro explains that Tanzanian microfinance staff are not efficient, therefore they 
cannot manage when the number of borrowers increases. 
Operating expense ratio is hypothesized to negatively affect MIFs’ sustainability. Nyamsogoro (2010) 
finds that the operating expense ratio is negatively related to Tanzanian MFIs’ sustainability. This 
means that if MFIs can reduce operating costs, they will be more efficient leading to financial 
sustainability. Dissanayake (2012) investigated factors affecting MFI profitability in Sri Lanka. The 
author finds that the operating expense ratio has a negative, statistically significant correlation with 
MFI sustainability. The author concludes that this variable is a statistically significant predictor 
variable in evaluating the OSS of Sri Lankan MFIs. Dissanayake states that this variable provides an 
overall measure of MFI efficiency. Efficiency in management practices enables MFIs to reach more 
clients and attain higher profit.  
Following the panel regression model above, the estimated impact of the independent variables on 
MFIs’ FSS is assessed in terms of the statistical significance of the coefficient 𝛽𝑖. However, some 
variables are omitted from the model. Therefore, without controlling for these variables, the 
estimated coefficients result in omitted variables bias (Woodridge, 2009). Two methods are 
commonly used to deal with omitted variables: the Fixed Effect (FE) method and the Random Effect 
(RE) method (Hsiao, 2007). Hausman’s test is used to select the more appropriate method. This test 
is based on differences between FE and RE results (Verbeek, 2008; Woldeyes, 2012). The key 
consideration in choosing between FE and RE is the correlation between 𝑋𝑖𝑡 and ∈𝑖𝑡. FE is assumed 
to be consistent when 𝑋𝑖𝑡 and ∈𝑖𝑡 are correlated. In contrast, RE is assumed to be consistent when 
𝑋𝑖𝑡 and ∈𝑖𝑡 are not correlated (Verbeek, 2008; Woldeyes, 2012). Verbeek (2008) states that FE 
estimators are consistent when 𝑋𝑖𝑡 and ∈𝑖𝑡 are correlated, whereas the RE estimator is consistent 
and efficient only if Xit and ∈it are not correlated. 
The data used in this section were obtained from VFs’ and SGPs’ annual reports. These data were 
collected by the GSB between 2014 and 2016. The GSB collected the data through the microfinance 
competition in Thailand. There are 90 VFs and 70 SGPs in Thailand with complete annual reports. The 
annual reports include the number of members, borrowers and staff, the cash, loans outstanding, 
assets, liabilities, equity, revenue, expenses and net profit. 
In summary, this section has outlined the panel regression model that will be used to investigate the 
factors affecting MFI sustainability. The panel regression model was chosen because it increases the 
degrees of freedom and resolves multicollinearity problems among the explanatory variables (Kinde, 
2012). 
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3.5 Chapter Summary 
This study uses four methods to answer the research questions. First, the multinomial logit model is 
used to determine household characteristics that affect their participation in microfinance 
programmes. Secondly, the PSM and the fixed effect models are used to examine the impact of 
microfinance programmes on individual’s and households’ economic and social welfare. These 
methods solve selection bias problems (Carreras, 2012). Thirdly, the study examines MFI 
performance using the institutional characteristics of outreach, productivity, financial structure and 
financial performance. Finally, the study uses the panel regression technique, which involves the 
pooling of observation units in cross-sectional data over several time periods, to investigate the 
determinants that affect MFIs’ sustainability. This method can be used to address a broader range of 
issues and tackle more complex problems (Kinde, 2012). Panel data combine cross-sectional data and 
time series data. This can increase the degrees of freedom and, therefore, the power of the test 
(Kinde, 2012). The model can also solve multicollinearity problems among the explanatory variables 
that can arise if the time series model is used alone (Kinde, 2012). The next chapter presents and 
discusses the results of the empirical models to determine which household characteristics affect 
participation in microfinance programmes. It also examines the impact of microfinance programmes 




This chapter discusses the empirical results of the credit participation and welfare impact models. 
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.1 describes borrower and non-borrower characteristics 
for microfinance programmes. Section 4.2 discusses the factors that influence household 
participation in microfinance programmes. Section 4.3 discusses the impact of MFI participation on 
individual household’s economic and social welfare. Finally, Section 4.4 summarizes the findings. 
4.1 The Characteristics of Microfinance Borrowers and Non-borrowers 
This section discusses the socio-economic and demographic characteristics of borrowers and non-
borrowers. As noted in the previous chapter, it uses cross-sectional data from the Socioeconomic 
Survey (2017) which was collected by the National Statistical Office of the Ministry of Information 
and Communication Technology. Briefly, the survey interviewed 43,210 households (both borrowers 
and non-borrowers) across the country. Of the 43,210 samples, 8,216 (19.01%) households borrowed 
from VFs, 5,394 (12.48%) households borrowed from SGPs and 799 (1.85%) households borrowed 
from both VFs and SGPs. Two thirds (28,801, 66.65%) of the sampled households were non-VF and 
SGP borrowers. 
Table 4.1 summarizes the borrowers’ and non-borrowers’ characteristics. One-way ANOVA (F-test) 
was used to assess whether the mean values of VFs, SGPs, both VFs and SGPs, and non-VF and SGP 
borrowers were statistically different. The Chi-square test was used to evaluate the relationship 
between non-metric household variables and credit participation. The one-way ANOVA (F-test) 
shows that all variables are statistically significant at the 99% level; in short, the mean value of age, 
education, household size, dependency ratio, number of children, number of elderly, monthly 
income, monthly expenditure on food and beverages, financial assets, number of cars and number of 
motorcycles in at least one group are different from the rest. The Chi-square tests are also 
statistically significant at the 99% level. This suggests that microfinance participation is strongly 
associated with marital status, occupation and the household’s geographical location. 
In terms of household head characteristics, the average age of the sample is 54.64 years. VF 
borrowers are the oldest, with an average age of 56.90 years; SGP borrowers are the youngest, with 
an average age of 49.12 years. The average ages of the VF and SGP borrowers and non-VF and SGP 
borrowers are 54.16 and 55.05 years, respectively (see Table 4.1). In terms of gender, approximately 
40% of all the members of the four groups are female. SGP borrowers have the highest education 
level (9.31 years) and VF borrowers have the lowest education level (6.36 years). 
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Both VF and 
SGP Borrowers 
All Respondents Statistical Test 
Household Head Characteristic       
Age (years) 55.05 56.90 49.12 54.16 54.64 F= 314.07*** 
Female (yes=1) 0.41 0.37 0.36 0.41 0.40 chi2= 57.3820*** 
Education (years) 8.39 6.36 9.31 6.73 8.08 F= 735.05*** 
Married (yes=1) 0.58 0.75 0.73 0.76 0.64 chi2 = 1.0e+03*** 
Single (yes=1) 0.14 0.02 0.10 0.02 0.11 chi2 = 917.7399*** 
Demographic       
Household Size (persons) 2.60 3.31 3.40 3.83 2.86 F= 869.16*** 
Dependency Ratio 0.42 0.35 0.33 0.35 0.39 F= 161.15*** 
Number of Children  
(age < 15 yrs) (persons) 
0.41 0.69 0.67 0.90 0.50 F= 436.72*** 
Number of Elderly  
(age > 60 yrs) (persons) 
0.65 0.67 0.40 0.51 0.62 F= 178.55*** 
Occupation      
 
Farmer (yes=1) 0.26 0.71 0.24 0.54 0.35 chi2 = 6.2e+03*** 
Entrepreneur (yes=1) 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.03 chi2 = 124.3592*** 
Formal Worker (yes=1) 0.32 0.19 0.44 0.31 0.31 chi2 = 1.0e+03*** 
Informal Worker (yes=1) 0.33 0.61 0.33 0.51 0.38 chi2 = 2.3e+03 *** 
Income, Expenditure and Assets      
 
Monthly Income (THB 1,000) 25.90 17.77 37.67 25.17 25.81 F= 222.83*** 
Monthly Expenditure on Food 
and Beverages (THB 1,000) 
7.02 6.29 9.10 7.72 7.16 F= 449.43*** 
Financial Assets (THB 1,000) 196.40 67.08 167.52 70.80 165.88 F= 89.86*** 
Number of Cars 0.22 0.07 0.38 0.16 0.21 F= 452.47*** 
Number of Motorcycles 1.07 1.47 1.50 1.69 1.21 F= 764.15*** 
Other Variables      
 










Both VF and 
SGP Borrowers 
All Respondents Statistical Test 
North (yes=1) 0.23 0.31 0.19 0.27 0.24 chi2 = 377.6739*** 
Northeast (yes=1) 0.22 0.47 0.19 0.35 0.26 chi2 = 2.2e+03*** 
South (yes=1) 0.18 0.04 0.22 0.06 0.16 chi2 = 1.2e+03*** 
Rural Household (yes=1) 0.36 0.54 0.35 0.49 0.39 chi2 = 987.3302*** 
Difficulty Obtaining an 
Emergency Loan (yes=1) 
0.08 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.07 chi2 = 324.9032*** 
Total 28,801 8,216 5,394 799 43,210  
Note: *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Source: Author’s calculations
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In terms of marital status, 58% of non-VF and SGP borrowers, 75% of the VF borrowers, 73% of the 
SGP borrowers and 76% of both VF and SGP borrowers are married. There is an average of three 
people per household in all four groups (VF and SGP borrowers, both VF and SGP borrowers, and 
non-VF and SGP borrowers). The dependency ratio is defined as the ratio of non-workers to workers 
in each household (Fongthong & Suriya, 2014). Non-VF and SGP borrowers have the highest 
dependency ratio (0.42). SGP borrowers have the lowest dependency ratio (0.33). The data show 
that the number of children and elderly in all four groups is less than one person per household (see 
Table 4.1). 
Though most non-VF and SGP borrowers are informal workers (self-employed, contributing family 
workers), most VF borrowers are farm workers. SGP borrowers are formal workers (government 
employees, state enterprise employees and private company employees). In terms of occupation, 
most borrowers in the third group (who borrow from both VFs and SGPs) are farmers. SGP borrowers 
have the highest monthly income and monthly expenditure on food and beverages (THB 37.67 and 
THB 9.10 thousand per household, respectively). VF borrowers have the lowest monthly income and 
expenditure on food and beverages of the three groups (THB 17.77 and THB 6.29 thousand per 
household, respectively). Both VF and SGP borrowers and non-VF and SGP borrowers have monthly 
household incomes between THB 25.17 and THB 25.90 thousand and monthly expenditure on food 
and beverages of between THB 7.02 and THB 7.72 thousand, respectively (see Table 4.1). 
Households from the four groups possess many financial assets (see Table 4.1). The average value of 
financial assets is THB 165.88 thousand per household. Non-VF and SGP borrowers have the most 
financial assets and VF borrowers have the least. SGPs borrowers have the highest average number 
of cars (0.38 cars) and VF borrowers have the lowest average number of cars (0.07 cars). Both VF and 
SGP borrowers have the highest average number of motorcycles (1.69 motorcycles), whereas non-VF 
and SGP borrowers, VF borrowers and SGP borrowers have 1.07, 1.47 and 1.50 motorcycles, 
respectively.  
Most VF borrowers (54%) live in rural areas. Thirty-six percent of non-VF and SGP borrowers and 35% 
of SGP borrowers live in rural areas. A minority of non-VF and SGP borrowers, VF, SGP, and both VF 
and SGP borrowers have had trouble accessing loans when faced with an emergency: 8%, 3%, 5% and 
4%, respectively (see Table 4.1). 
4.2 Factors Influencing Microfinance Participation 
There is a variety of factors that influence participation in microfinance programmes. This study 
includes four alternatives (borrowing from either a VF, or an SGP, or borrowing from both a VF and 
an SGP, or non-VF and SGP borrowing) in the multinomial logit model to investigate household 
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borrowing choices. Non-VF and SGP borrowing is taken as a base outcome so that the VF, SGP and 
both VF and SGP coefficients indicate (significant) differences from non-VF and SGP borrowing. 
4.2.1 Model Specification 
The multinomial logit model is coded as four outcomes that affect microfinance credit participation 
(1 = non-VF and SGP borrowing; 2 = borrowing from VFs (only); 3 = borrowing from SGPs (only); 4 = 
borrowing from both VFs and SGPs). The model is interpreted in terms of the odds ratios. The odds 
ratio is defined as the probability of outcome i versus outcome u (Balogun & Yusuf, 2011; Durojaiye 
et al., 2014; Mpuga, 2008; Verbeek, 2008) (see section 3.1.2) is: 
Pn(Tn=i)
Pn(Tn=u)
 = exp[Xn(βi − βu)]          (4.1) 
Where 
𝑃𝑛(Tn = i): Probability of observing outcome i  
𝑃𝑛(Tn = u): Probability of observing outcome u  
X: A vector of characteristics, including household head characteristics and demographics, household 
size, occupations, income and assets 
: Parameters to be estimated 
For the purpose of interpretation, equation (4.1) is transformed into a log form. Equation (4.2) 
expresses the multinomial logit model, which is linear in the logit (Balogun & Yusuf, 2011; Durojaiye 




= [𝑋𝑛(𝛽𝑖 − 𝛽𝑢)]         (4.2) 
The difference between 𝛽𝑖and 𝛽𝑢 in equation (4.2) is the influence of X on the logit of outcome i 
versus outcome u. Equation (4.2) can compute the partial derivative easily because the model is 








= (βi − βu)         (4.3) 
4.2.2 Estimation Strategies 
The multinomial logit model has several estimation tests that are commonly used in association with 
the model (Freese & Long, 2000). The first consideration is to test all coefficients associated with an 
independent variable that are simultaneously equal to zero. This study uses the Likelihood Ratio test 
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(LR test). The LR results test whether an independent variable affects a dependent variable (Freese & 
Long, 2000; Long & Freese, 2014). The second consideration is to test for combining dependent 
categories. The Wald test is used to test if any of the independent variables significantly affects the 
odds of outcome i versus outcome u. This indicates that i and u are indistinguishable with respect to 
the variables in the model. This test is commonly used to determine if two outcomes can be 
combined (Freese & Long, 2000; Long & Freese, 2014; Williams, 2018). The last step is to assess the 
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) assumption. The Hausman test is used to test whether 
the model violates the IIA assumption (Freese & Long, 2000; Hausman & McFadden, 1984; Long & 
Freese, 2014). The IIA assumption implies that adding another alternative or changing the 
characteristics of a third alternative does not affect the relative odds between alternatives i and u 
(Wooldridge, 2007). 
This study conducts an LR test for each independent variable. Table 4.2 shows the test results for the 
independent variables. The results show that all variable effects are significant at the 0.01 level. This 
finding indicates that independent variables affect the dependent variable. 
Table 4.3 shows the Wald test results for combining outcome categories. The results show that all 
combinations are significant at the 0.01 level. This indicates that no categories should be combined. 
Table 4.2 The Likelihood Ratio Test of the Independent Variables 
Independent Variable chi2 df P>chi2 
Household Head Characteristic    
Age (years) 221.825 3 0.000 
Female (yes=1) 116.598 3 0.000 
Education (year) 103.85 3 0.000 
Married (yes=1) 72.201 3 0.000 
Single (yes=1) 115.087 3 0.000 
Demographic    
Household Size (persons) 587.989 3 0.000 
Dependency Ratio 221.427 3 0.000 
Number of Children (age < 15 yrs) (persons) 13.704 3 0.003 
Number of Elderly People (age > 60 yrs) (persons) 108.274 3 0.000 
Occupation    
Farmer (yes=1) 889.8 3 0.000 
Entrepreneur (yes=1) 46.653 3 0.000 
Formal Worker (yes=1) 76.222 3 0.000 
Informal Worker (yes=1) 88.126 3 0.000 
Income and Assets    
Monthly Income (THB 1,000) 64.179 3 0.000 
Monthly Expenditure on Food and Beverages (THB 1,000) 53.679 3 0.000 
Financial Assets (THB 1,000) 216.192 3 0.000 
Number of Cars 204.36 3 0.000 
Number of Motorcycles 158.319 3 0.000 
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Independent Variable chi2 df P>chi2 
Other Variables    
Central (yes=1) 213.309 3 0.000 
North (yes=1) 320.869 3 0.000 
Northeast (yes=1) 383.008 3 0.000 
South (yes=1) 35.905 3 0.000 
Rural Households (yes=1) 117.145 3 0.000 
Difficulty Obtaining an Emergency Loan (yes=1) 121.616 3 0.000 
Source: Author’s calculations 
Table 4.3 The Wald Test of Combining Outcome Categories 
Independent Variable chi2 df P>chi2 
Non-VF and SGP & VF 6048.291 24 0.000 
Non-VF and SGP & SGP 2551.648 24 0.000 
Non-VF and SGP & Both VF and SGP 947.118 24 0.000 
VF & SGP 4601.939 24 0.000 
VF & Both VF and SGP 407.126 24 0.000 
SGP & Both VF and SGP 562.636 24 0.000 
Source: Author’s calculations 
The Hausman test evaluates whether the IIA assumption holds for the multinomial logit model. The 
Hausman test results for IIA (see Table 4.4) reveal that the null hypothesis of IIA cannot be rejected. 
This indicates that IIA is not violated. 
Table 4.4 The Results of the Hausman Test of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives 
Omitted Category 
Hausman Test  
Test Statistic P-value Evidence 
Non-VF and SGP Borrower 60.337 0.129 For IIA 
VF Borrower -31.301 - For IIA 
SGP Borrower -187.635 - For IIA 
Both VF and SGP Borrower -53.004 - For IIA 
Source: Author’s calculations 
4.2.3 Results and Discussion 
This section discusses the multinomial logit estimation results, a test conducted to investigate the 
determinants affecting household participation in microfinance programmes. The model is estimated 
using the MLE technique. Table 4.5 presents the estimated results of the multinomial logit model 
specified in equation (4.2). 
Table 4.5 presents the microfinance programme participation determinants and includes parameter 
estimates and marginal effects. Overall, 41,099 observations were used to calculate the estimated 
coefficients. The LR test (χ42
2 = 13911.19) rejects the null hypothesis that the parameter estimates 
for the multinomial logit model are zero; the model can be used to explain the probability of 
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microfinance programme participation. The multinomial logit model estimates the coefficients via 
MLE. However, the value of the estimated coefficients from the multinomial logistic regression have 
no direct economic interpretation because they are obtained using MLE techniques (Greene, 2003; 
Li, 2010). To address this limitation, this study calculates the marginal effect provided in Table 4.5. 
Marginal effects provide greater intuition in terms of interpreting the estimated coefficients of 
continuous explanatory variables, whereas the odds ratios are more useful for interpreting the 
estimated coefficients of the dichotomous explanatory variables (Greene, 2003; Li, 2010). 
4.2.4 The Determinants of VF Participation 
Column 1, Table 4.5, shows that VF participation is significantly explained by: household head 
characteristics (age, female, education, married, single), demographics (household size, dependency 
ratio, number of children, number of elderly people), occupation (farmer, entrepreneur, formal and 
informal worker), income, expenditure, and assets (monthly income, monthly expenditure on food 
and beverages, financial assets, number of cars, number of motorcycles), and other variables 
(central, north, northeast, south, rural households, difficulty obtaining an emergency loan).
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Table 4.5 Multinomial Logit Model Results for Predicting Borrower Choices of Microfinance Programmes in Thailand 
  
























          
Age (years) 0.009*** 0.002 1.131 × 10
-03*** -0.0239*** 0.002 -2.539 × 10-03*** -0.001 0.005 5.30 × 10-06 
Female (yes=1) 0.349*** 0.035 0.032*** 0.065* 0.037 1.68 × 10
-03 0.473*** 0.087 4.547 × 10-03*** 
Education (year) -0.044*** 0.006 -4.273 × 10
-03*** 0.018*** 0.005 2.428 × 10-03*** -0.073*** 0.015 -7.082 × 10-04*** 
Married (yes=1) 0.358*** 0.043 0.032*** 0.030 0.049 -1.424 × 10
-03 0.30*** 0.113 2.536 × 10-03** 
Single (yes=1) -0.739*** 0.088 -0.052*** -0.386*** 0.071 -0.028*** -1.292*** 0.313 -8.032 × 10
-03*** 
Demographic  
          
Household Size (persons) 0.265*** 0.019 0.020*** 0.397*** 0.019 0.037*** 0.413*** 0.042 3.428 × 10
-03*** 
Dependency Ratio -0.214*** 0.074 -5.452 × 10
-03 -1.153*** 0.080 -0.114*** -0.652*** 0.203 -5.00 × 10-03** 
Number of Children  
(age < 15 yrs) (persons) 
0.049* 0.029 5.411× 10-03** -0.076** 0.030 -8.453 × 10-03*** 0.099 0.066 1.041 × 10-03 
Number of Elderly People 
(age > 60 yrs) (persons) 
-0.195*** 0.027 -0.015*** -0.233*** 0.031 -0.021*** -0.358*** 0.069 -3.140 × 10-03*** 
Occupation 
 
          
Farmer (yes=1) 1.050*** 0.039 0.116*** -0.240*** 0.045 -0.038*** 0.458*** 0.096 3.709 × 10-03*** 
Entrepreneur (yes=1) 0.641*** 0.108 0.070*** 0.159* 0.091 4.228 × 10-03 1.060*** 0.238 0.015*** 
Formal Worker (yes=1) 0.452*** 0.065 0.046*** -0.124** 0.063 -0.019*** 0.744*** 0.159 8.246 × 10-03*** 
Informal Worker (yes=1) 0.414*** 0.058 0.043*** -0.256*** 0.062 -0.031*** 0.493*** 0.150 5.097 × 10-03*** 
Income, Expenditure, and 
Assets 
           
Monthly Income (THB 
1,000) 
-0.007*** 0.001 -6.941 × 10-04*** 0.001*** 3.415 × 10-04 2.258 × 10-04*** 0.001 0.001 1.77 × 10-05* 
Monthly Expenditure on 
Food and Beverages (THB 
1,000) 
-0.044*** 0.006 -0.004*** -0.003 0.004 2.439 × 10-04 -0.028** 0.012 -2.348 × 10-04* 
Financial Assets (THB 
1,000) 
-0.001*** 1.102 × 10-04 -8.18 × 10-05*** -3.603 × 10-04*** 4.49 × 10-05 -2.32 × 10-05*** -1.849 × 10-03*** 3.374 × 10-04 -1.72 × 10-05*** 
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Number of Cars -0.343*** 0.050 -0.037*** 0.360*** 0.032 0.041*** 0.068 0.010 6.335 × 10-04 
Number of Motorcycles 0.142*** 0.021 0.010*** 0.222*** 0.020 0.021*** 0.284*** 0.047 2.456 × 10-03*** 
Other Variables            
Central (yes=1) 3.0*** 0.411 0.416*** 0.307*** 0.073 -0.039*** 3.358*** 1.00 0.054 
North (yes=1) 3.533*** 0.412 0.552*** 0.222*** 0.080 -0.066*** 3.496*** 1.007 0.052 
Northeast (yes=1) 3.722*** 0.411 0.561*** 0.206*** 0.078 -0.067*** 3.517*** 1.006 0.046 
South (yes=1) 1.596*** 0.415 0.213*** 0.197** 0.078 -0.015 1.807* 1.015 0.027 
Rural Households (yes=1) 0.322*** 0.030 0.031*** 0.015 0.035 -2.722 × 10-03 0.209*** 0.077 1.768 × 10-03** 
Difficulty Obtaining an 
Emergency Loan (yes=1) 
-0.749*** 0.077 -0.052*** -0.293*** 0.068 -0.021*** -0.610*** 0.197 -4.236 × 10-03** 
Number of Observations 41,099    
 
    
Log Likelihood -31240.817    
 
    
LR chi2(42) 13911.19    
 
    
Prob > chi2 0.0000    
 
    
Pseudo R2 0.1821                 
Note: *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Source: Author’s calculations
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In terms of household head characteristics, being female and/or married are significant positive 
predictors of VF participation at the 1% level. Age is significant and positive at the 1% level, but 
higher levels of education and being single are negative and significant at the 1% level. This indicates 
that female household heads borrow more from VFs than male household heads. The marginal effect 
of the female coefficient shows that the probability of being a VF borrower increases by 3.20% when 
the borrower is female (see Column 1, Table 4.5). This result does not support previous evidence in 
Zeller (1994), Evans et al. (1999) and Li (2010) who all argue that women’s limited mobility and 
freedom from family domination lead to decreasing demand for credit, thus decreasing the 
likelihood of microfinance participation. However, this result supports Fongthong and Suriya’s (2014) 
study that investigated the determinants affecting household access to VFs in Thailand. They find 
that committees actively encourage women to borrow because they are a much lower credit risk. 
Cull et al. (2016, 2018) explains that many microfinance programmes, especially subsidized credit 
programmes, favour women because they are a lower credit risk; therefore, they are more likely to 
access microfinance programmes. In short, VFs not only encourage women to access loans but also 
to participate as committee members. 
In terms of age, the results show that older household heads are more likely to borrow from VFs. 
Holding all other determinants constant, the marginal effect of age indicates that an increase of a 
year in household-head age increases the probability of borrowing by 0.11% (Column 1, Table 4.5). 
Our result is similar to that of Zeller (1994), who finds that age is likely to increase the probability of 
formal microcredit participation in rural Madagascar. Eularie and Vishwanatha (2016), who evaluated 
the factors affecting small farmers’ access to microcredit in Rwanda, find that young small-scale 
farmers are not involved in microcredit activities, but older small-scale farmers are more interested. 
They explain that older household heads are more aware of the importance of microcredit 
programme participation for poverty reduction and improved livelihood than younger household 
heads.   
The married coefficient is positive and significant at the 1% level and the single coefficient is negative 
and significant at the same level. The marginal effect of the married and single coefficients indicates 
that the probability of becoming a VF borrower increases by 3.20% when the borrower is married 
and decreases by 5.20% when the borrower is single (Column 1, Table 4.5). These findings support 
some prior studies. Mpuga (2008), who investigated accessibility and demand for credit in rural 
Uganda, shows that people who are married are more likely to be stable thus, lenders are more likely 
to view them as reliable. Therefore, they are more likely to access credit than their single 
counterparts. Phan’s (2012) investigation of factors affecting rural households’ access to microcredit 
in Vietnam finds a positive sign for the married variable at the 5% level, which indicates that such 
individuals are more likely to participate in these programmes. Wachira and Kihiu (2012), who 
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evaluated the impact of financial literacy on access to financial services in Kenya, explain that 
informal service providers are more likely to grant loans to married persons because they are seen as 
being more trustworthy as they move from one life stage to another.  
The results show that well-educated household heads are less likely to borrow from VFs. Holding all 
other determinants constant, the marginal effect of education indicates that an increase in the 
number of years of a household head’s education decreases the probability of borrowing by 0.43% 
(Column 1, Table 4.5). This contradicts some previous studies. Mpuga (2008), Tang et al. (2010) and Li 
et al. (2011a) argue that a borrowers’ education level is positively related to participation in 
microfinance programmes. Higher levels of education are associated with higher levels of human 
capital, which, in turn, leads to higher rates of microfinance participation. However, this study’s 
finding could suggest that microfinance programmes usually target borrowers with lower levels of 
education. Fongthong and Suriya (2014) evaluated whether the VF reached the poor in Thailand. 
They find that VF borrowers have lower education levels. Similarly, Kasali et al. (2016), who examined 
the determinants that affect poor households’ access to microfinance programmes in Nigeria, find 
that microfinance borrowers tend to have lower education levels. 
For the demographic characteristics (household size, dependency ratio, number of children, number 
of elderly people), the results show a significant positive relationship between household size and 
microfinance participation. This implies that larger households are more likely to participate in VFs by 
2% (Column 1, Table 4.5). Fongthong and Suriya (2014) state that the larger a household is, the 
greater the likelihood that they will borrow from VFs. These households have more income sources 
and, as a result, are more capable of repaying their loans. Saqib et al. (2016), who explored the 
factors affecting farmers’ access to agricultural credit, find that household size has a positive 
coefficient, significant at the 0.01 level. The authors explain that, as the household size increases, 
farmers are more likely to use agricultural loans as a risk management strategy. Nguyen (2007), who 
examined the determinants of credit participation of Vietnamese households, finds that household 
size has a significant effect on credit participation. The author explains that labour demand increases 
during peak times (such as harvests) and this could be one reason why household size affects the 
probability of gaining a loan. Sarap (1990), who investigated factors that affect small farmers’ access 
to credit in India, reveals that larger household size increases credit demand as household resources 
are diverted into agricultural activities. Without hiring staff, small households have less capacity to 
expand their business, which leads to a lower level of microfinance participation. This study’s results 
suggest that larger households have more income sources and, as a result, are more capable of 
repaying their loans. In short, these households borrow to expand their businesses.  
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The dependence ratio coefficient is negative and significant at the 1% level. This result implies that 
individuals who are less economically active have a lower probability of borrowing from VFs. This 
finding suggests that households with high dependency ratios have fewer family members to help 
generate income and, therefore, are less able to repay their loans. These households must allocate 
money to look after their children and elderly members, which potentially affects their ability to 
repay loans (Fongthong & Suriya, 2014). Moreover, the number of elderly coefficient is negative and 
significant at the 1% level. This finding indicates that if a household has elderly members, the 
household is less likely to participate in VFs by 1.50% compared to other households, all other factors 
held constant (Column 1, Table 4.5). Our result suggests that households that have more elderly 
members are less able to repay loans. In short, financial services providers consider the elderly less 
creditworthy (Wachira & Kihiu, 2012).  
The positive number of children coefficient at the 10% level indicates that if households have more 
children, they are more likely to participate in VFs by 0.54% compared to other households, all other 
factors being constant (Column 1, Table 4.5). Our finding supports Phan’s (2012) study, which finds 
that households with a greater number of children tend to have higher levels of microcredit 
programme participation. The author explains that households with more children have greater 
levels of financial stress and that the proportion of households with over three children in the 
borrower group is significantly greater at the 1% level than households with fewer than three 
children in the non-borrower group. Therefore, the non-borrower group is less likely to be financially 
stressed than the borrower group. Likewise, Menkhoff and Rungruxsirivorn (2011), who compared 
borrowers’ characteristics between VFs and six other financial institutions in three provinces of 
northeast Thailand, find that households with more children have a higher probability of applying for 
loans. 
At the 1% significance level, farmers, entrepreneurs, formal workers and informal workers are more 
likely to participate in VFs by 11.60%, 7%, 4.60% and 4.30%, respectively, than other households 
based on occupation (Column 1, Table 4.5). These results suggest that farmers, entrepreneurs, 
formal workers and informal workers are the VF’s primary borrowers. VFs were developed to provide 
finance for occupational development, job creation, income generation activities and welfare 
improvement (Fongthong & Suriya, 2014). Farmers, entrepreneurs, formal workers and informal 
workers typically use loans to generate income. Lewis et al. (2013) explain that the VF provides good 
loan coverage, reaching the lowest income groups, including unskilled occupational groups. 
Income, expenditure and assets, monthly income, monthly expenditure on food and beverages, 
financial assets, the number of cars, and the number of motorcycles, are significant in explaining VF 
participation. The results show that monthly income and monthly expenditure on food and 
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beverages are negative and significant at the 1% level. The marginal effect of monthly income and 
monthly expenditure on food and beverages show that for every THB 1,000 increase in monthly 
income and monthly expenditure on food and beverages will decrease the probability of VF 
participation by 0.07% and 0.40%, respectively (Column 1, Table 4.5). This finding suggests that VF 
borrowers are from lower-income groups. Fongthong and Suriya (2014) state that near-poor 
households and lower-income households (with income above the poverty line) are more likely to 
participate in VFs. Likewise, Menkhoff and Rungruxsirivorn (2011) find that, though VFs reach lower-
income households, commercial banks serve higher-income households. Kaboski and Townsend 
(2012) state that the VF programme can help poor people smooth their consumption levels. 
An additional THB 1,000 increase in financial assets reduces a household’s probability of participating 
in VFs by 0.0082% (Column 1, Table 4.5). Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch (2005) explain that 
financial assets (e.g., savings) can help rural households protect themselves against any disaster that 
may affect their income. In addition, income and assets provide an indication of a household’s initial 
capital. A higher income level and/or assets reflects a less constrained household budget, which may 
weaken the demand for credit (Li, 2010; Ruiz-Tagle, 2005; Umoh, 2006). 
The number of cars and motorcycles are significant in explaining VF participation. The results show 
that the number of cars is negative and significant at the 1% level. This indicates that an additional 
car in a household reduces a family’s probability of participating in a VF by 3.70% (Column 1, Table 
4.5). Rural Thai households understand the loan system because of BAAC loans; these households 
can access other financial services. Households with multiple cars can use them as collateral to 
access financial services (Fongthong & Suriya, 2014). The results show the coefficient of the number 
of motorcycles is positive and significant at the 1% level, indicating that if a household has an 
additional motorcycle, the household is more likely to borrow from a VF by 1%. Coleman (2006) 
explains that, during the off-farm season, most farm households engage in non-farm activities like 
petty trading and driving a motorcycle taxi. Households that use their motorcycles as taxis can 
borrow money for investment purposes. Households with a greater number of motorcycles are more 
likely to borrow money because motorcycles are important production inputs - like owning a house, 
they provide a way to earn additional income (Fongthong & Suriya, 2014). 
All geographic factor coefficients have the hypothesized signs and are significantly associated with 
the probability of VF participation. The significant positive coefficients of central, north, northeast, 
and south imply that households living in these areas tend to have a higher probability of borrowing 
from VFs. In addition, the significant positive rural household coefficient suggests that households in 
rural areas are more likely to participate in VFs by 3.10% compared to other households (Column 1, 
Table 4.5). Mpuga (2008), who investigated accessibility and demand for credit in rural Uganda, finds 
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that location characteristics are important in the demand for credit. Households often use rural 
microcredit programmes to reduce their borrowing from informal sources. Fongthong and Suriya 
(2014) explain that the VFs provide loans throughout Thailand, meaning that rural households across 
the country are more likely to obtain loans. Menkhoff and Rungruxsirivorn (2011) find that VFs can 
help rural households reduce credit constraints.  
The coefficient of difficulty in obtaining an emergency loan is negative and significant at the 1% level. 
This indicates that households that have difficulty in obtaining an emergency loan are less likely to 
borrow from VFs than households that have no trouble in obtaining an emergency loan. In fact, 
households that have trouble in obtaining an emergency loan are less likely to borrow from the VF by 
as much as 5.20%, all other factors being constant (Column 1, Table 4.5). This implies that most VF 
borrowers do not experience any difficulty accessing emergency loans. This finding illustrates that 
rural households in Thailand can access loans from both formal and informal financial sources and 
that these households can access financial services (loans, deposits, remittances, and insurance). In 
short, most VF borrowers do not have any difficulty in obtaining an emergency loan (Fongthong & 
Suriya, 2014); the VF programme is an alternative financial source for rural households. 
4.2.5 The Determinants of SGPs Participation 
Column 2, Table 4.5 indicates that SGP participation is significantly explained by: household head 
characteristics (age, female, education, single), demographics (household size, the dependency ratio, 
the number of children, the number of elderly), occupation (farmer, entrepreneur, formal worker, 
informal worker), income, expenditure, and assets (monthly income, financial assets, the number of 
cars, the number of motorcycles), and other variables (central, north, northeast, south, difficulty 
obtaining an emergency loan). 
Age and single are negative and significant at the 1% level, whereas education and female are 
positive, significant predictors of SGP participation at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. The 
household head’s age influences the probability of SGP participation. With all other factors constant, 
a change in age decreases the probability of SGP participation by as much as 0.25% (Column 2, Table 
4.5). This finding is the same as those of Mpuga (2008) and Li (2010) who state that younger 
individuals are more energetic, dynamic and can adapt to new technology better than older 
individuals. In short, younger individuals tend to save and/or borrow more for investment; older 
individuals are less inclined to save or borrow. Mohamed (2003) and Okurut (2006) state that the 
probability of borrowing from formal and semi-formal sources of credit decreases for older 
individuals. The significant negative sign at the 1% level for being single indicates that single 
household heads are less likely to participate in SGP. People who are single are less likely to be stable 
(in terms of responsibility); thus, lenders are less likely to view them as reliable (Mpuga, 2008; 
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Wachira & Kihiu, 2012). Therefore, they are less likely to access credit than their married 
counterparts.  
The results show that well-educated household heads are more likely to borrow from SGPs. Holding 
all other determinants constant, the marginal effect of education indicates that an increase in the 
number of years of education of the household-head increases the probability of borrowing by 0.24% 
(Column 2, Table 4.5). A borrower’s education reflects human capital that, in turn, facilitates 
participation in microfinance programmes (Li et al., 2011a; Mpuga, 2008; Tang et al., 2010). Previous 
studies argue that borrowers’ education level is positively related to participation in microfinance 
programmes (Li et al., 2011a; Mpuga, 2008; Tang et al., 2010). Having a female household head is a 
significant positive predictor of SGP participation at the 10% level. The marginal effect of the female 
coefficient shows that the probability of being an SGP borrower increases by 0.17% if the borrower is 
female (Column 2, Table 4.5). As illustrated above, many microfinance programmes encourage 
women to borrow because they present a lower credit risk (Cull et al., 2016, 2018; Fongthong & 
Suriya, 2014). 
Four demographic factors (household size, the dependency ratio, the number of children, and the 
number of elderly) are significant in explaining SGP borrowing status. The significant positive 
relationship between household size and microfinance participation indicates that larger households 
are more likely to participate in SGPs by 3.70% (Column 2, Table 4.5). This finding is like the VF result. 
Larger households have a higher probability of borrowing from microfinance programmes because 
these households have more income sources and, as a result, are more capable of repaying their 
loans (Fongthong & Suriya, 2014). Moreover, farm households are more likely to adopt agricultural 
loans as a risk management strategy; larger households use this money to expand their businesses 
(Nguyen, 2007; Saqib et al., 2016). Saqib et al. (2016) note that some farmers (large-scale farmers) 
have larger families because they live with extended family members and share the land. Agricultural 
credit plays a significant role in terms of farmers’ income, production output, and food security, 
particularly for those vulnerable to floods, heavy rains, pests and diseases, and other catastrophic 
hazards (Saqib et al., 2016). 
The coefficient of the dependency ratio is negative and significant at the 1% level. This indicates that 
households with a higher dependency ratio have a lower probability of borrowing from SGPs. This 
result is like the VF finding. The significant negative coefficients of the number of elderly and number 
of children at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively, indicate that if households have a greater number 
of elderly or dependent children, they are less likely to borrow from SGPs by 2.10% and 0.80%, 
respectively, compared to other households, all other factors held constant (Column 2, Table 4.5). 
This result indicates that households with a higher dependency ratio are less likely to borrow money 
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because they do not have the same ability to repay the loans. These households must spend greater 
amounts of money taking care of non-earning members, which likely affects their repayment ability 
(Fongthong & Suriya, 2014).  
Column 2, Table 4.5 shows that farmers, entrepreneurs, formal workers, and informal workers are 
significant in explaining SGP borrowing. Households employed in farming, and those working in both 
formal and informal sectors, are less likely to borrow from SGPs by 3.80%, 1.90% and 3.10%, 
respectively, at the 1%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. In contrast, households employed 
as entrepreneurs are more likely to borrow from SGPs, by 0.40% at the 10% significance level. These 
results suggest that, apart from farming, individuals who are entrepreneurs are the primary SGP 
borrowers. Luxchaigul (2014) states that SGP members are local people who regularly save money in 
their cash pool to invest in economic activities. Luxchaigul also explains that these loans would likely 
solve the no cash investment problem and illegal loans. SGPs can help borrowers solve their 
investment problems (Luxchaigul, 2014). 
The expenditure and asset variables, monthly income, financial assets, the number of cars and 
number of motorcycles, are significant in explaining SGP participation. The results show that monthly 
income is positive and significant at the 1% level. The marginal effect of monthly income shows that 
every THB 1,000 increase in monthly income increases the probability of SGP participation by 0.02% 
(Column 2, Table 4.5). One possible explanation is that when households have more income and/or 
assets, they feel rich and consume more. As a result, they may also demand more credit (Cheng, 
2006; Li, 2010; Ruiz-Tagle, 2005). 
An additional THB 1,000 increase in financial assets reduces a household’s probability of SGP 
participation by 0.0023% (Column 2, Table 4.5). The marginal effect of financial assets on SGP 
participation is minimal. Financial assets can help a rural household insure themselves against the 
likelihood of a natural disaster that may affect their income (Armendariz de Aghion & Morduch, 
2005). These assets, which show a household’s initial capital, reflect a less constrained household 
budget, which may weaken the demand for credit (Li, 2010; Ruiz-Tagle, 2005; Umoh, 2006). 
The number of cars and of motorcycles are significant in explaining SGP participation. The results 
show that the number of cars is positive and significant at the 1% level. This indicates that an 
additional car in a household will increase a household’s probability of SGP participation by 4.10% 
(Column 2, Table 4.5). Households that have multiple cars can use them as collateral to access 
financial services. Column 2, Table 4.5 also shows the coefficient of the number of motorcycles is 
positive and significant at the 1% level. This result indicates that an additional motorcycle will 
increase a household’s probability of SGP participation by 2.10%. One reason why this may be so is 
that, during the off-farm season, most farm householders work in non-farm activities (Coleman, 
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2006). In short, for rural households, motorcycles are important production inputs (Fongthong & 
Suriya, 2014). 
Almost all the geographic factor coefficients have the hypothesized signs and are significantly 
associated with the probability of SGP participation. The significant positive coefficients of central, 
north, northeast, and south imply that households in these areas have a higher likelihood of 
borrowing from SGPs (Column 2, Table 4.5). The results indicate that SGPs provide loans in all regions 
of Thailand and that these loans act as substitutes for informal credit (Akihiko, 2015). SGPs create a 
rural financial market using a bottom-up approach. SGPs serve as financial intermediaries by 
collecting savings from rural households and extending loans to their members (Akihiko, 2015). 
Column 2, Table 4.5 also shows the coefficient of difficulty in obtaining an emergency loan is negative 
and significant at the 1% level. This indicates that households that have difficulty in obtaining an 
emergency loan are less likely to borrow from SGPs than households that do not have any problems. 
The significant negative difficulty in obtaining an emergency loan coefficient suggests that 
households that have trouble obtaining an emergency loan are less likely to participate in SGPs by 
2.10%, compared to other households, all other factors held constant. This implies that most of SGP 
borrowers do not experience any difficulty gaining an emergency loan. The finding indicates that SGP 
borrowers can access both formal and informal financial services. 
4.2.6 Both VF and SGPs Participation Determinants 
The results in Column 3, Table 4.5, indicate that both VF and SGP participation is significantly 
explained by: household head characteristics (female, education, married, single), demographics 
(household size, the dependency ratio, the number of elderly people), occupation (farmer, 
entrepreneur, formal worker, informal worker), income, expenditure and assets (monthly 
expenditure on food and beverages, financial assets, the number of motorcycles), other variables 
(central, north, northeast, south, rural households, and difficulty obtaining an emergency loan). 
The female and married coefficients are positive, significant predictors at the 1% level of both VF and 
SGP participation, whereas the education and single coefficients are negative, significant predictors 
at the 1% level. This indicates that household heads who are female borrow more from both VFs and 
SGPs than male household heads. The marginal effect of the female coefficient shows that the 
probability of being both a VF and SGP borrower increases by 0.45% when the borrower is female 
(Column 3, Table 4.5). A key objective of many microfinance programmes is to encourage women’s 
participation; thus women are more likely to be granted loans (Cull et al., 2016, 2018). Moreover, 
MFI committees believe that female borrowers present a lower credit risk than men. Therefore, they 
have a higher chance of being granted loans than males (Fongthong & Suriya, 2014). 
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Column 3, Table 4.5, also shows that well-educated household heads are less likely to borrow from 
both VFs and SGPs. Holding all other determinants constant, the marginal effect of education 
indicates that an increase in the number of years of education of the household-head decreases the 
probability of borrowing by 0.07%. Thai microfinance programmes target poor and low educated 
borrowers (Fongthong & Suriya, 2014). Kasali et al. (2016), who examined the determinants that 
affect poor households’ access to microfinance in Nigeria, find that microfinance programmes’ 
borrowers have lower education levels. 
The coefficient of married is positive and significant at the 1% level and the coefficient of single is 
negative and significant at the same level. The marginal effect of the married and single coefficients 
indicates that the probability of being both VF and SGP borrowers increases by 0.25% when the 
borrower is married and decreases by 0.80% when the borrower is single (Column 3, Table 4.5). The 
marital status finding is like the VF result. One possible explanation is that MFIs are more likely to 
grant loans to married individuals because they are believed to be more stable as they move from 
one life stage to another (Mpuga, 2008; Wachira & Kihiu, 2012). Married people are thought to be 
more responsible and thus are seen as more trustworthy (Mpuga, 2008; Wachira & Kihiu, 2012).  
Three demographic-related factors (household size, the dependency ratio, and the number of 
elderly) are significant in explaining both the VF and SGP borrowing status. For household size, a 
significant positive relationship between household size and both VF and SGP participation shows 
that larger households are more likely to participate in both VFs and SGPs by 0.34% (Column 3, Table 
4.5). This finding is like those of the other borrower groups (VF and SGP individual findings) where 
larger households have more income sources and, as a result, are more capable of repaying their 
loans (Fongthong & Suriya, 2014). Farm-households obtain loans to expand their businesses when 
their household size is larger (Nguyen, 2007; Saqib et al., 2016).  
The coefficient of the dependency ratio is negative and significant at the 1% level indicating that 
households with higher dependency ratios have a lower probability of borrowing from both VFs and 
SGPs. The significant negative coefficient of the number of elderly at the 1% level indicates that if 
households have a greater number of elderly members, they are less likely to participate in both VF 
and SGP by 0.31% compared to other households, other factors held constant (Column 3, Table 4.5). 
This indicates that households with a higher dependency ratio are less likely to borrow because they 
do not have the same ability to repay their loans (Fongthong & Suriya, 2014).  
Farmers, entrepreneurs, formal workers, and informal workers are significant factors in explaining 
borrowing from both VFs and SGPs. Households employed as farmers and entrepreneurs are more 
likely to borrow from both VFs and SGPs by 0.37% and 1.50%, respectively, at the 1% significance 
level. Households employed in formal and informal occupations are more likely to participate in both 
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VFs and SGPs by 0.82% and 0.50%, respectively, at the 1% significance level (Column 3, Table 4.5). 
These results suggest that farmers, entrepreneurs, formal workers, and informal workers are the 
primary borrowers from both VFs and SGPs. The finding indicates that both VFs and SGPs provide 
loans to farmers, entrepreneurs, formal workers, and informal workers. As noted earlier, these loans 
can solve the problem of no cash investments and illegal loans (Fongthong & Suriya, 2014; Lewis et 
al., 2013; Luxchaigul, 2014). 
The expenditure and assets variables, monthly expenditure on food and beverages, financial assets, 
and the number of motorcycles, are significant in explaining both VF and SGP participation. For the 
monthly expenditure on food and beverages, the negative coefficient is significant at the 5% level. 
The marginal effect of monthly expenditure on food and beverages shows that every THB 1,000 
increase in monthly expenditure on food and beverages decreases the probability of both VF and SGP 
participation by 0.02% (Column 3, Table 4.5). This suggests that both VF and SGP borrowers are from 
lower-income groups. One possible explanation is that poor rural households need credit to maintain 
their consumption levels (especially for necessities like food) when faced with a cash shortage (Li, 
2010). In developing countries, the poor usually rely on credit to smooth their consumption 
expenditure (Doan et al., 2010). 
An additional THB 1,000 increase in financial assets reduces a household’s probability of participating 
in both VFs and SGPs by 0.0017% (Column 3, Table 4.5). The marginal effect of financial assets on 
both VF and SGP participation is minimal. Financial assets may help a rural households overcome 
situations that may affect their income (Armendariz de Aghion & Morduch, 2005). In addition, 
financial assets show a household’s capital. In short, more financial assets reflect a less constrained 
household budget, which may reduce the demand for credit (Li, 2010; Ruiz-Tagle, 2005; Umoh, 
2006). 
The number of motorcycles is significant in explaining both VF and SGP participation. Column 3, Table 
4.5 shows the coefficient of the number of motorcycles is positive and significant at the 1% level, 
indicating that an additional motorcycle in a household increases that household’s probability of 
participating in both VFs and SGPs by 0.25%. One possible explanation is that motorcycles, which are 
an important input component, are used in non-agricultural activities during the off-farm season 
(Coleman, 2006). Rural households use their own vehicles as production inputs to invest in new 
businesses (Fongthong & Suriya, 2014). 
All geographic factor coefficients have the hypothesized signs and are significantly associated with 
the probability of both VF and SGP participation. The significantly positive coefficients of central, 
north, northeast, and south imply that households in these areas have a higher likelihood of 
borrowing from both VFs and SGPs. In addition, the significant positive rural household coefficient 
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suggests that households in rural areas are more likely to participate in both VFs and SGPs by 0.18%, 
compared to other households (Column 3, Table 4.5). This mirrors earlier results for VF and SGP 
borrowers. These programmes provide loans that help rural Thai households decrease their reliance 
on informal credit (Mpuga, 2008).  
Column 3, Table 4.5, also shows that the coefficient of difficulty in obtaining an emergency loan is 
negative and significant at the 1% level. This indicates that households that have difficulty in gaining 
an emergency loan are less likely to borrow from both VFs and SGPs than households that have no 
difficulty. The difficulty in obtaining an emergency loan’s coefficient suggests that households that 
have difficulty in accessing an emergency loan are less likely to participate in both VFs and SGPs by 
0.42% compared to other households, all other factors held constant. This implies that both VF and 
SGP borrowers do not have trouble obtaining an emergency loan.  
In summary, the results reveal that VFs tend to service low-income households in rural areas. Most 
VF borrowers do not have difficulty accessing loans. In addition, older, lower educated, female 
household heads are more likely to gain loans. Larger households and those with lower dependency 
ratios are more likely to participate in VFs. The VF primary borrowers are farmers, entrepreneurs, 
formal and informal workers. Young household heads in all Thailand’s regions are more likely to 
borrow from SGPs. Those with higher education levels and those with greater income tend to exhibit 
higher levels of SGP participation. Most SGP borrowers can access other loans. Finally, those with low 
education levels, married household heads, and female household heads are more likely to borrow 
from both VFs and SGPs. Larger households have a higher probability of borrowing from both 
microfinance programmes. Farmers, entrepreneurs, formal workers, and informal workers are the 
main borrowers of both VFs and SGPs. Borrowers in this group live in rural areas and can access 
other loan sources. The next section discusses the impact of microfinance programme participation 
on economic and social welfare. 
4.3 The Impact of VF and SGP Participation on Economic and Social Welfare 
Borrower welfare is measured in terms of monthly household income and consumption. The impact 
of a microfinance programme is subject to two main sources of bias: observed and unobserved 
biases. In this study, we use PSM and panel data to evaluate the microfinance programme impact. 
We use cross-sectional data from the SES Survey (2017) and panel data from the SES Survey 
conducted in 2012 and 2017. Sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 discuss the empirical results from the PSM and 
panel data, respectively. 
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4.3.1 Microfinance Impact: PSM Impact Evaluation 
4.3.1.1 Data for Impact Evaluation 
The data for VF and SGP impact evaluation were collected by the National Statistical Office, the 
Ministry of Information and Communication Technology (see section 4.1). The impact assessment 
compares outcomes for both borrowers (treated group) and non-borrowers (control group). The 
treated group is the target group. This group was selected based on the borrowing status under 
credit constraints. The control group consists of non-borrowers who may or may not confront credit 
constraints. To evaluate the economic and social welfare impact, this section uses monthly 
household income and expenditure to measure outcomes. 
4.3.1.2 Estimation Strategies 
The coefficient of the mean impact of treatment on 𝛿𝑃𝑆𝑀
𝐴𝑇𝑇  is obtained using the PSM method based 
on the following specification: 
δPSM
ATT = E(y1|T = 1, x) − E(y0|T = 0, x)                  (4.4) 
Where y1, y0: are the potential outcomes in the two counterfactual situations (i.e., participation/non-
participation in the microfinance programme). The outcomes in this study are household monthly 
income and expenditure (measured in THB 1,000). T is a binary variable; if a household participates in 
a microfinance programme (T=1) or if not (T=0). X is a covariate set of observed characteristic 
variables, including household head characteristics (female, education, married, single), 
demographics (household size, the dependency ratio, the number of children, the number of 
elderly), socio-economic factors such as occupation (farmer, entrepreneur, formal worker, informal 
worker), income and assets (homeowner, landless, financial assets, the number of cars, the number 
of motorcycles), other variables (central, north, northeast, south, rural households, difficulty 
obtaining an emergency loan). Household income and consumption in 2017 are included in the 
covariate to explain the microfinance programme impact estimator of each outcome of interest. 
Covariate variables chosen from the previous section have high predictive power of credit 
participation (equation 4.2) conditional on the explanatory variables. 
Covariates are used to control for individual heterogeneity and are selected following the rule that 
the variable should simultaneously influence microfinance programme participation and the 
outcome (Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008; Phan, 2012). Therefore, in this study, covariates are selected 
from variables that are significant in determining microfinance programme participation in the 
previous section. These variables have been found to be correlated with income and consumption 
outcomes in other empirical studies. For example, in terms of household characteristics, household 
size and education are strongly correlated with income and consumption outcomes in microfinance 
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studies (see Nguyen, 2008; Phan 2012). Covariates act as a control for individual heterogeneity since 
the borrowers are not a random group of participants. Covariates also assume that households are 
time-invariant during the income and consumption period. If the conditions are satisfied, impact 
estimators are obtained using different matching procedures (Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008; Phan, 
2012).  
The matching procedure follows a particular process. First, the variables are selected to define the 
probability of microfinance participation. These variables include household head characteristics 
(female, education, married, single), demographics (household size, the dependency ratio, the 
number of children, and the number of elderly), socio-economic factors such as occupation (farmer, 
entrepreneur, formal worker, informal worker), income and assets (homeowner, landless, financial 
assets, the number of cars, and the number of motorcycles), other variables (central, north, 
northeast, south, rural households, and difficulty gaining an emergency loan). The next step uses the 
probit model (see equation 3.24, section 3.2.2.1) to calculate the probability of microfinance 
participation. Then, propensity scores are calculated based on this probability. Balancing tests are 
conducted to ensure that the mean propensity score is not different for the treated and control 
groups in each block for each model (Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008; Phan, 2012). This process ensures 
that a comparison group is constructed from the selected variables. If balancing is satisfied, common 
support is defined. Common support is then used for the matching. Finally, I estimate the 
microfinance impact. 
4.3.1.3 Results and Discussion 
VF Impact on Income and Expenditure (Housing, Food, Medicine, Education, and 
Transport) 
The estimated results of the probit model (equation 3.24, section 3.2.2.1) for propensity scores are 
reported in Table 4.6. Among the factors determining the probability of participation in the VF, 
female, education, married, household size, farmer, entrepreneur, formal worker, informal worker, 
central, north, northeast, south, and rural households are significant at the 1% level. The dependency 
ratio is significant at the 5% level. The Chi-square test for this model shows statistical significance at 
the 1% level, indicating that the variables included in this model statistically explain the propensity 
scores used in the matching steps. 
The propensity scores for each covariate were estimated based on the results of the probit model 
(see equation 3.24, section 3.2.2.1). This model was balanced based on the results of the balancing 
tests. Table 4.7 shows that all the covariates are well balanced because the t-test for equality of 
means in both the treated and control groups is non-significant after matching and the percentage 
bias of all covariates when matched is less than 5%. 
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Table 4.6 The Probit Results for the Propensity Score for the VF Impact on Income and 




Constant -3.006*** 0.134 
Household Head Characteristic 
  
Female (yes=1) 0.210*** 0.018 
Education (year) -0.061*** 0.003 
Married (yes=1) 0.229*** 0.020 
Demographic 
  
Household Size (persons) 0.091*** 0.006 
Dependency Ratio 0.069** 0.035 
Occupation 
  
Farmer (yes=1) 0.692*** 0.020 
Entrepreneur (yes=1) 0.227*** 0.053 
Formal Worker (yes=1) 0.335*** 0.030 
Informal Worker (yes=1) 0.313*** 0.028 
Other    
Central (yes=1) 1.322*** 0.130 
North (yes=1) 1.688*** 0.130 
Northeast (yes=1) 1.786*** 0.130 
South (yes=1) 0.635*** 0.132 
Rural Household (yes=1) 0.202*** 0.016 
Number of Obs. 41,099 
 
Log Likelihood -16434.986 
 
LR chi2(14) 9558.93   
Note: *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Source: Author’s calculations 
Figure 4.1 demonstrates the density of propensity scores estimated for the impact of VFs. The solid 
and long dash lines in Figure 4.1 graphically illustrate the distribution of the propensity scores of 
borrowers and non-borrowers, respectively. The propensity scores range from 0.0015352 to 
0.8204954 and from 0.0000411 to 0.8346302 for borrowers and non-borrowers, respectively. The 
mean scores are 0.388622 and 0.1635417 for borrowers and non-borrowers, respectively. The figure 
shows that the model performs well in separating treatment and control groups because the 
maximum density of the propensity score for the treatment group is always significantly higher than 
the maximum density of propensity score for the control group (Cintinna & Love, 2014). Given a 
substantial overlap in distributions, the common support region is defined in the range of 0.0000411 
to 0.8346302. The figure also shows that there is sufficient common support; this can be seen in the 
area of overlap between the two densities. This common support guarantees that the treatment 
observations can be matched with comparison observations. In this process, no treatment 
observations are dropped because of a lack of comparison units (Cintinna & Love, 2014). 
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Table 4.7 The Balancing Test for the Propensity Score for the VF Impact on Income and 
Expenditure (Housing, Food, Medicine, Education and Transport) 
Control Variables p-Value of t-Test Before Matching  
p-Value of t-Test After 
Matching  
% Bias After 
Matching  
Household Head Characteristic   
Female (yes=1) 0.000 0.414 1.2 
Education (year) 0.000 0.532 0.7 
Married (yes=1) 0.000 0.791 -0.4 
Demographic    
Household Size (persons) 0.000 0.109 2.4 
Dependency Ratio 0.000 0.315 1.3 
Occupation    
Farmer (yes=1) 0.000 0.717 -0.6 
Entrepreneur (yes=1) 0.000 0.419 1.1 
Formal Worker (yes=1) 0.000 0.332 1.3 
Informal Worker (yes=1) 0.000 0.182 -2.1 
Other Variables    
Central (yes=1) 0.000 0.713 0.5 
North (yes=1) 0.000 0.881 0.2 
Northeast (yes=1) 0.000 0.715 -0.6 
South (yes=1) 0.000 0.939 -0.1 
Rural Households (yes=1) 0.000 0.939 -0.1 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
Figure 4.1 Propensity Score for Borrowing Status based on the Covariates for the Impact of VFs on 
Income and Expenditure (Housing, Food, Medicine, Education and Transport) 
Source: Author’s calculations 
The estimates of the average treatment effect of VF programme participation on the treated (ATT) 
are reported in Table 4.8 for six outcomes using nearest neighbour matching. The first column in 
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Table 4.8 specifies the outcome variables in the propensity score function and the second and the 
third columns report the treated and control in relation to the mean of income and expenditure. The 
last column shows the ATT for household monthly income and expenditure by nearest neighbour 
matching; the standard errors are provided in parentheses. According to these PSM estimates, the 
average income of VF borrowers is less than non-borrowers, by 3,037 baht. On average, borrowers 
spent 99 baht less on education and 63 baht less on transport per month than non-borrowers. This 
comparison is based on data from 8,700 borrowers and 32,399 non-borrowers. Matching results are 
statistically significant at the 5% level for income and educational expenditure and transport 
expenditure is statistically significant at the 10% level. Housing, food, and medical expenditure are 
not statistically significant. 
Table 4.8 Average Treatment Effect of VFs on Monthly Income and Expenditure using Matching 
Estimator 
  VF Participation Control Difference 
Mean Income 18.568 21.605 
-3.037** 
(1.242) 
Mean Housing Expenditure 1.970 2.097 
-0.127 
(0.125) 
Mean Food Expenditure 6.453 6.757 
-0.304 
(0.187) 
Mean Medicine Expenditure 0.334 0.309 
0.025 
(0.066) 
Mean Education Expenditure 0.160 0.259 
-0.099** 
(0.045) 
Mean Transport Expenditure 0.122 0.185 
-0.063* 
(0.038) 
Note: *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Source: Author’s calculations 
The PSM results reveal that the impact of VFs is significant in terms of income, educational, and 
transport expenditure but not for housing, food, and medical expenditure. However, the sign of 
these variables is negative. This result is like Diagne and Zeller’s (2001) study of Malawi, where the 
authors evaluated the impact of microfinance programmes on income and household food security. 
They find that there are significant negative impacts on the per capita income of borrowers. Diagne 
and Zeller (2001) explain that borrowers in Malawi use their loans in low-income crops, therefore, 
their income decreases because of low crop price. Farmers also confront disasters such as drought, 
leading to decreased income. Abou-Ali et al. (2010) assessed the Social Fund for Development (SFD) 
programmes in Egypt using PSM. The authors find that non-farm income decreases because 
borrowers invest loans in farming; they often stop doing paid work outside the farm. Chandoevwit 
and Ashakul (2008) evaluated the impact of the VF on household income in Thailand. Their results 
show that the VF increases farm income only in the central region, not in other regions. The authors 
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state that the VF does not decrease the country’s poverty. This programme increases only non-
consumption expenditure (e.g., expenditure on gifts, donations, gambling, insurance premiums, 
taxes, and interest payments), indicating that borrowers do not spend their loans on investment 
activities. Any positive impact on farm income is inadequate in terms of improving total household 
income. 
The expenditure result is similar to that in Waelde’s (2011) study. Waelde (2011) evaluated the 
impact of microcredit expenditure in India and finds a significant negative impact on expenditure for 
the very poor. Poor entrepreneurs are cannot make significant financial gains because they are 
unable to accumulate more than a certain level of wealth above which they could shift private 
expenditure into business activities. The author recommends adjusting programmes to fit specific 
groups of entrepreneurs and their needs. Augsburg et al. (2015) evaluated the impact of 
microfinance programmes on income and expenditure in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Augsburg et al. 
(2015) find that there is a significant decrease in weekly consumption and savings. The authors 
explain that households invest all their loans in their businesses (on start-up costs) because they 
have limited investment capital. These households may need to decrease consumption and/or 
accumulate more savings if the total loan does not cover the required capital; hence they face 
liquidity constraints. 
SGP Impact on Income and Expenditure (Housing, Food, Medicine, Education, and 
Transport) 
The estimated results of the probit model (equation 3.24, section 3.2.2.1) for propensity scores are 
reported in Table 4.9. Among the factors determining the probability of participation in SGPs, female, 
education, married, household size, the dependency ratio, farmer, entrepreneur, formal worker, 
informal worker, central, north, and south are significant at the 1% level. The northeast variable is 
significant at the 5% level. The Chi-square test for this model shows statistical significance at the 1% 
level, indicating that the variables included in this model statistically explain the propensity scores 
used in the matching steps. 
Based on the results of the probit model (equation 3.24, section 3.2.2.1), the propensity scores for 
each covariate were estimated. This model was based on balancing tests. Table 4.10 shows all the 
covariates are well balanced; the t-test for equality of means in treated and control groups is non-
significant after matching and percentage bias of all covariates when matched is less than 5%.
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Table 4.9 The Probit Results for the Propensity Score for the SGP Impact on Income and 




Constant -2.006*** 0.049 
Household Head Characteristic 
  
Female (yes=1) 0.063*** 0.018 
Education (year) 0.028*** 0.002 
Married (yes=1) 0.113*** 0.020 
Demographic 
  
Household Size (persons) 0.198*** 0.006 
Dependency Ratio -0.603*** 0.035 
Occupation 
  
Farmer (yes=1) -0.157*** 0.023 
Entrepreneur (yes=1) 0.250*** 0.021 
Formal Worker (yes=1) 0.189*** 0.026 
Informal Worker (yes=1) -0.108*** 0.026 
Other Variables   
Central (yes=1) 0.255*** 0.037 
North (yes=1) 0.142*** 0.039 
Northeast (yes=1) 0.087** 0.039 
South (yes=1) 0.266*** 0.040 
Rural Households (yes=1) -0.004 0.018 
Number of Obs. 41,099  
Log Likelihood -15766.171  
LR chi2(14) 2759.79   
Note: *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Source: Author’s calculations 
Figure 4.2 demonstrates the density of propensity scores estimated for the impact of SGPs. The solid 
and long dash lines in Figure 4.2 illustrate the distribution of the propensity scores of borrowers and 
non-borrowers, respectively. The propensity scores range from 0.0168422 to 0.8383503 and from 
0.0085819 to 0.7965991 for borrowers and non-borrowers, respectively. The mean scores are 
0.2023521 and 0.1369062 for borrowers and non-borrowers, respectively. The figure shows that the 
model performs well in separating treatment and control groups because the maximum density of 
propensity scores for the treatment group is always significantly higher than the maximum density of 
propensity score for the control group (Cintinna & Love, 2014). Given a substantial overlap in 
distributions, the common support region is defined in the range of 0.0085819 to 0.8383503. The 
figure also shows that there is sufficient common support, which can be seen in the area of overlap 
between the two densities. This common support guarantees the treatment observations can be 
matched with comparison observations. In this process, no treatment observations were dropped 
because of a lack of comparison units (Cintinna & Love,2014). 
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Table 4.10 The Balancing Test for the Propensity Score for the SGP Impact on Income and 
Expenditure (Housing, Food, Medicine, Education and Transport) 
Control Variable 
p-Value of t-Test 
Before 
Matching  
p-Value of t-Test After 
Matching  
% Bias After 
Matching  
Household Head Characteristic    
Female (yes=1) 0.000 0.231 2.2 
Education (year) 0.000 0.532 -1.2 
Married (yes=1) 0.000 0.144 -2.5 
Demographic    
Household Size (persons) 0.000 0.359 1.8 
Dependency Ratio 0.000 0.381 1.4 
Occupation    
Farmer (yes=1) 0.000 0.246 2.0 
Entrepreneur (yes=1) 0.000 0.751 0.6 
Formal Worker (yes=1) 0.000 0.169 -2.6 
Informal Worker (yes=1) 0.000 0.155 -2.6 
Other Variables    
Central (yes=1) 0.000 0.219 2.3 
North (yes=1) 0.000 0.871 0.3 
Northeast (yes=1) 0.000 0.643 -0.8 
South (yes=1) 0.000 0.411 -1.6 
Rural Households (yes=1) 0.001 0.139 2.7 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
Figure 4.2 Propensity Score of Borrowing Status based on the Covariates for the Impact of SGPs 
on Income and Expenditure (Housing, Food, Medicine, Education and Transport) 
Source: Author’s calculations
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The estimates of the average treatment effect of SGP programme participation on the treated (ATT) 
are reported in Table 4.11 for six outcomes using nearest neighbour matching. The first column in 
Table 4.11 specifies the outcome variable in the propensity score function. The second and the third 
columns report the mean of income and expenditure of the treated and control groups. The last 
column shows the ATT for household monthly income and expenditure by nearest neighbour 
matching; the standard errors are provided in parentheses. According to these PSM estimates, the 
average income of SGPs borrowers is 2,620 baht more than non-borrowers. The matching results are 
statistically significant at the 5% level. This comparison is based on matching 6,035 borrowers and 
35,064 non-borrowers. 






Mean Income 36.406 33.787 
2.620** 
(1.249) 
Mean Housing Expenditure 2.876 2.951 
-0.075 
(-0.47) 
Mean Food Expenditure 8.962 8.969 
-0.007 
(0.136) 
Mean Medicine Expenditure 0.640 0.528 
0.112 
(0.096) 
Mean Education Expenditure 0.453 0.499 
-0.046 
(0.038) 
Mean Transport Expenditure 0.528 0.542 
-0.013 
(0.040) 
Note: *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Source: Author’s calculations 
The PSM results reveal that the impact of SGPs is significant on income but not significant on 
expenditure. The income result is similar to that in Li et al.’s (2011b) study that evaluated the impact 
of individual loans from Rural Credit Cooperatives on income in China. The authors find that the 
impact of Rural Credit Cooperatives on income is significant because households that obtain loans 
from microcredit programmes invest in income-generating activities, e.g., agricultural production and 
self-employment. This investment can improve their livelihood. Dadson, Abankwah, and Kwansah 
(2012) evaluated the impact of a microcredit programme in Ghana and find that female borrowers 
have a statistically significant higher income than the control group. The authors state that 
microcredit provides a means to improve women’s income in small scale businesses.  
The results show that the microfinance programme’s impact on expenditure is insignificant. This 
indicates that individuals or households participating in microfinance programmes have insignificant 
gains in terms of consumption over non-participants. The results are similar to those in Crépon et al. 
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(2015) and Banerjee et al.’s (2015) studies. Crépon et al. (2015) find that the microcredit impact on 
expenditure is insignificant. They explain that it is possible that most borrowers have only just 
received their loans and therefore the impact of microfinance programmes is limited. In their study 
of microcredit in India, Banerjee et al. (2015) find that the impact of the loans on expenditure is 
insignificant. They explain that by the fact that microcredit loans are substitutes for informal loans. 
Though PSM is a useful method for controlling bias because of observed determinants in impact 
evaluation, Marr (2012) argues that PSM cannot control unobserved characteristics (such as 
individual motivation and ability) that affect microfinance participation. The method is more 
appropriate for cross-sectional survey data (Dehejia & Wahba, 2002). Smith and Todd (2005) and 
Dehejia (2005) state that there are two concerns relating to PSM. First, cross-sectional data cannot 
control for unobserved characteristics (such as individual motivation and ability) or time effects. 
Secondly, bias, which is associated with cross-sectional data matching estimators, may be too large if 
there is no good set of covariates or if treated and control individuals or households are not strictly 
comparable to those located in different markets (Smith & Todd, 2005). Panel data can control for 
unobserved bias, but the data must be available. The next section discusses microfinance programme 
estimation using panel data. 
4.3.2 Microfinance Impact: Impact Evaluation of Panel Data 
4.3.2.2 Data for Microfinance Impact Evaluation 
As previously noted, this study evaluates the impact of microfinance programmes in Thailand using 
panel data from SES surveys in 2012 and 2017 collected by the National Statistical Office of the 
Ministry of Information and Communication Technology. Briefly, the 2017 survey interviewed 4,461 
households across the country. Data were collected monthly. The information includes a variety of 
household socio-economic data, such as income, expenses, assets, and liabilities. The 2012 survey 
used the same questionnaire but covered 6,080 households. The sample used in this study includes 
4,406 households (both borrowers and non-borrowers) throughout the country in panel data drawn 
from the 2017 SES survey. Of the 4,406 households, 353 (8.01%) borrowed from VFs, 49 (1.11%) 
borrowed from SGPs, and 4,004 (90.88%) were non-borrowers. These data include information about 
borrowers/non-borrowers ages, level of education, household size, dependency ratio, monthly 
income, assets, number of cars, number of motorcycles, marital status, occupation, and the 
household location. Table 4.12 summarises the variables used in the impact evaluation model 
(equation (4.5)). 
Panel data are used to estimate the unbiased microfinance programme impact. Two years’ data were 
collected, before and after programme implementation. In other words, we required baseline data 
before VFs and SGPs were officially established and one period after these microfinance programmes 
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were formed. However, our first dataset was collected in 2012 when the microfinance programmes 
were already established. Nguyen (2008) and Phan (2012) raised concerns about bias when 
evaluating microfinance programmes using only post-programme data because there may be 
significant differences between the treated and the control groups in the first period. Therefore, the 
data are adjusted before we use the panel data. 
Table 4.12 Borrower and Non-borrower Characteristics using Panel Data from the SES Survey 
(2017) 
  Non-borrower VF Borrower  SGP Borrower 
Household Head Characteristic    
Age (years) 58.20 55.98 51.41 
Female (yes=1) 0.39 0.34 0.43 
Education (years) 7.70 6.62 7.66 
Married (yes=1) 0.66 0.80 0.74 
Single (yes=1) 0.08 0.04 0.02 
Demographic    
Household Size (persons) 3.88 4.29 4.80 
Dependency Ratio 0.50 0.40 0.45 
Occupation    
Farmer (yes=1) 0.23 0.46 0.34 
Entrepreneur (yes=1) 0.14 0.07 0.21 
Formal Worker (yes=1) 0.22 0.17 0.23 
Informal Worker (yes=1) 0.05 0.07 0.04 
Income and Assets    
Monthly Income (THB 1,000) 17.30 8.62 13.05 
Landless (yes=1) 0.63 0.23 0.56 
Assets (THB 1,000) 865.54 567.88 506.43 
Number of Cars 0.25 0.11 0.24 
Number of Motorcycles 1.20 1.63 1.76 
Other Variables    
Central (yes=1) 0.22 0.15 0.18 
North (yes=1) 0.19 0.31 0.31 
Northeast (yes=1) 0.30 0.53 0.22 
South (yes=1) 0.13 0.003 0.20 
Rural Households 0.50 0.69 0.47 
Total 4,004 353 49 
Source: Author’s calculations 
4.3.2.2 Estimation Strategies 
To deal with the data problem, PSM is estimated for the first time to match borrowers with non-
borrowers, using a set of observable characteristics. This estimation creates a new panel dataset, 
consisting of borrower and non-borrower groups that have similar observed characteristics. The 
objective of this step is to eradicate observed heterogeneity in the initial period before using the 
panel data model (Heckman et al., 1997). 
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Panel data are used to solve unobserved variable bias when measuring the impact of VFs and SGPs, 
because panel data can eliminate unobserved variable bias (Boonperm et al., 2013). This study uses 
the fixed effect model to evaluate the impact of VFs and SGPs in Thailand. The fixed effect model 
corrects any possible bias because of pre-existing initial heterogeneity of households and time-
variance factors (Imai & Azam, 2012). 
Given the matched pre-programme attributes from PSM and under the exogeneity of microfinance 
programme participation, the microfinance programme impact estimator can be obtained from 
equation (3.29) (Section 3.2.2.2). That model is rewritten as follows: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝑇𝑖𝑡𝛾 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑡∅ +  𝑖𝑡                   (4.5) 
Where 𝑦𝑖𝑡  indicates the outcome variables of interest, e.g., household income and consumption, for 
household i at time t (t= 2012, 2017), 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a set of regressors that are the observed household 
characteristics, such as gender of the household head, age of the household head, the number of 
household members, education, careers, the value of house and landholding. 𝑇𝑖𝑡is a programme 
participation dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the individual or household i takes a loan 
from a microfinance programme in time t and 0 otherwise. 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑡 is a vector of year dummy that 
takes into account time-specific effects, 𝛼𝑖 indicates unobserved characteristics of the household and 
𝑖𝑡 are error terms. 
4.3.2.3 Results and Discussion 
This section discusses the impact of VF and SGP participation on the income and expenditure of 
borrowers. Tables 4.13 and 4.14 summarise the estimated results of the fixed effects with PSM 
models. Table 4.13 outlines the VF impact on income and expenditure and Table 4.14 includes the 
SGP impact on income and expenditure. 
VF Impact on Income 
The second column in Table 4.13 shows that the household head education level, household size, 
and formal worker, are positive and significant at the 1% level. Informal worker is positive and 
significant at the 5% level. These results reveal that an additional year’s education, a larger 
household, and formal and informal workers have higher monthly incomes: 445 baht, 3,793 baht, 
3,463 baht and 3,694 baht, respectively. However, the dependency ratio, farmer, entrepreneur, and 
assets are negative and significant at the 1% level. The negative coefficient of these variables 
indicates that a higher dependency ratio, farmer, entrepreneur, and higher assets have a lower 
monthly income: 9,238 baht, 4,390 baht, 4,950 baht, and 2.83 baht, respectively. 
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The impact estimator on household income is not significant. This result is similar to Chandoevwit 
and Ashakul’s (2008) study. They evaluated the impact of the VF on household income in Thailand. 
They find that the VF does not decrease the country’s poverty. They also find that this programme 
increases only non-consumption expenditure, which indicates that borrowers do not spend their 
loans on investment activities. Instead, borrowers spend the money on things such as household 
necessities. 
VF Impact on Housing Expenditure 
The third column in Table 4.13 shows that households with a female household head, household size, 
assets, farmer, and formal worker are positive and significant at the 10% level. This indicates that 
female household heads, larger households, greater assets, farmer, and formal worker have higher 
monthly housing expenditure: 322.56 baht, 159.91 baht, 0.1 baht, 191.65 baht, and 243.54 baht, 
respectively. However, the dependency ratio and the year 2017 are negative and significant at the 
1% and 5% level, respectively. This result suggests that a higher dependency ratio and the year 2017 
have lower monthly housing expenditure: 488.85 baht and 137.47 baht, respectively. 
The impact of the VF on housing expenditure is not significant. This result is similar to Li’s (2010) 
study that evaluated microcredit in China. Li finds that microcredit’s impact on house repairs or 
construction is not statistically significant. Cintina and Love (2014) evaluated microfinance impact on 
expenditure for MFI borrowers in India and explain that microfinance loans can be used for small 
home repairs. However, they do not find any difference in housing expenditure between borrowers 
and non-borrowers. 
VF Impact on Food Expenditure 
The fourth column in Table 4.13 shows that household size and formal workers are positive and 
significant at the 5% level. This shows that larger households and formal workers have higher 
monthly food expenditure: 847.22 baht, and 1,708.60 baht, respectively. However, the coefficient of 
the dependency ratio is negative and significant at the 1% level. This indicates that households with a 
higher dependency ratio have a lower monthly food expenditure: 3,864.30 baht. 
The impact estimator for a household’s food expenditure is not significant. This is similar to Banerjee 
et al.’s (2015) result. They evaluated microcredit programmes in India and find that microcredit 
programmes in India do not affect food expenditure. Similarly, Augsburg et al. (2015) evaluated the 
impact of microfinance programmes on food consumption in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The authors 
find that microfinance programmes do not increase weekly food consumption. They explain that 
households who establish businesses often do not have enough money to cover their start-up costs. 
Therefore, these households must reduce their household consumption to cover these costs. Thai 
rural households do not save enough to invest in their businesses. Thai farmers obtain loans to invest 
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in farming and then use their harvest income to repay the loans (Hickson, Pochanukul, & 
Achavanuntakul, 2013). 
VF Impact on Medical Expenditure 
The fifth column in Table 4.13 shows that the year 2017, female household heads, and the 
dependency ratio are positive and significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. These results 
reveal that the year 2017, female household heads and those with a higher dependency ratio have 
higher monthly medical expenditure: 1,285.28 baht, 2,006.11 baht, and 2,084.67 baht, respectively.  
The VF impact on medical expenditure is not significant. Microfinance is a short-term loan that is 
typically used as a substitute for informal loans (Banerjee et al., 2015; Crépon et al., 2015). 
Moreover, the main objective of the VF is to help the lowest income groups to improve their 
investments, job creation, income generation, welfare and reduce expense (Fongthong & Suriya, 
2014). This result indicates that the VF’s primary objective is not to improve health expenditure. 
VF Impact on Educational Expenditure 
The sixth column in Table 4.13 shows that entrepreneurs and the year 2017 are positive and 
significant at the 1% level; household size and farmers are positive and significant at the 5% level. 
These results reveal that entrepreneurs, the year 2017, a larger household, and farmers have higher 
monthly educational expenditure: 705.65 baht, 569.98 baht, 213.91 baht, and 507.37 baht, 
respectively. However, the coefficient of informal worker is negative and significant at the 1% level. 
This result shows that informal workers have lower monthly educational expenditure of 1,370.63 
baht. 
The impact of VFs on educational expenditure is positive and significant at the 1% level. The result 
also reveals that VF borrowers spend 585.03 baht more on education than non-borrowers. This result 
is similar to Takahashi, Higashikata, and Tsukada’s (2010) result. They evaluated the impact of 
microcredit programmes in Indonesia and find that there is a significant, positive short-term impact 
on clients’ school expenditure. They explain that the poor benefit more from microcredit 
participation via investment in their children’s schooling. Money spent on education helps to break 
the poverty vicious circle. Adjei, Arun, and Hossain (2009) evaluated the role of Ghanaian 
microfinance programmes in asset-building and poverty reduction and find that borrowers often use 
the loans to improve their children’s education. 
VF Impact on Transport Expenditure 
The seventh column in Table 4.13 indicates that education and household size are positive and 
significant at the 1% level. This result shows that a higher education level and larger household have 
a higher monthly transport expenditure, 148.21 baht and 864.76 baht, respectively. However, the 
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year 2017, the dependency ratio and assets are negative and significant at 1%, 5% and 5% levels, 
respectively. This shows that 2017, a higher dependency ratio, and larger assets have lower monthly 
transport expenditure, by 532.60 baht, 838.28 baht, and 0.26 baht, respectively. 
The VF impact on transport expenditure is not significant. Our result implies that VF loans do not 
increase a household’s transport expenditure. Vehicles can help households in many ways. For 
example, households can transport products from remote areas to the shops and markets. In 
addition, they can drop off and pick up their children from school (Awan & Juiya, 2015). Vehicles are 
an important production input and provide a means to travel to work (Kaboski & Townsend, 2012). 
This implies that transport expenditure is related to household production. Therefore, as our result 
implies, VF loans are not related to household production in rural areas. 
VF participation does not affect a borrowers’ income and, apart from educational expenditure, all 
other forms of expenditure. This result indicates that VF participation does not help borrowers 
improve their income or encourage them to spend more on food or healthcare. However, VF loans 
can increase borrowers’ educational expenditure. This result suggests that VFs help some borrowers 
invest in the education of their children. Fongthong (2013) states that VFs contribute to households’ 
educational expenditures. Borrowers in the Thai agricultural sector do not have any income outside 
of the planting season. If they do not have any savings, they must rely on loans to pay for large 
expenses such as tuition fees. VFs can help them meet this financial need (Yostrakul, 2018). An ADB 
study concludes that 14% of Thai adults use loans for educational expenditure (Microfinance 
Services, Ltd., 2013). Thai people feel a great sense of responsibility to invest in their children’s 
education. Thai parents believe that when their children graduate, they will find a good job and have 
a better life (Fongthong, 2013). 
SGP Impact on Income 
The second column in Table 4.14 indicates that education and household size are positive and 
significant at the 5% level. This result shows that an increase in the years of a household head’s 
education and larger households have higher monthly income of 896.26 baht and 3,144.99 baht, 
respectively. Mpuga (2008) notes that educated borrowers are more likely to have higher incomes 
and savings and therefore to have assets that can be used as collateral. Larger households tend to 
have higher incomes because they have more income sources (Fongthong & Suriya, 2014). 
In contrast, the dependency ratio and entrepreneur are negative and significant at the 1% level. The 
farmer variable is also negative but significant at the 5% level. The negative coefficient of these 
variables indicates that households with higher dependency ratios, entrepreneurs and farmers have 
lower incomes than other households. The result reveals that a higher dependency ratio significantly 
decreases monthly household income by 20,989.47 baht. This result suggests that households with 
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Housing Food Medical Educational Transport 
Impact Estimator       
VFs -1.109 0.006 -0.714 0.982 0.585*** -0.107 
Household Head 
Characteristic 
      
Female (yes=1) 0.678 0.323*** 0.945 2.006** - - 
Age (years) - - - - -0.007 4.469 × 10-04 
Education (years) 0.445*** -0.003 0.031 0.143 -0.028 0.148*** 
Demographic       
Household Size 
(persons) 
3.793*** 0.160** 0.847** -0.401 0.214** 0.865*** 
Dependency Ratio -9.238*** -0.489*** -3.864*** 2.085* 0.255 -0.838** 
Occupation       
Farmer (yes=1) -4.390*** 0.192* -0.069 - 0.507** -0.094 
Entrepreneur 
(yes=1) 
-4.950*** 0.186 0.548 0.397 0.706*** 0.444 
Formal Worker 
(yes=1) 
3.463*** 0.244* 1.709** - -0.005 0.025 
Informal Worker 
(yes=1) 
3.69** -0.053 0.847 0.665 -1.371*** -0.210 
Assets       
Assets -0.003*** 9.99 × 10-04** 4.177 × 10-04 3.287 × 10-04 -9.62 × 10-05 -2.612 × 10-04** 
Other Variables       
Year 2017 (yes=1)  -1.005 -0.137** -0.067 1.285*** 0.570*** -0.533*** 
Constant -2.348 0.016 2.298 -1.397 -0.612 -1.891** 
Number of 
Observations 
3,279 3,279 3,279 3,279 3,279 3,279 
Note: *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Source: Author’s calculations 
a high dependency ratio have fewer family members working to generate income. Moreover, 
financial services providers believe that these households will not be able to repay their loans 
(Wachira & Kihiu, 2012; Fongthong & Suriya, 2014).  
The SGPs’ impact on household income is positive and significant at the 5% level. The result also 
reveals that SGPs borrowers have a 5854.65 baht higher monthly income than non-borrowers. This 
result indicates that SGP participation increases borrowers’ income. This result is similar to that in 
Islam’s (2011) study that estimated the impact of microcredit programmes on income in Bangladesh. 
Islam finds that there is a positive, significant impact on self-employment income. This finding 
suggests that microfinance programmes improve borrowers’ welfare. Moreover, increased income is 
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the result of microfinance investment in working capital (such as seeds, raw materials and fertilizers) 
and assets (machinery and cash saving). Capital and asset accumulation improve borrowers’ income-
generation abilities (Armendariz de Aghion & Morduch, 2005; Islam, 2007; Phan, 2012). 
SGP Impact on Housing Expenditure 
The third column in Table 4.14 shows that education is positive and significant at the 10% level. This 
result reveals that household heads with higher education levels spend 157.72 baht per month more 
on housing than those with lower education levels. However, the coefficients of farmer and formal 
worker are negative and significant at 1% and 5% levels, respectively. This shows that farmers and 
formal workers spent 2,546.14 and 1,195.95 baht per month, respectively, less on housing than 
those with other occupations. 
The SGP impact on housing expenditure is positive but not significant. Microfinance loans are often 
used for minor house repairs. Therefore, the impact is not significant (Cintina & Love, 2014). In 
addition, expenditure related to house repairs is sizable but infrequent, meaning that such expenses 
are not significant (Kaboski & Townsend, 2012). Moreover, poor borrowers are risk-averse and have 
limited investment channels, thus they have limited opportunities to take advantage of such loans 
(Chandoewit & Ashakul, 2008). 
SGP Impact on Food Expenditure 
The fourth column in Table 4.14 indicates that the female variable is positive and significant at the 
5% level. This indicates that households with female household heads are more likely to spend 
2,237.75 baht per month more on food. However, the dependency ratio, farmer, and formal worker 
coefficients are negative and significant at 5%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. These results 
indicate that households with a higher dependency ratio, farmers, and formal workers are less likely 
to spend more on food. The results also show that a higher dependency ratio, farmers, and formal 
workers have lower food expenditure by 4,893.69 baht, 2,505.39 baht, and 2,326.50 baht, 
respectively, per month than lower dependency ratio households and other occupations. 
The SGP impact on food expenditure is not significant. Most microfinance loans are short-term loans; 
the impact of microcredit on food expenditure is not significant (Crépon et al., 2015). In addition, 
microfinance borrowers may obtain loans as substitutes for informal loans (Banerjee et al., 2015). 
Banerjee et al. (2015) state that borrowers obtain lower interest loans from microfinance 
programmes to repay informal loans with higher interest rates. Those authors find no significant 
difference in consumption patterns. 
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SGP Impact on Medical Expenditure 
Column 5, Table 4.14, shows that the age of the household head variable is positive and significant at 
the 5% level. This indicates that older household heads are likely to spend 55.34 baht per month 
more on medical expenses. The number of cars variable is negative and significant at the 5% level, 
which indicates that households with more than one car are likely to spend 359.09 baht per month 
less on medical expenses. 
The SGP impact on medical expenditure is not significant. This result is similar to Coleman’s (2006) 
study. Coleman evaluated microfinance in northeast Thailand and finds that the impact of 
microcredit on health expenditure is insignificant. Similarly, Banerjee et al. (2015) find that the 
impact of Indian microcredit programmes on health expenditure is not significant. Banerjee et al. 
explain that borrowers obtain loans to invest in their businesses but their profits are not enough to 
improve their livelihood. The loans are short-term and therefore cannot improve welfare. 
SGP Impact on Education Expenditure 
The sixth column in Table 4.14 indicates that the year 2017, farmer and formal worker variables are 
positive and significant at 5%, 10%, and 10% levels, respectively. These results suggest that 2017, 
farmers and formal workers spend 1,517.36 baht, 2,164.65 baht and 1,912.68 baht, respectively, 
more per month on education than other households. However, the informal worker variable is 
negative and significant at the 1% level. Informal worker households are likely to spend 8,385.10 
baht per month less on education than other households. 
The SGP impact on education expenditure is not significant. Banerjee et al. (2015) state that most 
microfinance participants borrow money for business and investment. Tarozzi, Desai, and Johnson 
(2015) find that there is no significant impact on education expenditure in Ethiopia. Moreover, they 
note that the increased school attendance rates for children aged between 6 and 15 years is very 
small and insignificant. Tarozzi et al. (2015) explain that access to credit increases the demand for 
child labour. They also find that increased borrowing from microfinance programmes is associated 
with decreased school attendance rates because teenagers are sent to work in the fields. 
SGP Impact on Transport Expenditure 
The seventh column in Table 4.14 shows that the education variable is positive and significant at the 
5% level. This result suggests that household heads with higher education levels spend 246.67 baht 
per month more on transport. Assets are negative and significant at the 1% level. This suggests that 
households with more assets are likely to spend 1.41 baht per month less on transport. 
The impact estimator on household transport expenditure is significant at the 10% level. This shows 
that SGP borrowers have higher transport expenses by 1,237.44 baht per month than non-
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borrowers. This result indicates that SGP loans help borrowers increase their transport expenditure. 
Higher transport expenditure implies that households conduct more business (Awan & Juiya, 2015). 
Vehicles are necessary production inputs and provide a means of travel to work (Kaboski & 
Townsend, 2012). Kaboski and Townsend (2012) note that vehicle repairs are an investment that has 
high returns. Hickson et al. (2013) state that Thai farm households need a vehicle to travel to their 
farm and to transport their products to markets. Lower-income households also use vehicles to 
complete jobs in different places. Karlan and Zinman’s (2010) investigation into the impact of 
commercial credit on transport expenditure in South Africa finds that the most common reason for 
borrowing is to cover transport expenses. 




Housing Food Medical Educational Transport 
Impact Estimator       
SGPs 5.855** 0.754 0.909 0.009 0.390 1.237* 
Household Head 
Characteristic 
      
Female (yes=1) - - 2.238** -0.217 0.406 - 
Age (years) 0.153 -0.018 0.025 0.055** 0.029 0.019 
Education (years) 0.896** 0.158* 0.206 - - 0.247** 
Married (yes=1) - - - - 1.40 - 
Single (yes=1) - - 2.291 - - - 
Demographic       
Household Size 
(persons) 
3.145** - - - - 0.411 
Dependency Ratio -20.989*** - -4.894** - - -1.39 
Occupation       
Farmer (yes=1) -8.611** -2.546*** -2.505** - 2.165* 0.216 
Entrepreneur 
(yes=1) 
-13.547*** -1.191 -0.971 - 1.495 -0.929 
Formal Worker 
(yes=1) 
-2.157 -1.196** -2.327* - 1.913* 0.592 
Informal Worker 
(yes=1) 
-3.111 -1.415 -2.750 - -8.385*** 0.357 
Assets       
Assets 0.002 - - - - -1.413 × 10-03*** 
Number of Cars - - - -0.359** - - 
Other Variables       
Year 2017 (yes=1) 3.442 -0.528 0.324 0.075 1.517** -0.797 
Constant -1.869 2.550** 6.139** 0.042 -3.61 -0.139 
Number of 
Observations 
514 519 519 514 519 514 
Note: *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
Source: Author’s calculations 
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The results show that SGP affects only income and transport expenses. This indicates that SGPs do 
not help borrowers improve their housing or encourage borrowers to spend more on education, food 
or healthcare. However, the result suggest that SGP loans can improve income and encourage 
borrowers to increase investment in working capital and assets. This ultimately improves borrowers’ 
income-generating ability (Armendariz de Aghion & Morduch, 2005; Islam, 2007; Phan, 2012). 
4.4 Chapter Summary 
This chapter discusses the empirical results of the credit participation and welfare impact models. 
The empirical results from the multinomial logit model reveal that VFs target low-income households 
in rural areas. VFs also encourage older, less educated and female household heads to participate in 
their programme. Larger households are more likely to access VFs. Households with higher 
dependency ratios are less likely to borrow from VFs. This suggests that VFs cannot help less 
economically active households. Farmers, entrepreneurs, formal and informal workers are the VFs’ 
primary borrowers. Significantly, VF borrowers do not have problems accessing other loans, like 
emergency loans. 
For SGPs, well-educated, young household heads in regional areas are more likely to borrow money 
from SGPs. SGPs’ borrowers have higher household incomes than those who borrow from VFs. These 
borrowers can also access other loans, such as emergency loans. Larger households are more likely 
to participate in SGPs. Entrepreneurs are the primary SGP borrowers. 
Less-educated and female household heads in rural areas are more likely to borrow from both VFs 
and SGPs. Like the two previous groups, these borrowers can access other loans, such as emergency 
loans. Larger households have a higher probability of borrowing from both programmes. VFs’ and 
SGPs’ main borrowers are farmers, entrepreneurs, formal and informal workers. 
The PSM models estimate the welfare impacts of VF and SGP participation on income and 
expenditure. Participation in a VF has a significant impact on income, education, and transport 
expenditure but not on housing, food, or medical expenditure. However, the sign of these variables is 
negative. This result indicates that VFs do not improve borrowers’ wellbeing. VF borrowers spend 
their loans on non-consumption expenditure; VF borrowers do not spend loans on investment 
activities (Chandoevwit & Ashakul, 2008). In addition, VF loans are not large enough to improve 
income and expenditure (Chandoevwit & Ashakul, 2008). For SGPs, the results reveal that SGP effects 
are significant in terms of income but not in terms of expenditure. This result indicates that SGP 
borrowers effectively invest their loans in income-generating activities, such as agricultural 
production and self-employment. 
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PSM is a useful method for controlling bias due to observed determinants in impact evaluation; 
however, PSM cannot control for unobserved characteristics. Panel data can control for unobserved 
bias. This study uses the fixed effect model with PSM to evaluate the VF and SGP impact on 
household income and expenditure. The results show that participation in the VF impacts only on 
educational expenditure; in other words, borrowers spend more money on education. Thai farmers 
in rural areas have limited money during the planting season. If they have any expenses, like their 
children’s school fees, they must borrow money to pay these bills. Our results suggest that the VF 
helps them meet this need (Yostrakul, 2018). 
The fixed effect model with PSM also shows that SGPs affect income and transport expenditure. This 
indicates that SGPs can improve borrowers’ income and encourage borrowers to increase investment 
in working capital and assets. SGPs’ borrowers spend more on transport expenditure; vehicles are 
necessary production inputs (Kaboski & Townsend, 2012). Cars and motorcycles can help households 
transport products from remote areas to their shops and markets (Awan & Juiya, 2015). Vehicle 
ownership is essential for Thai households, especially middle-income farmers. Farmers need vehicles 
to travel to their farms and transport crops to the market. Labourers need to have vehicles because 
they work in several locations (Hickson et al., 2013). Higher transport expenditure indicates that 
households conduct more business (Awan & Juiya, 2015; Hickson et al., 2013). The next chapter 
discusses the performance of VFs and SGPs and investigates the factors that affect MFI sustainability. 
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Chapter 5 
MFIs’ Performance and Sustainability 
Chapter 5 discusses Thai MFIs’ performance and sustainability. Section 5.1 describes the 
performance of the MFIs under investigation. Section 5.2 discusses factors that influence MFIs’ 
sustainability. Finally, section 5.3 summarizes the findings. 
5.1 Performance of MFIs in Thailand 
This section investigates MFIs’ performance. This includes the study methodology and data, VF and 
SGP characteristics, outreach, productivity, differences between VF and SGP financial structures, and 
financial performance. 
5.1.1 Methodology and Data 
This study analyses and compares VFs’ and SGPs’ performance based on MFIs’ characteristics, 
outreach, productivity, financial structure and financial performance. MFIs’ characteristics include 
age, personnel, profit, total assets, total liability, and total equity. Outreach consists of the total 
number of members, the total number of borrowers and the average loan balance per borrower. 
Productivity consists of borrowers per staff member and loans per staff member. Financial structure 
covers capital to asset ratio, debt per equity, deposit per loan, and gross loan portfolio per asset. In 
terms of financial performance, this study uses three financial ratios: ROA, ROE, and OSS.  
To evaluate MFIs’ performance, this study uses data collected from annual VF and SGP reports from 
2014 to 2016. This study uses data for the period of 2014-2016 because the GSB only has information 
for this period. The Thai government does not have a database that contains the most recent data. 
There are 90 VFs and 70 SGPs in Thailand. Annual reports were collected by the GSB. The GSB 
collected this data through the 2017 MFI competition. The MFI contest is an annual event run by the 
GSB. Over 100 MFIs across Thailand participated in the contest. The contest objectives are, first, to 
encourage communities to develop MFIs and secondly, to raise community awareness of local MFI 
management teams. The target groups for this contest are: (1). community financial institutions, (2) 
VFs, and (3) SGPs. The MFI contest judges and ranks competitors in terms of three features: (1). 
financial management, (2) good management practices, and (3) the benefits for members, society 
and the community. This study also uses descriptive statistics to assess VFs’ and SGPs’ performance. 
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5.1.2 VF and SGP Characteristics, Outreach and Productivity 
This section compares the VF and SGP characteristics outreach and productivity. Table 5.1 shows that 
VFs and SGPs have an average age of 13.09 and 10.61 years, respectively. The means the groups are 
significantly different at the 1% level. Age refers to the total years that an MFI has been in operation 
(Woldeyes, 2012). Kar (2012) states that older MFIs may benefit from organizational learning. 
Organizational learning is learning within a specific organization that involves the interaction of 
multiple levels of analysis (individual, group, organizational and inter-organizational). The process 
includes creating, retaining, and transferring knowledge within an organization. An organization 
improves over time as it gains experience. From this experience, an organization can create 
knowledge (Argote & Miron-Spektor, 2011; Popova-Nowak & Cseh, 2015). Learning considers 
productivity and efficiency and how these can be improved (Kar, 2012). Cull et al. (2007) evaluated 
the financial performance and outreach of 124 MFIs in 49 developing countries. The authors find a 
positive relationship between MFI age and sustainability. Robinson (2001) explains that experienced 
MFIs, or those over six years old, are 102% financially self-sufficient. Those between three and six 
years old are 86% financially self-sufficient, whereas those that have been in operation for less than 
three years are only 69% financially self-sufficient. This implies that an MFI’s age affects its financial 
sustainability. Our results for the average age of VFs and SGPs indicate that both types of MFI would 
benefit from organizational learning.  
Table 5.1 shows that SGPs have a higher average number of members and borrowers than VFs. The 
average numbers of SGP members and borrowers are 445.54 and 106.72, respectively; VFs have an 
average of 347.38 members and 97.04 borrowers. The number of members for the MFI types are 
significantly different at the 5% level. The average SGP loan amount per borrower is significantly 
higher at the 5% level than for VFs. The average loan for SGPs and VFs is 32,377.61 and 27,008.03 
baht per borrower, respectively. The average loan balance per borrower is measured using depth of 
outreach (Ledgerwood, 1998). Smaller loans reflect a poorer client base (Cull et al., 2007; Mersland & 
Storm, 2009). Table 5.1 indicates that VFs provide more loans to poorer clients than SGPs. 
The average number of staff members per VF and SGP is 10.68 and 11.26 persons, respectively. The 
number of staff members is significantly different at the 10% level. VFs and SGPs have similar 
numbers of borrowers per staff member (9.08 and 8.77) (see Table 5.1). A higher ratio reflects an 
MFI’s ability to use its staff members efficiently. Our finding indicates that the efficiency of staff 
member use for both MFIs does not differ in terms of monitoring borrowers. However, for SGPs, 
loans per staff member are significantly higher at the 1% level than for VFs. Total loan amounts per 
staff member for SGPs and VFs are 288,952.6 and 194,390.7 baht, respectively. The loans per staff 
member ratio is used to measure staff productivity in terms of loan management. Table 5.1 results 
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suggest that SGP staff members are more productive than VF staff members. In addition, SGP profits, 
118,253.6 baht per year, are significantly higher at the 1% level than VF profits. 
Table 5.1 Institutional Characteristics, Outreach and Productivity of Thai VFs and SGPs (average 
values from 2014 to 2016) 
Element 
Benchmark T-test 
VFs SGPs P-value 
Institutional Characteristic    
Age (years) 13.09 10.61 0.000*** 
Personnel (Persons) 10.68 11.26 0.0334** 
Profit (Baht) 112623.10 230867.60 0.0000*** 
Total Assets (Baht) 2576263.00 5513542.00 0.0000*** 
Total Liability (Baht) 78813.04 2861209.00 0.0000*** 
Total Equity (Baht) 2499516.00 2693207.00 0.4833 
Outreach    
The Number of Members (Persons) 347.38 445.54 0.0117** 
The Number of Borrowers (Persons) 97.04 106.72 0.2950 
Average Loan Balance per Borrower (Baht per Borrower) 27008.03 32377.61 0.0262** 
 Productivity    
Borrowers per Staff Member 9.08 8.77 0.7308 
Loan per Staff Member 194390.70 288952.60 0.0075*** 
Note: *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Source: Author’s calculations 
SGPs’ total assets are significantly higher at the 1% level, almost double those of VFs (5,513,542 baht 
and 2,576,263 baht, respectively). The MFI assets reflect the MFI size. Larger MFIs can benefit from 
economies of scale by reducing operating expenses and therefore achieving greater financial 
performance (Meyer, 2019). Our results imply that SGPs gain more benefit from economies of scale 
than VFs. In addition, larger MFIs can reach more people than smaller MFIs (Mersland & Storm, 
2009). This implies that SGPs can reach greater number of borrowers than VFs.  
SGPs have significantly higher (at the 1% level) liabilities than VFs, approximately 36 times (2,861,209 
baht and 78,813.04 baht, respectively). Total liabilities include all deposits, debts, accounts payable, 
and other liability accounts (CGAP, 2003). When MFIs take on more debt instruments, efficient 
liability management and planning are key to growing the institutions (Bayai & Ikhide, 2016). SGPs 
were established by community leaders or citizen groups to promote savings among members, to 
provide credit to improve members’ lives, and to make emergency funds available (Meagher, 2013). 
In short, SGPs are funded through member deposits. The results suggest that if SGPs manage and 
plan their liabilities efficiently, SGPs can grow more than VFs. However, long-term debts are 
relatively more expensive and, therefore, employing a high proportion of such debts could lead to 
lower profitability (Kar, 2012). SGPs should be concerned about the cost of such liability.  
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SGPs’ and VFs’ total equity are similar. The total equities are 2,693,207 and 2,499,516 baht, 
respectively (see Table 5.1). Total equity is the sum of all equity accounts net of any equity 
distributions; e.g., dividends, stock repurchases, or other cash payments made to shareholders 
(CGAP, 2003). Equity has an impact on MFI performance because equity is cheap, leading to higher 
FSS (Bayai & Ikhide, 2016; Kar, 2012). Nyamsogoro (2010) states that equity is a relatively cheap 
source of funding; equity can improve MFI sustainability. Some Thai MFIs’ equity comes from the 
government. The programmes do not have an objective to make a profit from poor people. This 
makes equity a relatively cheap source of finance and, thus, improves MFIs’ financial sustainability. 
5.1.3 VF and SGP Financial Structures 
This section compares VFs’ and SGPs’ financial structures using the capital per asset, debt per equity, 
deposit per loan, and gross loan portfolio per asset ratios. The VF capital per asset ratio is 
significantly higher at the 1% level than the SGPs’. Both the VFs’ and SGPs’ capital per asset ratios are 
far above that of the Global and FSS benchmarks (see Table 5.2). The capital per asset ratio is used to 
evaluate MFIs’ solvency. This ratio also shows an MFI’s ability to meet its obligations and absorb 
unexpected losses (Yenesew, 2014). Yenesew (2014) states that the determination of an acceptable 
ratio level is generally based on an MFI’s assessment measures, which include expected losses, 
financial strength, and the ability to absorb losses. This ratio measures the amount of capital 
required to cover unexpected losses. Our study uses the capital per asset ratio as a proxy for MFI 
capital. This means that if an MFI has a higher capital per asset ratio, it is safer than lower ratio 
institutions. Therefore, both VFs and SGPs are relatively safe compared with Global and FSS 
benchmarks. 
Table 5.2 A Comparison of Thai MFIs’ Financial Structures (average values from 2014 to 2016) 
Indicator 
Financial Structure T-test Benchmark1 
VFs SGPs P-value Global FSS 
Capital per Asset Ratio 0.98 0.68 0.0000*** 0.2398 0.231 
Debt per Equity  0.08 3.23 0.0000*** 0.0286 0.033 
Deposits per Loan  0.01 0.40 0.0000*** 0.1107 0.118 
Deposits per Total Assets  0.00 0.19 0.0000*** 0.0597 0.089 
Gross Loan Portfolio per Assets  0.77 0.64 0.0193** 0.7685 0.784 
Note: *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
1Benchmark refers to the 2009 Global and Financial Self Sufficiency (FSS) ratio of MFIs (Shaoyan & Duwal, 
2012).  
Source: Author’s calculations 
The SGP average debt per equity ratio is above the VF average ratio and significantly different at the 
1% level. Both the VF and SGP average ratios are higher than Global and FSS benchmarks - especially 
the SGP ratio (see Table 5.2). These results indicate that SGPs are savings-based organizations (the 
SGP ratio is much higher than the VF ratio). This also implies that SGPs have greater creditor risks. 
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However, Muriu (2011) concludes that if MFIs employ more debt in their capital structure, these 
institutions can increase their profit. Our finding shows that SGP profits are significantly higher at the 
1% level than VF profits, 118,253.60 baht per year. 
There is a significant difference at the 1% level in the deposit to loan ratio for VFs and SGPs. Though 
the VF deposit per loan ratio is lower than the Global and FSS benchmarks, the SGP ratio is much 
higher (see Table 5.2). Eur-U-Sa (2011) evaluated the performance of the BAAC in Thailand. The 
author finds that the BAAC deposit per loan ratio gradually increased between 1967 and 2009. This 
suggests that the BAAC is moving towards becoming a self-financing institution. Muriu (2011) 
explains that external funding is more costly than deposits, thus MFIs may effectively use local 
depositors. This study’s finding indicates that deposits are SGPs’ main source of funding.  
The VF and SGP gross loan portfolio per asset ratios differ significantly at the 5% level but they are 
similar to the Global and FSS benchmarks (see Table 5.2). Rahman and Mazlan (2014) used this ratio 
to compare five Bangladeshi MFIs’ financial structures. Their results show that Bangladesh MFI gross 
loan portfolio to assets ratio is high. Bhuiyan et al. (2011) used this ratio to compare the financial 
structure of MFIs in Malaysia and Bangladesh. Their results reveal that MFIs in Malaysia have higher 
gross loan portfolio to assets ratio than MFIs in Bangladesh. The gross loan portfolio per assets ratio 
is a key indicator of financial structure. This ratio indicates an MFI’s proportion of core earning 
assets. Rahman and Mazlan’s (2014) and Bhuiyan et al.’s (2011) results reveal that Malaysia and 
Bangladesh MFIs’ core earning assets are loans. Mahapatra and Dutta (2016) state that the gross 
loan portfolio acts as an indicator of an MFI’s main source of income. In short, the bigger the loan, 
the more interest income they will make. Our results indicate that both VFs’ and SGPs’ core earning 
assets are loans. 
5.1.4 VF and SPG Financial Performance 
This section evaluates the financial performance of VFs and SGPs using ROA, ROE, and OSS. Table 5.3 
compares the average financial performance of VFs and SGPs between 2014 and 2016. The results 
show that there is a significant difference at the 1% level between the ROAs for VFs and SGPs. For 
both VFs and SGPs, the ROA ratio is higher than Global and FSS benchmarks. This result indicates that 
both VFs and SGPs can deploy their assets profitably. As Ngo (2012) notes, ROA is used to measure 
profitability in commercial institutions. Rahman and Mazlan (2014) used ROA to compare the 
financial performance of five MFIs in Bangladesh. They conclude that Bangladesh MFIs are financially 
sustainable because the ROA ratio is positive. Agarwal and Sinha (2010) used ROA to evaluate the 
financial performance of Indian MFIs. The authors find that MFIs in India are also financially 
sustainable. Wassie, Kusakari, and Sumimoto (2019), who evaluated Ethiopian MFIs performance 
using ROA, find that they also perform well. 
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In terms of ROE, the SGP ratio is significantly higher at the 1% level than the VF ratio. Though the 
SGPs’ average ROE is above the Global and FSS benchmarks, the VFs’ average ROE is lower than both 
benchmarks (see Table 5.3). The lower VFs’ average ROE is not surprising given that its equity comes 
from the government; they do not prioritize profits because their core objective is to assist the poor. 
VFs play an important role in the Thai credit market, especially for poor individuals who live in rural 
areas and cannot access formal financial services (Fongthong & Suriya, 2014). The ROE ratio is 
important only for profit-earning institutions (Shaoyan & Duwal, 2012). Ngo (2012) notes that the 
ROE ratio tends to encourage investors to reinvest in MFIs. Likewise, Ledgerwood (1998) states that 
this ratio is a crucial indicator for private investors when deciding whether to invest in MFIs. This 
ratio is the most common indicator used to assess financial sustainability. Table 5.3 shows that the 
average ROEs for VFs and SGPs are positive, indicating that both are financially sustainable. 
Table 5.3 shows that the OSS of VFs is significantly at the 1% level above that of SGPs. The OSS of 
both VFs and SGPs is higher than the Global and FSS benchmarks. OSS measures operating income 
and includes operating costs, such as salaries and wages, supplies, loan losses, and other 
administrative costs (Meyer 2002). Ngo (2012) states that OSS is one indicator used to assess the 
financial sustainability of MFIs. Rahman and Mazlan (2014) compared the financial performance of 
five MFIs in Bangladesh using the OSS. They find that all MFIs are financially sustainable. Bhuiyan et 
al. (2011) compared the financial sustainability of Malaysian and Bangladeshi MFIs using OSS. Their 
results show that Malaysian MFIs perform better than the Bangladeshi MFIs in terms of the OSS. Our 
results indicate that both types of MFI are profitable and financially sustainable. 
Table 5.3 A Comparison of Thai MFIs’ Financial Performance (average values from 2014 to 2016) 
Indicator 
Financial Performance T-test Benchmark1 
VFs SGPs P-value Global FSS 
Return on Assets 0.05 0.07 0.0000*** 0.01 0.02 
Return on Equity 0.06 0.31 0.0000*** 0.07 0.11 
Operational Self-Sufficiency 13.59 2.94 0.0011*** 1.09 1.17 
Note: *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
1Benchmark refers to the 2009 Global and Financial Self Sufficiency (FSS) ratio of MFIs (Shaoyan & Duwal, 
2012). 
Source: Author’s calculations 
In summary, this section investigated VFs’ and SGPs’ performance, comparing their financial 
structures and performance. The results indicate that SGPs perform better than VFs in terms of the 
number of members, loans per staff member and profit. The results show that SGPs have an average 
of 445.54 members and VFs have an average of 347.38 members. These averages differ significantly 
at the 5% level. The SGPs’ loans per staff member ratio is significantly higher at the 1% level than the 
VFs one. The loans per staff member ratio is used to measure productivity. In short, SGP staff 
members are more productive in terms of loan management than VF staff. SGPs’ average profit is 
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significantly higher at the 1% level than VFs’, by 118,253.6 baht per year,. SGPs have greater assets 
and liabilities than VFs. However, VFs and SGPs are similar in terms of the number of borrowers, 
borrowers per staff member and total equity. SGPs’ funds come from members’ savings (Meagher, 
2013). In contrast, VFs were established by the Thai government with one million baht given to each 
VF (Fongthong & Suriya, 2014), i.e., SGPs are funded through member deposits but VFs are 
subsidized by the government. This study concludes that SGPs perform better than VFs in terms of 
the number of members, loans per staff member and profit. Muriu (2011) finds that higher deposits, 
as a percentage of total assets, are associated with improved profitability. In addition, deposit 
funding can help MFIs achieve independence from investors and donors because deposit funding 
provides MFIs with an inexpensive, sustainable source of loan funds (Muriu, 2011). 
Regarding the financial structure, the VF capital per asset ratio is significantly higher at the 1% level 
than SGPs. Both VFs’ and SGPs’ capital per asset ratios are above the Global and FSS benchmarks. 
This suggests that both VFs and SGPs are relatively safe from financial risk. MFIs with higher capital 
per asset ratios are considered relatively safe compared with MFIs with lower ratios (Yenesew, 204). 
The capital per asset ratio is used to evaluate MFI solvency. This ratio shows an MFI’s ability to meet 
its obligations and absorb unexpected losses (Yenesew, 2014). This study uses the capital per asset 
ratio as a proxy for MFI capital. This means that if an MFI has a higher capital per asset ratio, it is 
regarded as safer than an institution with a lower ratio. The SGP debt per equity ratio is above that of 
the VFs. Both MFIs’ ratios are higher than the Global and FSS benchmarks - especially the SGP ratio. 
This result shows that SGPs are savings-based organizations, as indicated by their deposits per loan 
and deposits per total asset ratios, 0.40 and 0.19, respectively. Eur-U-Sa (2011) states that if a bank’s 
deposits per loan ratio is higher, then it is moving towards becoming a self-financing institution. 
Muriu (2011) explains that external funding is more costly than deposits, thus MFIs may effectively 
use local deposits. This finding indicates that SGPs depend more on deposits, their main source of 
funding. 
The gross loan portfolio per assets ratio indicates that both VFs’ and SGPs’ core earning assets are 
loans. The gross loan portfolio per assets is a financial structure indicator. This ratio reveals the 
proportion of an MFI’s core earning assets. Mahapatra and Dutta (2016) state that the gross loan 
portfolio is the main source of an MFI’s income. In short, if an individual MFI has a higher loan ratio, 
its income from interest will be higher. Our result indicates that both VFs’ and SGPs’ core earning 
assets are loans. Our study suggests that if VFs and SGPs grant more loans, they will increase their 
revenue from interest and, eventually, their profit. In terms of financial performance, both VFs and 
SGPs are profitable and financially sustainable. Our results indicate that the VFs’ operational self-
sufficiency is significantly higher at the 1% level than SGPs. Both VFs’ and SGPs’ operational self-
sufficiency ratios are higher than the Global and FSS benchmarks. Our results indicate that VFs and 
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SGPs can cover all their costs and that these institutions are financially sustainable. The next section 
investigates the factors affecting MFIs’ sustainability. 
5.2 The Sustainability of Thai MFIs 
5.2.1 Data and Methodology 
To evaluate the MFIs’ sustainability, this study uses data collected from the annual reports of both 
VFs and SGPs from 2014 to 2016. These annual reports were collected by the GSB via the MFIs 
competition in Thailand in 2017. There are 90 VFs and 70 SGPs across the country.  
A panel regression model is used to identify the determinants of MFI financial self-sufficiency. I use 
the panel regression model because of its advantages over cross-section and time-series data 
methods (Kinde, 2012). Panel data involves the pooling of observations on a cross-section of units 
over several time periods (Kinde, 2012). This method can increase the degrees of freedom and, 
therefore, the power of the test (Kinde, 2012). In short, panel data are more useful than either cross-
section or time-series data alone. 
Before using the regression model, I test it for normality. I test the distribution of the variables using 
a plot of each variable. From the visual plot, it is evident that the distribution of some variables is not 
normal; some variables (the financial self-sufficiency ratio; total assets; the personnel productivity 
ratio; the average loan balance per borrower; and the ratio of operating expenses) are skewed. The 
test also shows evidence of normal distribution for the debt to equity ratio. Non-normally distributed 
variables can distort relationships and significance tests (Osborne & Waters, 2002). To solve this non-
normal distribution problem, this study uses variable transformation as suggested by Cameron and 
Trivedi (2009), Verbeek (2008) and Wooldridge (2009). This study transforms the variables to their 
natural log. The log transformed variables can help to attain linearity in a parameter that is a 
requirement for regression analysis (Nyamsogoro, 2010). The panel regression model for MFI 
financial self-sufficiency (Kinde, 2012) is: 
𝐿𝑁 (𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡) = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑁 (𝑌𝐼𝐸𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽2𝐿𝑁 (𝑆𝐼𝑍𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽3𝐿𝑁 (𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽4𝐷𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝑁 (𝐴𝐿𝐵𝑃𝐵𝑖𝑡) +
𝛽6𝐿𝑁 (𝑂𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡) +∈𝑖𝑡          (5.1) 
Where:  
LN (FSSit): is the natural log of the financial self-sufficiency ratio of MFI i at time t;  
𝛼𝑖: is a constant; 
𝐿𝑁 (𝑌𝐼𝐸𝑖𝑡): is the natural log of yield on gross loan portfolio of MFI i at time t; 
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𝐿𝑁 (𝑆𝐼𝑍𝑖𝑡): is the natural log of total assets of MFI i at time t; 
𝐿𝑁 (𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑡): is the natural log of personnel productivity ratio of MFI i at time t; 
𝐷𝐸𝑖𝑡: is the debt to equity ratio of MFI i at time t; 
𝐿𝑁 (𝐴𝐿𝐵𝑃𝐵𝑖𝑡): is the natural log of average loan balance per borrower of MFI i at time t; 
LN (OERit): is the natural log of the ratio of operating expense of MFI i at time t; and 
∈: is the error term. 
This model (Equation 5.1) estimates the impact of each explanatory variable on the financial self-
sufficiency ratio. The impact of each variable is assessed in terms of the statistical significance of the 
coefficients. These coefficients are derived using the panel regression model, which may be subject 
to omitted variables bias. This situation occurs when some variables not included in the model affect 
the dependent variable. If a researcher does not control for these variables, the coefficients’ 
estimation will lead to an omitted variables bias (Kinde 2012; Wooldridge, 2009). Controlling for the 
omitted variables bias depends on the nature of the omitted variables. Omitted variables bias can be 
divided into constant or changing over time or constant or changing over cases. These are known as 
time specific and individual specific effects of unobservable or omitted variables (Kinde 2012). Hsiao 
(2007) notes that there are two common methods to deal with omitted variables: the fixed effect 
model and the random effect model. 
To choose between a fixed effect model and a random effect model, this study uses the Hausman 
test that compares the coefficients of the fixed and random effect estimators. This test reveals that 
the random effect is consistent under the null hypothesis. Table 5.4 shows the random effect model 
provides more consistent estimates than the fixed effect model. The test results show that the 
Hausman test statistic is not significant and, therefore, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. In 
short, the random effect model provides a more consistent result.
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LN (Average Loan Balance per Borrower) 0.576 0.473 0.102 0.053 
LN (Number of Borrowers per Staff 
Member) 
0.437 0.404 0.032 0.221 
LN (Total Assets) -0.468 -0.360 -0.108 0.062 
Debt to Equity Ratio -0.004 -0.006 0.002 0.002 
LN (Operating Expense Ratio) -0.821 -0.840 0.020 0.025 
LN (Yield on Gross Loan Portfolio) 0.826 0.810 0.016 0.021 
Note: χ2= 5.03; Probability > χ2= 0.5397 
Source: Author’s calculations 
This study also investigates the appropriateness of using the random effect model as opposed to 
pooled OLS using the Breusch and Pagan multiplier test (LM test). The null hypothesis in the LM test 
is that the variances across the entities equal zero. Table 5.5 shows the results of the LM test. The LM 
test is statistically significant, which indicates the existence of random effects. The results suggest 
that pooled OLS regression is not appropriate. Thus, this study uses the random effect model. 
Table 5.5 The Results of the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier Test (LM Test) 
Variables Var Sqrt (Var) 
LN (Financial Self-sufficiency Ratio) 1.230 1.109 
e 0.019 0.139 
u 0.138 0.372 
Note: Test: Var(u) = 0; chibar2(01) = 44.34; Prob > chibar2 = 0.0000 
Source: Author’s calculations 
This study checks for serial correlation in the error term using the Wooldridge test that looks for 
autocorrelation in the panel data. The null hypothesis is that there is no first-order autocorrelation. 
The p-value of the test statistic for equation (5.1) is statistically significant. Therefore, we reject the 
null hypothesis because the test statistic indicates the presence of serial correlation. 
This study tests for heteroskedasticity across the explanatory variables using the Breusch-Pagan test. 
The null hypothesis is that there is no heteroskedasticity. The p-value of the test statistic for equation 
(5.1) is statistically significant. Thus we reject the null hypothesis, which indicates the presence of 
heteroscedasticity. 
The random effect model explains the impact of the determinants of MFI financial sustainability. The 
model is estimated using heteroskedastic and autocorrelation consistent standard errors, as 
suggested by Cameron and Trivedi (2009), Verbeek (2008) and Wooldridge (2009). The next section 
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presents the descriptive statistics of dependent and independent variables of the panel regression 
model. 
5.2.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 5.6 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables of financial self-sustainability, including 
the mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum values of MFIs from 2014 to 2016. The 
average loan balance per borrower variable shows an MFI’s efficiency in selling loans, their primary 
product (Woldeyes, 2012). Assuming all things are equal, if an MFI sells more loans, it will have 
greater profitability and operational sustainability. Table 5.6 reveals that the mean average of this 
variable is 29,254.03 baht, indicating that, on average, MFIs provide 29,254.03 baht to each 
borrower. The maximum value is 166,666.70 baht and the minimum is 0. The minimum value is zero 
because some MFIs do not provide loans; they are savings-only institutions. 
Table 5.6 The Descriptive Statistics for the Dependent and Independent Variables 
Variable Mean SD Minimum Maximum 
Financial Self-sufficiency Ratio 5.41 18.36 0.002 188.03 
Yield on Gross Loan Portfolio 0.14 1.08 0 22.7 
Total Assets 3,958,338.00  5,391,584.00  11,240.98  39,200,000.00  
Debt to Equity Ratio 1.46 6.33 -21.20 64.88 
Average Loan Balance per Borrower 29,254.03  22,668.73  0 166,666.70  
Operating Expense Ratio 0.02 0.05 0 0.61 
Borrowers per Staff Member 8.92 8.29 0 44.44 
Source: Author’s calculations 
In terms of borrowers per staff member, a higher ratio reflects an MFI’s ability to use its staff 
efficiently. Staff productivity is measured by dividing active borrowers by the number of officers 
(Kinde, 2012). This ratio is called the personnel productivity ratio. Kinde explains that serving a loan 
client can be more labour intensive and costly than serving a depositor because the process involves 
a series of interviews and site visits before the loan can be disbursed. Nyamsogoro (2010) studied the 
relationship between the number of borrowers per staff member and the financial sustainability of 
Tanzanian MFIs in rural areas. The author concludes that Tanzanian MFIs’ staff in rural areas are not 
efficient because they fail to manage borrowers when the number of borrowers grows. Table 5.6 
shows the mean value of borrowers per staff member is 8.92, i.e., one staff member monitors 
approximately nine customers. The minimum and maximum values are 0 and 45 people (see Table 
5.6). The minimum value is 0 because some MFIs do not have any borrowers because they do not 
provide loans. 
Total assets measure if MFIs are large enough to be operationally and financially sustainable 
(Woldeyes, 2012). Bogan (2012) evaluated how changes in capital structure can improve financial 
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sustainability through OSS. Bogan’s results show that assets and capital structure affect MFI 
performance. Asset size is positive and significantly influenced by sustainability. Cull et al. (2007) and 
Woldeyes (2012) find that MFI size significantly, positively affects MFI‘s FSS. Table 5.6 shows the 
mean total assets are 3,869,404 baht, with maximum and minimum values of 39,200,000 baht and 
11,240.98 baht, respectively. The standard deviation is 5,391,584 baht. The MFIs in our study differ in 
their asset size.  
This study also investigates MFIs’ capital structure. The debt to equity ratio indicates an MFI’s capital 
structure. A high debt to equity ratio implies that MFIs are leveraged rather than financed through 
equity capital (Kinde, 2012). Kinde (2012) investigated the factors affecting the FSS of Ethiopian MFIs. 
The author finds that the debt to equity ratio has a negative, statistically insignificant impact on FSS. 
The result implies that a combination of various sources of capital does not improve an MFI’s FSS. 
Nyamsogoro (2010) states that equity is a relatively cheap source of funding; equity can improve MFI 
sustainability. The author shows that capital structure positively correlates with MFI sustainability. 
Table 5.6 shows the mean of debt to equity ratio is 1.46. This finding indicates that for every baht 
owned by the shareholders, Thai MFIs owe 1.46 baht to creditors. This indicates that some Thai MFIs 
are leveraged rather than financed through equity capital. Interestingly, the minimum value of debt 
to equity ratio is -21.20 (see Table 5.6). This suggests that some MFIs are incurring losses and that 
they have more liabilities than assets. However, the maximum value of debt to equity ratio is 64.88 
(see Table 5.6) which shows that debt financing is considerably higher than equity capital. This result 
indicates that some MFIs in Thailand are savings-based organizations and that their MFI debt to 
equity ratio is much higher. Voluntary deposit mobilization can help MFIs achieve independence 
from investors and donors because this funding provides MFIs with an inexpensive, sustainable 
source of loan funds (Muriu, 2011). Muriu (2011) concludes that if MFIs employ more debt in their 
capital structure, they could increase their profit. 
The operating expense ratio refers to total operating costs in relation to outstanding loan portfolios. 
This variable measures MFI efficiency. Management efficiency enables MFIs to reach more clients 
and attain higher levels of profitability (Dissanayake, 2012). Nyamsogoro (2010) finds that the 
operating expense ratio is negatively related to Tanzanian MFIs’ sustainability. This means that, if 
MFIs can reduce their operating costs, they will be more efficient and financially sustainable. 
Dissanayake (2012) investigated factors affecting MFI profitability in Sri Lanka. The author finds that 
the operating expense ratio has a negative, statistically significant correlation with MFI sustainability.  
Table 5.6 shows that the average operating expense ratio is 0.02. This result indicates that, on 
average, Thai MFIs absorb two satang in operating expenses for each baht in the gross loan portfolio. 
Shaoyan and Duwal (2012) explain that the operating expense ratio can be used to compare 
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administrative and personnel expenses with MFIs’ yields on loan portfolios. Shaoyan and Duwal note 
that if an MFI has a lower operating expense ratio, it is more efficient. Interestingly, some MFIs in 
Thailand do not have this cost because their staff members are volunteers; they do not earn wages. 
Table 5.6 shows the minimum value of the operating expense ratio is zero. The VF is administered at 
two levels (national and the village level) (Meagher, 2013). The national level works with volunteers 
(VF members from each village). These volunteers deal directly with the funds.  
The yield on gross loan portfolio ratio indicates MFI efficiency in terms of generating cash revenue 
from its outstanding portfolios (Woldeyes, 2012). Yield on gross loan portfolio indicates the efficiency 
with which an MFI has used its resources to generate cash revenue (Woldeyes, 2012). The greater 
the ratio, the greater the efficiency. Cull et al. (2007) assessed patterns of profitability, loan 
repayments, and cost reduction strategies in 124 micro-banks in 49 countries. The authors find that 
yield on gross loan portfolio is positive and significantly associated with FSS for individual lenders. 
Woldeyes (2012) concludes that yield on gross loan portfolio indicates an MFI’s ability to generate 
revenue that covers its financial and operating expenses. Table 5.6 shows the mean value for yield on 
gross loan portfolio is 0.14. This suggests that, on average, these Thai MFIs generate 14 satang for 
every baht in their outstanding loan portfolios. In this study, the minimum and maximum of this 
variable are 0 and 22.7, respectively. This result indicates that some MFIs do not generate revenue 
from loans, whereas more efficient MFIs can generate up to 22.7 baht. As Lewis et al. (2013) note, 
some savings groups in Thailand are community-run. The objective of these groups is to encourage 
people to save. Some of these groups also provide their members with welfare services, such as 
hospital and funeral coverage, education and community development programmes.   
The financial self-sustainability variable indicates that an MFI can cover all its operating and capital 
costs without depending on any subsidy (Kinde, 2012). Kinde (2012) argues that financial 
sustainability is the key to MFI sustainability. Woldeyes (2012) notes that if the value of financial self-
sustainability is below 1, then an MFI has not ‘break even’ financially. Table 5.6 shows that the mean 
value of financial self-sustainability is 5.41, which suggests financial self-sustainability. This finding 
shows that, on average, the financial self-sustainability of the Thai MFIs under consideration is 5.41. 
This result is above the threshold for sustainability. In short, Thai MFIs are financially self-sustainable. 
5.2.3 Empirical Results 
The results show that the overall Wald statistic is significant at the 1% level. This rejects the 
hypothesis that all coefficients are equal to zero. The R-squared values indicate that the proportion 
of variance in the dependent variable can be explained by the fact that the independent variables are 
higher within the same MFI than between MFIs (within = 0.9307, between = 0.8856, overall = 
0.8912). This indicates high explanatory power within an MFI, i.e., about 93% of the variation in the 
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dependent variable is explained by the independent variables in the model. In terms of panel data, 
Cameron and Trivedi (2009) and Hsiao (2007) note that r-squared values above 0.2 are large enough 
to draw reliable conclusions. These empirical results indicate that six determinants are statistically 
significant and affect MFI financial sustainability. They are: average loan balance per borrower, the 
number of borrowers per staff member, MFI size, the debt to equity ratio, the operating expense 
ratio, and the yield on the gross loan portfolio (see Table 5.7). 
There is a positive relationship between the average loan balance per borrower and financial 
sustainability. The relationship is significant at the 1% level (see Table 5.7). This result is similar to 
that of Adongo and Stork (2005) who investigated factors influencing the financial sustainability of 
Namibian MFIs. They find that profitability is related to bigger loans. Nyamsogoro (2010) finds a 
positive and statistically significant correlation between the average loan balance per borrower 
Table 5.7 The Results of the Determinants of Financial Self-sustainability 
Variable Coefficient Robust SD P-Value 
LN (Average Loan Balance per 
Borrower) 
0.473 0.122 0.000*** 
LN (Borrowers per Staff Member) 0.404 0.088 0.000*** 
LN (Total Assets) -0.360 0.109 0.001*** 
Debt to Equity Ratio -0.006 0.003 0.068* 
LN (Operating Expense Ratio) -0.840 0.049 0.000*** 
LN (Yield on Gross Loan Portfolio) 0.810 0.080 0.000*** 
Constant -0.307 0.679 0.652 
R-Sq Within = 0.9307, Between = 0.8856, Overall = 0.8912 
Note: *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Source: Author’s calculations 
and MFI sustainability. The result indicates that MFIs’ profitability is associated with greater loan size. 
This means larger loans are more cost efficient and, therefore, more profitable. The average loan 
balance per borrower is used as a proxy measure for depth of outreach (Adongo & Stork, 2005; Cull 
et al., 2007; Nyamsogoro, 2010). Smaller loans indicate poorer borrowers (Adongo & Stork, 2005; 
Cull et al., 2007; Nyamsogoro, 2010). Our results suggest that Thai MFIs do not lend money to the 
very poor. Fongthong and Suriya (2014) and Rungruxsirivorn (2011) find that Thai MFIs reach near-
poor households and lower-income households (with income above the poverty line), but not the 
very poor. 
The number of borrowers per staff member is a significant positive factor at the 1% level affecting 
the sustainability of MFIs (see Table 5.7). This result is similar to that in Crombrugghe et al. (2008), 
who evaluated Indian MFIs’ performance. They find that an increase in the number of borrowers per 
staff member increases MFIs’ sustainability. Hossain and Khan (2016) who studied Bangladeshi MFIs’ 
sustainability, find that there is a positive relationship between the number of borrowers per staff 
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member and MFIs’ financial sustainability. Hossain and Khan (2016) conclude that if a staff member 
serves a larger number of borrowers, then an MFI will be more financially sustainable. Nyamsogoro 
(2010) points out that the number of borrowers per staff member shows an MFI’s efficiency. The 
result implies that Thai MFI staff members are more efficient at managing borrowers when the 
number increases. This leads to MFI sustainability. Thai MFI committees are normally limited to 15 
members. MFIs have a simple committee structure, with a chairperson, a vice-chair, a treasurer, 
secretary, and staff members (Boonperm et al., 2013; Meagher, 2013). Village residents vote for 
individual management committee members. A key aim of Thai MFIs is a high level of village 
participation (Meagher, 2013). 
A significant negative relationship at the 1% level between MFI size and MFI sustainability suggests 
that larger MFIs are less likely to be sustainable (see Table 5.7). Our result is similar to that in 
Yenesew (2014), who investigated factors affecting Ethiopian MFIs and finds a negative relationship 
between MFI size and financial performance. Yenesew states that large MFIs do not benefit from 
economies of scale. Yenesew explains that diseconomies of scale might occur because of the 
existence of a bureaucratic bottleneck and inefficiency in terms of asset management. Sima (2013), 
who examined factors affecting Ethiopian MIFs profitability, states that MFIs have become too 
complex to manage and diseconomies of scale occur when they are too large. The author finds that 
Ethiopian MFIs do not benefit from economies of scale.  
Our finding is contrary to both Cull et al. (2007) and Woldeyes (2012). Cull et al. (2007) and Woldeyes 
(2012) find that MFI size is significant and positively affects financial sustainability. Cull et al. (2007) 
conclude that MFI size is significant and positively related to three financial performance indicators: 
FSS, OSS, and ROA. Woldeyes agrees with Cull et al.’s argument that a change in size causes a 
positive change in OSS. Cull et al. (2007) and Woldeyes (2012) conclude that size is positive and 
significantly related to financial performance, reflecting the cost advantages associated with size 
(economies of scale). This study suggests that larger MFIs are less likely to be sustainable because 
they do not benefit from economies of scale.  
Diseconomies of scale lead to increased unit costs because of MFIs getting too large or expanding too 
quickly (Ngo, 2012). A lack of efficient MFIs to deliver financial services is a big problem (Meyer, 
2002). Meyer (2002) states that there are more funds available from governments and donors than 
efficient market-oriented MFIs can absorb and efficiently use. Therefore, MFIs should prioritize 
building and strengthening themselves. Meyer (2002) suggests that the increasing availability of 
technology and non-proprietary information among MFIs across various networks and associations 
will help them to improve their efficiency. 
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The debt to equity ratio is negative and significant at the 10% level (see Table 5.7). A high debt to 
equity ratio implies that MFIs are leveraged rather than financed through equity capital. The result 
suggests that a higher debt to equity ratio is less likely to lead to MFI sustainability. Tehulu (2013) 
investigated the determinants affecting MFI financial sustainability in East Africa. The author uses 
unbalanced panel data from 23 MFIs between 2004 and 2009 and finds that the debt to equity ratio 
has a negative and statistically significant impact on FSS. This result implies that a combination of 
various sources of capital does not improve an MFIs’ FSS. The negative relationship between debt to 
equity and MFI sustainability suggests that the more MFIs are debt-financed (compared with other 
sources of finance), the less sustainable they are. Tehulu (2013) explains that MFIs, especially those 
in Ethiopia, do not pay dividends, and this makes equity a relatively cheap source of finance 
compared with debt financing. According to Nyamsogoro (2010), equity is a relatively cheap source 
of funding and can improve MFI sustainability. Nyamsogoro’s study shows that capital structure is 
positively correlated with MFI sustainability. 
There is a significantly negative relationship at the 1% level between the operating expense ratio and 
MFI sustainability (see Table 5.7). This result indicates that the higher the operating expense ratio is, 
the less sustainable an MFI is likely to be. The lower an MFI’s operating expense ratio, the more 
efficient it will be. In short, if the operating expense ratio is low, then the MFI is operating efficiently 
(Nyamsogoro, 2010). Our finding is similar to Nyamsogoro’s (2010), who concludes that the 
operating expense ratio is negatively related to MFI sustainability. Dissanayake (2012) investigated 
factors affecting MFI profitability in Sri Lanka. The author finds that the operating expense ratio has a 
negative, statistically significant correlation with MFIs’ sustainability. Dissanayake states that this 
variable provides an overall measure of MFI efficiency. In short, efficient management practices 
enable MFIs to reach more clients and attain higher profit. 
The yield on gross loan portfolio variable is positive and significant at the 1% level in terms of MFI 
sustainability (see Table 5.7). This result suggests that an increase in yield on gross loan portfolios 
increases MFI sustainability in Thailand. The yield on gross loan portfolio indicates an MFI’s ability to 
use short-term assets to generate cash or financial revenue. In short, if an MFI uses more of its short-
term assets, it can generate higher revenue, which, in turn, increases its sustainability (Woldeyes, 
2012). Woldeyes (2012) states that the yield on gross loan portfolio indicates an MFI’s efficiency in 
generating cash revenue from its outstanding portfolio. Cull et al. (2007) assessed patterns of 
profitability, loan repayments, and cost reduction strategies in 124 micro-banks in 49 countries. The 
authors find that yield on gross loan portfolio is positive and significantly associated with FSS for 
individual-based lenders. Nyamsogoro (2010) evaluated the financial sustainability of MFIs in 
Tanzania and finds that there is a positive relationship between gross loan portfolio yields and FSS. 
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This section investigated the determinants affecting MFI sustainability using the panel regression 
model. The study found six determinants are statistically significant: the number of borrowers per 
staff member, MFI size, the debt to equity ratio, the operating expense ratio, the yield on gross loan 
portfolio, and average loan balance per borrower. 
5.3 Chapter Summary 
This chapter discussed the empirical results of Thai MFI performance and sustainability. The chapter 
compared VF and SGP performance in terms of characteristics, outreach, productivity, financial 
structure, and financial performance. In terms of characteristics, VFs and SGPs have an average age 
of 13.09 and 10.61 years, respectively. It has been argued that both VFs and SGPs could benefit from 
organizational learning, which can improve MFI productivity and efficiency. In terms of breadth of 
outreach and depth of outreach, SGPs have a higher average number of members and borrowers 
than VFs. However, VFs provide more loans to poorer clients than SGPs. The average loan per 
borrower of SGPs is significantly higher than by VFs. In terms of productivity, both MFIs are similar in 
terms of monitoring their borrowers. However, for the loans per staff member ratio, SGPs are 
significantly higher at the 1% level than VFs. This result suggests that, in loan management, SGP staff 
are more efficient than VF staff. In addition, SGPs’ profits are significantly higher than VFs’. 
Considering total assets, SGPs’ assets are significantly higher – twice as much as VFs’. This result 
indicates that SGPs are larger than VFs. The information indicates that SGPs are funded through 
member deposits and have significantly higher liabilities than VFs, approximately 36 times. SGPs’ 
funds come from members’ savings and VFs are subsidized by the government. This finding is shown 
by VFs’ high equity and low liability.  
In terms of financial structure, the VFs’ capital per asset ratio is significantly higher at the 1% level 
than the SGPs’ one. Both the VFs’ and SGPs’ capital per asset ratios are above the Global and FSS 
benchmarks. Therefore, both VFs and SGPs are relatively safe compared with the Global and FSS 
benchmarks. Yenesew (2014) states that if an MFI has a higher capital per asset ratio, it is relatively 
safer than lower ratio institutions. Capital per asset ratio is used to evaluate MFI solvency. This ratio 
shows an MFI’s ability to meet its obligations and absorb unexpected losses (Yenesew, 2014). The 
debt per equity ratio of SGPs is higher than VFs and significantly different. This result indicates that 
SGPs are savings-based organizations. The information shows that SGPs have significantly more 
liabilities than VFs. The VFs’ deposit per loans ratio is lower than the Global and FSS benchmarks and 
the SGPs’ ratio is higher than the benchmarks. This finding indicates that SGPs depend more on 
deposit collection, their primary source of funding; external funding is more costly than deposits. 
Thus, MFIs may effectively use local deposits (Muriu, 2011). The gross loan portfolio per assets ratio 
indicates that both VFs and SGPs’ core earning assets are loans. The gross loan portfolio per assets 
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ratio is one indicator of financial structure. This ratio indicates an MFI’s proportion of core earning 
assets. Gross loan portfolio is the MFI‘s main income source (Mahapatra & Dutta, 2016). MFIs with 
higher loan values have higher interest income. This analysis of VFs’ and SGPs’ financial performance 
indicates that both are profitable and financially sustainable. 
This study has identified the determinants that affect MFI sustainability: average loan balance per 
borrower, borrowers per staff member, size of MFI, debt to equity ratio, the operating expense ratio, 
and yield on gross loan portfolio. The average loan balance per borrower has a positive and 
statistically significant impact on MFIs’ sustainability. The result suggests that larger loans are related 
to higher cost efficiency and, therefore, profit. The results also show a positive relationship between 
borrowers per staff member and MFI sustainability. In short, Thai MFIs staff members are more 
efficient at managing borrowers as the number increases. This leads to MFI sustainability. 
Total assets indicate MFIs’ size. The results indicate that larger MFIs are less likely to lead to 
sustainability. One reason is that Thai MFIs do not experience economies of scale. MFIs have become 
too complex to manage; in short, diseconomies of scale occur when MFIs are too large. MFI staff 
members should pay more attention to strengthening their knowledge (e.g., financial management 
practices, lending strategies, credit appraisal and internal audit processes) (Aditto, 2016). Aditto 
(2016) suggests that MFIs should consider introducing appropriate short training courses for MFI 
staff members.  
The debt to equity ratio assesses the use of commercial funds by MFIs. The results indicate that a 
higher debt to equity ratio is less likely to lead to MFI sustainability. Abdulai and Tewari (2017) 
explain that MFIs that increase their funds using debt are less likely to be sustainable because they 
have high financing costs from the debts. 
The operating expense ratio shows a significant negative relationship with MFI sustainability. The 
operating expense ratio also reflects MFI efficiency. This study indicates that when the operating 
expense ratio is low, an MFI is running efficiently. In short, efficient management practices enable 
Thai MFIs to reach more clients and attain higher profit. 
There is a significant positive relationship between yield on gross loan portfolio and MFI 
sustainability. The results indicate that an increase in yield on gross loan portfolio increases MFIs’ 
sustainability in Thailand. The yield on gross loan portfolio indicates an MFI’s efficiency in generating 
cash revenue from its outstanding portfolio (Woldeyes, 2012). The next chapter summarizes the 




This chapter summarizes the study. Section 6.1 presents a recap of the research objectives, the data 
used and methodology. Section 6.2 summarizes the major findings. Section 6.3 discusses the 
implications of the findings. Finally, section 6.4 discusses the research limitations and provides 
recommendations for future research. 
6.1 Summary 
The primary aim of this study was to identify individuals who participate in Thai microfinance 
programmes and investigate how these programmes impact on participants’ economic and social 
welfare. A secondary aim of the study was to evaluate Thai MFIs’ performance and investigate the 
factors that affect the sustainability of these programmes. This study had four objectives: (1) to 
explore the determinants of households’ credit participation in Thailand; (2) to investigate the impact 
of microfinance programmes on the economic and social welfare of Thai households; (3) to evaluate 
the VF and SGP performance; and (4) to investigate the determinants that affect MFI sustainability. 
Chapter 1 provided background information about Thai MFIs and outlined the differences between 
VFs and SGPs. Chapter 2 reviewed the literature on microfinance participation, the impact of 
microfinance programmes on the economic and social welfare of Thai households, MFI performance 
and sustainability. The literature review on microfinance for both theoretical and empirical models 
suggested that asymmetric information plays an important role in credit participation. The 
asymmetric information problem explains how the credit market works. The literature on the credit 
market argues that asymmetric information flows lead to adverse selection and moral hazard 
problems. Both problems lead to credit rationing. Credit rationing gives rise to credit constraints 
regardless of an individual’s repayment ability. The demand for credit is used to explain households’ 
behaviours by assuming that households maximize their utility level. The demand for credit plays an 
important role in understanding households’ participation in the credit market. 
Based on the literature review, microfinance impacts can be divided in two: the impact on economic 
welfare and on social welfare (Coleman, 2006). In terms of the economic welfare impact of 
microfinance, two common indicators are used: income and consumption (Hume, 2000). Under 
social welfare we included education and healthcare. The literature review concludes that there are 
problems with selection bias when evaluating microfinance impacts. Many studies use more than 
one method to overcome selection bias. This study used PSM and the fixed effect model to evaluate 
the impact of microfinance programmes.  
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There are three ways to assess MFIs’ performance and sustainability: outreach, welfare impact and 
financial self-sustainability. This study focused solely on financial self-sustainability because financial 
self-sustainability covers the cost of funds and other forms of subsidies. Previous studies have used 
MFI characteristics, financial structure and financial performance to evaluate MFI performance. MFI 
characteristics include: age, total assets, total liability, total equity, the number of members, the 
number of borrowers, average loan balance per borrower, personnel, borrowers per staff member, 
loans per staff member, and profit. For financial structure, five criteria are identified in the literature: 
capital per asset ratio, debt per equity, deposit per loan, and gross loan portfolio per assets. For 
financial performance, this study used three criteria: ROA, ROE, and operational self-sufficiency, 
because financial performance covers these three ratios. In terms of MFI sustainability, the literature 
review showed that two indicators are commonly used to evaluate MFIs sustainability: operational 
self-sustainability and financial self-sustainability. This study focused on only financial self-
sustainability because it covers the cost of funds and other forms of subsidies beside operational self-
sustainability.  
This study investigated the determinants that affect the financial self-sustainability of MFIs in 
Thailand using a panel regression model and panel data. The panel regression model was used 
because of its advantages over cross-section and time-series data methods (Kinde, 2012). Panel data 
involve the pooling of observations on a cross-section of units over several time periods. This can 
increase the degrees of freedom and, therefore, the power of the test (Kinde, 2012). 
Chapter 3 discussed relevant issues in the microfinance literature (the theory of credit rationing, 
household credit demand, MFI sustainability and performance) to establish the empirical models for 
research objectives 1, 2, 3 and 4 discussed in Chapter 2. The theory of credit rationing explains how 
imperfect information creates the problem of credit rationing in the credit market. This problem 
leads to credit constraints. Given credit constraints, the demand for credit can be derived using the 
standard Ramsey Growth Model. This model shows how loans can improve individual or household 
utility through production and consumption and increase an individual’s/household’s welfare. 
Following the theory of credit rationing, household credit demand, MFI sustainability and 
performance, different empirical models to address different research objectives were discussed. 
First, this study investigated the determinants affecting a household’s decision to participate in VF, 
SGP, both VF and SGP, or not participate. Our study used the multinomial logit model to determine 
household characteristics that affect microfinance participation. Next, we used PSM and fixed effect 
models to evaluate the impact of microfinance programmes on borrowers’ social and economic 
welfare. These models were chosen to obtain unbiased and consistent estimators. Chapter 3 also 
discussed MFI financial performance and sustainability. This chapter compared VF and SGP 
performance in terms of MFI characteristics, financial structure and financial performance. This study 
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used these parameters because they are comprehensive and are globally accepted indicators of 
financial performance for MFIs (Agarwal & Sinha, 2010). In terms of MFI sustainability, this study 
used the panel regression technique, which involved pooling observation units in cross-sectional data 
over several time periods to investigate the determinants that affect MFI sustainability. 
Chapter 4 investigated microfinance participation and microfinance impact. It is important to 
understand the determinants of households’ credit participation and the impact of microfinance 
programmes because these results are crucial towards developing effective microfinance products 
and services that can help reduce poverty (Cintina & Love, 2014; Hermes & Meesters, 2011). Chapter 
5 evaluated MFI performance and sustainability. This chapter determined how well MFIs are doing 
financially and how to improve the institutions’ future performance. This study used different 
techniques to analyse the data. First, a multinomial logit model was used to investigate the 
determinants affecting household participation in microfinance programmes. PSM and fixed effect 
models were chosen because they can overcome observed and unobserved biases. Having controlled 
for bias using observed covariates, PSM was applied to estimate the impact of microfinance 
programmes on households using cross-sectional data. The fixed effect model with PSM was applied 
on the panel data set to control both observed and unobserved biases in the impact estimators of 
microfinance programmes. Before the fixed-effect model was estimated, PSM was applied to remove 
any possible biases. The objective of PSM is to eradicate observed heterogeneity in the initial period, 
before using the fixed effect model (Heckman et al., 1997). For MFI performance, this study analysed 
and compared both VF and SGP performance using all 11 characteristics identified in the literature, 
financial structure and financial performance. This study used descriptive statistics to assess VFs’ and 
SGPs’ performance. Finally, a panel regression model was used to identify determinants of MFI 
financial self-sustainability. The study’s findings are summarized in the next section. 
6.2 Major Findings 
In the analysis of microfinance participation, VFs serve low-income households in rural areas. 
However, VFs do not reach the poor. Households with higher dependency ratios are less likely to 
borrow from VFs. This finding suggests that VFs cannot help households that are less economically 
active. Most VF borrowers can access other loan sources when they need to obtain emergency loans. 
This indicates that the VF programme is only one source of credit for individuals in rural areas. The 
programme also provides loans to elderly and low-educated household heads. VFs target women. 
Larger households are more likely to access VFs. VFs also grant loans to formal and informal workers. 
In contrast, SGPs grant loans to well-educated, young household heads in regional areas. SGP 
borrowers have higher household incomes than VF ones. These borrowers can also access other 
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loans. This shows that SGP borrowers can access other forms of credit. Larger households are more 
likely to participate in SGPs. SGP borrowers are more likely to be entrepreneurs than farmers. 
VF and SGP borrowers are low-educated and female household heads in rural areas. These 
borrowers can access other loans when they have an emergency. Larger households and households 
that own their own motorcycles have a higher probability of borrowing from both programmes. Both 
VF and SGP borrowers are employed in a range of jobs: farmers, entrepreneurs and in both formal 
and informal occupations. 
Our findings indicate that VFs and SGPs are credit sources in the rural credit market; these sources 
help rural households access credit to meet their needs (Yostrakul, 2018). In addition, rural Thai 
households borrow from many sources so that they can rotate their loan repayments. Low-income 
households refinance their loans by borrowing from different sources. This practice enables them to 
maintain good credit ratings (Hickson et al., 2013). 
This study used PSM models to estimate the welfare impact of VF and SGP participation on income 
and expenditure. VFs impact income, educational, and transport expenditure, but not food, housing 
and medical expenditure. VFs have a negative impact on income, educational, and transport 
expenditure. Our findings are similar to previous studies (e.g., Chandoevwit & Ashakul, 2008). One 
reason is that VF loans are not large enough to enhance income, educational, and transport 
expenditure (Chandoevwit & Ashakul, 2008). This study finds that SGPs’ effects are significant in 
increasing income but not significant in terms of housing, food, medicine, educational, and transport 
expenditure. This indicates that SGP borrowers effectively invest their loans in income-generating 
activities, such as agricultural production and self-employment. This suggests that SGPs achieve their 
objective of supporting borrowers to invest in economic activities (Luxchaigul, 2014). 
PSM is an effective method to control bias because of observed determinants in impact evaluation. 
However, PSM cannot control for unobserved characteristics. Panel data can control for unobserved 
bias. This study used the fixed effect model with PSM to evaluate the impact of VFs and SGPs on 
household income and housing, food, medicine, educational, and transport expenditure. The results 
show that the VF impacts only on educational expenditure; i.e., borrowers spend more money on 
their children’s education. Rural Thai households, especially farmers, do not have much surplus 
money. To pay bills, like children’s school fees, they often need to borrow money. However, VF loans 
are short-term (only a year), which means that increased educational expenditure does not reduce a 
household’s poverty. If education were truly free, households would be able to spend the loans on 
income generating activities (Fongthong, 2013).  
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The fixed effect model with PSM results show SGPs’ impact on income and transport expenditure. 
This indicates that SGP borrowers invest their loans on working capital and assets that enable them 
to earn more money. SGP loans also affect transport expenditure. Cars and motorcycles are 
necessary production inputs (Kaboski & Townsend, 2012). Rural households use these vehicles to 
transport products from remote areas to their shops (Awan & Juiya, 2015). This suggests that a 
common purpose of household borrowing is transport expenses, related to work investment (Awan 
& Juiya, 2015; Karlan & Zinman, 2010). Households need access to convenient transport to complete 
their activities, e.g., going to school, getting to work, meeting friends, and buying items at the market 
(Fongthong, 2013). High household transport costs may imply that a household has a lot of activities 
to accomplish. 
To meet the third objective (examine MFI performance), this study compared VFs and SGPs in terms 
of age, total assets, total liability, total equity, the number of members, the number of borrowers, 
average loan balance per borrower, personnel, borrowers per staff member, loans per staff member, 
and profit), financial structure, and financial performance. We find that both VFs and SGPs could 
benefit from organizing learning because VFs and SGPs have been operating for an average of 13.09 
and 10.61 years, respectively. Organizational learning is a process within a specific organization that 
involves the interaction of multiple levels of analysis (individual, group, organizational and inter-
organizational). Productivity and efficiency improvement can be achieved via organizational learning 
(Kar, 2012). SGPs are bigger than VFs in terms of the average number of members and borrowers. 
However, VFs provide more loans than SGPs to poorer clients. In loan management, SGP staff are 
more efficient than VF staff. SGPs’ profits are significantly higher than VFs’ profits.  
In financial structure, SGPs’ assets are significantly higher – twice as much as VFs’. SGPs also have 
significantly higher liabilities than VFs, approximately 36 times. One reason why SGPs have higher 
liabilities than VFs is that SGPs are funded through member deposits. In contrast, VFs receive 
government subsidies. This can be seen by VFs’ high equity and low liability. The VFs’ capital per 
asset ratio is significantly higher than SGPs’. Both the VF and SGP capital per asset ratios are above 
the Global and FSS benchmarks. The capital per asset ratio is used to evaluate MFI solvency. This 
ratio also shows an MFI’s ability to meet its obligations and absorb unexpected losses (Yenesew, 
2014). If an MFI has a higher capital per asset ratio, it is safer than a lower ratio institution. The 
finding indicates that both VFs and SGPs are safe compared with the Global and FSS benchmarks. In 
short, both VFs and SGPs can meet their obligations and absorb unexpected losses. The SGP debt per 
equity ratio is significantly higher than the VF one. This indicates that SGPs are savings-based 
organizations. We also found that the SGP deposits per loans ratio is higher than the Global and FSS 
benchmarks, but VFs one is lower than the benchmarks. This suggests that SGPs depend more on 
depositor funds, their primary source of funding. External funding is more costly than deposits. Thus, 
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MFIs may effectively use local deposits (Muriu, 2011). The gross loan portfolio per assets ratio 
indicates that both VFs and SGPs have lending as their core earning asset. Our results indicate that 
both VFs and SGPs are profitable and financially sustainable. The determinants that affect Thai MFI 
sustainability are: average loan balance per borrower, borrowers per staff member, total assets, debt 
to equity ratio, the operating expense ratio, and the yield on the gross loan portfolio. 
There is a positive relationship between average loan balance per borrower and MFI sustainability. In 
short, MFIs profitability is associated with greater loan size. This means that larger loans are more 
cost efficient and, therefore, more profitable. The average loan balance per borrower is used as a 
proxy measure for depth of outreach (Adongo & Stork, 2005; Cull et al., 2007; Nyamsogoro, 2010). 
Smaller loans indicate poorer borrowers (Adongo & Stork, 2005; Cull et al., 2007; Nyamsogoro, 
2010). The results indicate that Thai MFIs do not lend money to the very poor. The findings also 
indicate that the number of borrowers per staff member is a significant positive factor affecting MFI 
sustainability. The greater the number of clients an MFI serves, the more efficient it is. This result 
indicates that Thai MFIs’ staff are more efficient at managing borrowers when their number 
increases. This leads to greater MFI sustainability. MFIs have a simple committee structure, with a 
chairperson, a vice-chair, a treasurer, secretary, and several members (Boonperm et al., 2013; 
Meagher, 2013). Village residents vote for individual management committee members. This process 
shows that village residents and management committee members know each other well (Meagher, 
2013). 
For financial structure, the results show a significant negative relationship at the 1% level between 
total assets and MFI sustainability. This suggests that larger total assets decrease MFI sustainability. 
Our result implies that large MFIs do not benefit from economies of scale. Diseconomies of scale 
might occur because of the existence of a bureaucratic bottleneck and inefficient asset management 
(Yenesew, 2014). Diseconomies of scale lead to increased unit costs because MFIs get too large or 
expand too quickly (Ngo, 2012). The results also show that the debt to equity ratio is significantly 
negative at the 5% level. This result implies that a higher debt to equity ratio is less likely to lead to 
MFI sustainability. This means that if MFIs are more debt-financed (compared with other sources of 
finance), they are less sustainable. This result implies that a combination of capital sources does not 
improve an MFI’s FSS. 
The results show that there is a significant negative relationship at the 5% level between the 
operating expense ratio and MFI sustainability. A higher operating expense ratio is associated with 
decreased MFI sustainability. The lower an MFI’s operating expense ratio, the more efficient it is. In 
short, if the operating expense ratio is low, it is operating efficiently (Nyamsogoro, 2010). 
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The yield on gross loan portfolio variable is positive and significant at the 1% level in terms of MFI 
sustainability,. This result suggests that an increase in yield on gross loan portfolio increases MFI 
sustainability. This indicates that Thai MFIs are efficient in generating cash revenue from their 
outstanding portfolios. 
6.3 Implications of the Study 
The results of our study have several important implications for academics and policymakers, 
particularly those working in the area of microfinance. 
6.3.1 Academic Implications 
Given the existence of asymmetric information, MFI financial service provisions are not optimal 
solutions. To make the microfinance market work more effectively, the government and village 
leaders who manage and/or oversee microfinance programmes should focus on solutions to reduce 
asymmetric information problems and associated costs (Hao, 2005). For MFIs, financial innovations 
are essential to solve asymmetric information problems. Innovation in financial technologies include 
group lending, credit rating and credit scoring agencies (Hao, 2005). Group lending is the practice of 
individuals coming together to obtain loans (Armendariz de Aghion & Morduch, 2005). This form of 
borrowing reduces MFI transaction costs. Credit rating and credit scoring agencies help increase 
information and reduce the costs related to the provision of financial services (Hao, 2005). MFIs work 
with these agencies in partnership with social and informational intermediaries (Hao, 2005). The 
government should enhance the development of financial infrastructure and information 
intermediation. 
To achieve MFI sustainability, MFIs should make sure their social and financial goals are adequately 
balanced. We propose that MFIs use a mixed approach. We recommend that MFIs follow profit 
maximization principles and that the government and donors support this approach in two ways. 
First, they should create a robust financial infrastructure. This will require the participation of 
information intermediaries to assist MFIs to reduce their costs, e.g., credit rating, credit bureaus or 
credit scoring agencies. Secondly, the government should provide social intermediaries for the poor, 
e.g., they should offer education, job creation, physical infrastructure, and business skills to the poor 
to enable them to access to financial institutions (Hao, 2005). These services would help the poor to 
participate in financial services (Hao, 2005). 
6.3.2 Policy Implications 
Our results show a positive relationship between VFs and educational expenditure. In short, VFs help 
rural households obtain loans to invest in their children’s schooling. Investment in education is 
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important because it helps to break the vicious poverty cycle. This study also found that SGPs impact 
income and transport expenditure. These findings indicate that SGP loans can improve rural 
livelihoods and support poverty reduction. 
Our results show that the VF targets certain individuals, that is, low-income rural households, those 
with older or female household heads and/or those households with lower levels of education. 
Households who are well-educated and those households who have young household heads in 
regional areas are more likely to borrow money from SGPs. SGP borrowers have higher household 
incomes than VF borrowers. This result shows that both VFs and SGPs do not encourage the 
extremely poor to participate in MFI schemes. 
For low-income households, improving microfinance participation can start from the households 
themselves; households should participate in credit groups and improve their work-skills and 
education. Education can be used to raise collateral-free borrowers’ creditworthiness, and work skills 
can guarantee that borrowers will repay their loans (Phan, 2012). However, MFIs do not benefit from 
including the very poor because poor people need pre–support, such as special aids and community 
support, to overcome internal rationing. Internal credit rationing is associated with the demand for 
credit. Internal credit rationing refers to a borrower’s acts of self-rationing (asking for the smallest 
possible loan). Extremely poor people often suffer from illness and/or a lack of skills or education. As 
MFIs are designed to lend money for income generating activities, the very poor are unlikely to be 
granted loans. Thus, microfinance programmes will not be an effective solution for this group of 
people; the extremely poor require both welfare and microfinance programmes (Phan, 2012). 
Microfinance programme participation would therefore be the next step after the very poor receive 
pre-support and provide evidence of their ability to work. Thai MFIs can use the Central Public 
Database from the Revenue Department, the Ministry of Finance, to identify poor people. The 
database is a personal income database that facilitates more effective targeting of low-income 
earners (NESDB, 2017). This database can identify the extremely poor who receive government 
benefits such as financial assistance, free public transport and food coupons. This strategy will help 
microfinance programmes reach the real poor who really need loans to improve their livelihoods. 
Our findings indicate that VFs and SGPs are major credit sources in Thailand rural credit market. 
These sources enable rural households to access credit to meet their needs. Rural Thai households 
borrow from many sources so that they can rotate their loan repayments. Low-income households 
refinance their loans by borrowing from different sources. This practice means that Thai households 
have multiple sources of debt leading to high levels of debts. The government should provide training 
courses on financial management and financial literacy to households who are struggling with 
financial issues or owe money to multiple lenders. The government should target households which 
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are most likely to have poor financial health. They should develop campaigns around financial health 
and encourage the target group to engage in budgeting practices (Chotewattanakul, 2019). This 
activity will help such households to better manage their cash flow and create savings plans. By 
putting money aside, households are better able to deal with future income shocks 
(Chotewattanakul, 2019).  
In terms of sustainability, our study finds that staff member productivity and operating expense are 
the determinants affecting MFIs’ sustainability. Our study suggests that MFIs should embrace 
technology to minimize their transaction costs. MFIs can use management information software and 
other innovative banking technologies; e.g., internet banking, mobile phone banking, smart card 
operation, and credit scoring. These tools can decrease administrative costs, increase staff 
productivity and improve financial accounts’ reliability (Muriu, 2011). MFI staff should learn to use 
modern technology. In the first stage, the CDD and GSB should select MFIs that can afford advanced 
technology. GSB and BAAC should train MFI staff in how to use the new technologies. In addition, 
MFIs should be aware of the possibility of data breaches (or the privacy of MFI clients), when using 
new technologies; e.g., mobile banking and branchless micro-banking (Muriu, 2011). Therefore, MFIs 
should identify best practice and the most cost-effective ways of using new technology. New 
technology can improve MFI profitability in an increasingly competitive microfinance sector (Muriu, 
2011). 
The evidence around MFIs’ funding choices calls for the development of appropriate regulatory 
policies that can help MFIs access long-term debt to improve their performance. These policies 
should include laws that help MFIs access the capital market. In addition, MFIs should mobilize 
deposits to lower operation costs. Deposits provide MFIs with an inexpensive, sustainable source of 
funds for lending, assuming the deposit programme is cost-efficient. However, MFIs need to have a 
license to accept public deposits which means they would need to comply with certain regulations. A 
larger ratio of loans to total assets translates into more interest revenue and, therefore, greater 
profitability (Muriu, 2011). 
6.4 Limitations and Future Research 
This current study has several limitations. Some of these limitations provide the basis for 
recommendations for future research. 
The current study investigated only the impact of semi-formal microfinance programmes in Thailand. 
Our methodologies should be applied to other sources of credit, e.g., those offered through the 
BAAC and informal credit such as Sajja Saving Groups and Village banks. The results indicate that Thai 
households can access many sources of credit. Households with multiple sources of credit have high 
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debt levels. As Thai households often borrow from formal credit sources to pay other (informal) 
debts, this can become a vicious cycle. However, high debt levels or multiple sources of credit are not 
always an indication of financial distress; many microcredit programmes have a credit limit so 
households may borrow from multiple credit sources to have enough capital to invest in income 
generation activities. Therefore, future study should investigate if multiple sources of credit can 
improve household income and expenditure or whether this simply perpetuates the poverty cycle.  
Future research could examine the dynamic impact of microfinance programmes. A microfinance 
impact study that takes in to account the effect of past credit and the length of microfinance 
participation would be helpful because the impact of microfinance programmes is believed to be 
related to previous loans and the length of microfinance participation. It is important to understand 
the dynamics of microfinance expansion and its impact on household welfare (Khandker & Samad, 
2014). The dynamic impact of microfinance programmes can accurately confirm the programme 
effect beyond the participation period. Confirmation of the dynamic impact of microfinance 
programmes provides further of evidence whether the programme impacts accrue beyond the 
participation period (Khandker & Samad, 2014; Phan, 2012).  
This study shows that community leaders and staff in rural areas are vital to MFIs’ operations. There 
is little/no research on the impact of community leaders and staff on MFI sustainability. In addition, 
social capital roles (defined as social networks, norms, and trustworthiness) in the community play 
an important role in enhancing MFI performance. Future research should examine the effect of social 
capital on MFI sustainability. 
The current study used annual MFI reports. These reports lack comparable accounting standards. 
This problem creates limitations for a cross-Thai MFI analysis. Many MFIs do not have the necessary 
knowledge to compile annual reports. This study used annual reports from well-performing MFIs. 
Therefore, the current study found that both VFs and SGPs are profitable and financially sustainable. 
However, we were unable to collect many MFI annual reports because the government does not 
currently have a database that contains this information. If the current study had used a broader 
sample, the results may have been different. 
Operation cost limitations: In Thai MFIs, operation costs do not reflect the real costs. Most Thai MFIs 
do not have major operating costs because their staff members are volunteers, i.e., they do not earn 
wages. VFs are administered at two levels (national and village level) (Meagher, 2013). The national 
level works with volunteers (VF members from each village). These volunteers deal directly with the 
funds. The evidence shows that the minimum value of the operating expense ratio is zero. Future 
research should include all MFI operational costs.  
 146 
There are several questions that this study has not answered. One example is how new financial 
technologies could be installed. Financial technologies may enhance information availability and 
these technologies can decrease administrative costs, increase staff productivity and improve MFIs’ 
profitability (Muriu, 2011). Future research could also explore how social intermediation could be 
developed and how it would contribute to financial intermediation. Future research might also 
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